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ABSTRACT
Regulation of admission to the United States for technology workers from foreign
countries has been a difficult issue, especially during periods of intense development. Following
the dot.com bubble, the Google Corporation continued to argue in favor of higher limits under
the Immigration and Nationality Act exception referred to as “H-1B” for the section of the law
where it appears. H-1B authorized temporary admission for highly skilled labor in specialty
occupations. Congressional testimony by Laszlo Bock, Google Vice President for People
Operations, provided the most succinct statement of Google’s concerns based on maintaining a
competitive and diverse workforce. Diversity has been a rhetorical priority for Google, yet
diversity did not affect the argument in a substantial and realistic way. Likewise, emphasis on
geographically situated competitive capability suggests a limited commitment to the global
communities invoked by information technology.
The history of American industry produced corporations determined to control and
exploit every detail of their affairs. In the process, industrial corporations used immigration as a
labor resource. Google portrayed itself, and Google has been portrayed by media from the
outside, as representative of new information technology culture, an information community of
diverse, inclusive, and democratically transparent technology in the sense of universal
availability and benefit with a deliberate concern for avoiding evil. However, emphasis by
Google on American supremacy combined with a kind of half-hearted rhetorical advocacy for
principles of diversity suggest an inconsistent approach to the argument about H-1B. The Google
argument for manageable resources connected to corporate priorities of Industrial Modernity, a
habit of control, more than to democratic communities of technology.
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In this outcome, there are concerns for information technology and the Industry of
Knowledge Work. By considering the treatment of immigration as a sign of management
attitude, I look at questions posed by Jean Baudrillard, Daniel Headrick, Alan Liu, and others
about whether information technology as an industry and as communities of common interests
has achieved any democratically universal “ethical progress” beyond the preceding system of
industrial commerce that demands the absolute power to exploit resources, including human
resources. Does Google’s performance confirm skeptical questions, or did Google actually
achieve something more socially responsible? In the rhetoric of immigration history and the
rhetoric of Google as technology, this study finds connections to a recycled corporatemanagement version of Industrial Modernity that constrains the diffusion of technology.
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Anything worth doing depends on more than a formal program, so I dedicate the results
here to my tribal village of provocateurs. By a combination of encouragement, prodding,
affection, and timely intervention, the adorable Christine Patten overcame numerous crisis
points. In spite of their own demanding responsibilities, Steven, Erik Christopher, and Thomas
Patten never failed to make progress an expectation. “How’s the dissertation going, Dad?” I
always insisted on the title of “Dad” as a distinction equal to academic, financial, or political
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1: Connecting with Jules Verne and his Nautilus: Machine Age as “Logo” by Google
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
Introduction and Overview
In 2004, the United States Congress extended comprehensive review of immigration law
and policy to determine appropriate admission levels and adjustments to existing restrictions.
The review followed reduction of the limit for admission of “highly skilled” temporary workers
from foreign countries under exception H-1B of immigration regulations consolidated in 1952
and comprehensively revised in 1990. In Congressional hearings, the Google Corporation argued
to increase the limit for admission of highly skilled foreign workers under the H-1B exception
("Google Testifies"). Google’s argument for diversity in an exclusive workforce suggested some
contradictions. Was the diversity that Google argued really the concern, something more than
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Alan Liu’s skeptical diversity in corporate “monoculture” (67)? Does the treatment of diversity
by an information technology enterprise say something about the development of information
technology as well?
Google became a premier example of information technology success, but the idea of
tension between socially responsible business ethics and a kind of egotistical determination to
compete has been noticed before. Steven Levy, for instance, in his evaluation of Google culture
speculated about Google’s prominent concern with recognition for producing important results
as much as satisfaction with the results, and even, in the case of Larry Page after the death of his
father, a kind of defensive need for assurance that results and accomplishments could be secured
and protected. In spite of idealism and the original “don’t’ be evil” principles, Google wanted
acknowledgment measured in dollars and never does anything without expectations of benefit for
Google. Aside from the practical effects of finance and psychology, however, there is a more
comprehensive explanation for the contradictions in Google’s H-1B argument. Google argued,
not just as a competitive business, but more significantly as an extension of Industrial Modernity,
a machine-age influence like the brass portholes in the Google “Logo” for Jules Verne’s birthday
illustrated in Figure 1 above. This is about how that is true, and why it matters.
Exception H-1B to the Immigration Act of 1990 allows admission to America for highly
skilled workers from foreign countries for three years with a possible three-year extension.
During the dot.com era from 1995 to the tech stock collapse in 2001-2002, H-1B represented a
potential source of additional IT expertise for prominent knowledge work enterprise, such as
Google and Microsoft. Opponents claimed that the H-1B exception to immigration limits
deprived Americans of jobs, encouraged exploitation of workers from foreign countries, and
deprived challenged communities of critical talent. Concern among Congressional legislators

2

about the effects of the program produced a proposal to let a temporary increase lapse, resulting
in extensive discussion of advantages and disadvantages both before and after, particularly
during the period from 2004 to 2007.
For Google, higher H-1B limits made sense, not just as a source of expert personnel, but
also as a way to emphasize diversity in a global information technology enterprise. The rhetoric
and marketing that promoted information products and explained corporate identity for Google
also emphasized a diverse and inclusive culture. Bringing workers from foreign countries
intuitively suggests a degree of concern for a diverse and inclusive workforce. Foreign origin
alone does not ensure comprehensive diversity and inclusion, however, and there are other
ambiguous aspects of the argument about H-1B limits involving Google. In fact, diversity
represented more of a rhetorical than a substantive concern. Instead, H-1B served Google as
labor management rather than assurance of diversity and inclusion. Was advocacy for increased
H-1B limits simply a pragmatic response to competition and the politics of economics, or
something more complex? In reality, the argument by Google for admission of foreign workers
depends on connections to Industrial Modernity and the history of immigration adapted to
management of labor, rather than on global diversity and inclusion. Google performed as an
industrial corporation instead of as a representative for socially responsible technology that it
seemed to represent rhetorically. There is no inherent moral requirement that an information
technology enterprise such as Google should conform to any demands for social responsibility.
Yet if we are not aware of the ideology that we support through interaction with information
services, and the Industry of Knowledge Work does not respond to social concerns, then perhaps
consumers are merely commodities to be exploited for another kind of industrial development in
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the way of commodification and the “culture machine” suggested by Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer.
Examining the inconsistencies and the relationship to Industrial Modernity depends on
analysis of Google’s rhetorical identity and argument related to the legislative limit for H-1B.
The results suggest that Google behaved as an industrial organization in the sense of concern for
employees and customers based on an expectation of supremacy. To claim Google resembles a
corporation of Industrial Modernity does not mean Google somehow failed compared to other
information technology business, but our faith may be misplaced if we expect information
technology to promote social responsibility where the leading corporations have priorities and
expectations similar to machine-age capitalist aristocracy that treated people as resources of
production.
I follow the analytical framework suggested by Craig Lee Engstrom for analysis of
organizational rhetoric suitable to “conduct research in any specifiable organizational field”
(260), where “lived experience” inspires concern for the effects of rhetorical discourse in the
context of organizational communities (266). Engstrom uses the example of mythical belief in
the reliability of scientific forensic information for criminal investigations. He argues that this
exaggerated belief in scientific infallibility has been encouraged by popular media. Belief in the
supremacy of science connects to Auguste Comte’s positivist confidence in the solution of
problems with the right information and to the technological success of the industrial revolutions
through science and technology. Connections to machine-age Industrial Modernity through
science and information that are considered in Engstrom’s analysis make this approach ideal for
application to relationships with Industrial Modernity, information technology, and social
responsibility, because science also produced information technology.
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Engstrom suggests a four-part, reflexive analysis. The first part identifies a rhetorical
problem in an information community, what has more traditionally been considered as the
essential focus of a “rhetorical situation”. The second part is selection of events and artifacts for
examination. The third part identifies myths associated with the events and artifacts. The fourth
and final part connects myth to trends in the rhetorical context of the community. The parts of
the analysis are not strictly exclusive or sequential. Either the myth of scientific infallibility or
the artifacts of legal procedure, for instance, could be entry points to the rhetorical situation.
For Google, labor, and immigration, the rhetorical situation is the discussion of legislative limits
for admission of foreign workers with information technology expertise under immigration
regulation exception H-1B in the course of the new millennium’s first decade, especially the
period from 2004-2007, but also both preceding this period and following the legislative
determination. The discussion of H-1B limits took place in terms of argument for reduction of
the limit as opposed to Google’s advocacy for increasing the limit. The result of argument for
and against reduction of the limit is not as urgent for this discussion as the rhetoric and
perspectives of Google. However, a general review of the argument for and against has also been
included to explain the nature of the information and the attitudes involved in an argument
characterized by conflicting interests and lack of information.
The artifacts chosen for examination include a variety of electronic documents from
Google web pages, media commentary, legislative discussion, and American immigration
regulations. Whether a development such as enactment of immigration restrictions qualifies as a
legislative artifact in terms of recorded information or as an event in terms of the situation,
however, is less important than the effects of rhetoric and context. Background to the rhetorical
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discussion also includes the history of immigration in America as commercial enterprise and as a
response to “constriction” of space both symbolically and pragmatically.
Essentially, rhetorical analysis of Google and the H-1B argument depends on two myths,
the social myth of democratic technology and the myth of the Immigrant Nation. For Thomas
Friedman, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, technology is democratic if it is universally
available and useful, but information technology has not yet lived up to the promises of universal
inclusion and empowerment envisioned. The tension existing between industrial heritage and a
potentially global social consciousness invokes opportunities to exploit consumers under the
guise of socially responsible information communities. Google implies democratic availability in
ways that are actually exclusive and potentially misleading.
The second myth involves popular belief in a heritage of approval and encouragement for
immigration produced as much or more by iconic images and events than by a consistent reality,
but the myth of the Immigrant Nation complicates immigration management that was
traditionally controlled by commercial interests and industrial corporations. The flows of
immigration that respond to global economic conditions more realistically depend on the effects
of commerce than on heroic principles of freedom and opportunity. The myths of democratic
technology and the Immigrant Nation also complicate Google’s H-1B argument through the
hegemonic and commercially reductive impulses of Industrial Modernity. The motives to
maintain supremacy and exclusion inherited from corporations of Industrial Modernity are not
necessarily motives that promise a socially responsible Industry of Knowledge Work represented
by Google.
As the first step of the analysis, Chapter One introduces and examines the significance of
the rhetorical situation, the immigration argument, in a wider context of social responsibility and
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relationship to the myth of democratic technology. The myth of democratic technology connects
to perceptions of social responsibility for technology enthusiasts such as Friedman. Democratic
technology would solve the problem of economic exclusion by providing equal opportunity. If
communities and peoples of the globe had practical, democratically equal access to the resources
represented by information technology, then Francis Fukuyama’s universal resolution of
conflicts and Friedman’s hope for economic opportunities would be combined in the realization
of Hardt and Negri’s democratic empire of the masses. Democratic technology encourages
universal access and benefit. Democratic technology in the sense of availability and benefit
would mean social inclusion and economic opportunity for users. Chapter Two accounts for the
myth of the Immigrant Nation in the context of history, especially the significance of events that
produced traditional attitudes toward immigration up to approval of the first Exclusion Acts in
1882. Chapter Three examines the intersection of the Immigrant Nation with immigration control
and extends the effect to the H-1B discussion with legal and legislative artifacts. Chapter Four
considers rhetorical artifacts representing Google as information technology connected to
Industrial Modernity. Chapter Five explains the consequences and potential effects of the
connections to Industrial Modernity and concludes with suggestions for further research.
The Rhetorical Situation
The Rhetorical Situation: Immigration, Technology, and Social Responsibility
Immigration may not be the first concern that springs to mind with regard to a
phenomenal information enterprise like Google as a search engine, but immigration, at least in
the sense of foreign origin, became a pivotal point for Google’s expansion. In the dot.com era
Google tried to use immigration in the sense of the H-1B exception to manage “People
Operations” as Google’s replacement terminology for the ironic yet ubiquitous and enduring
“human resources” of Industrial Modernity. Did Google’s “don’t be evil” expression of
7

corporate identity and concern for social responsibility represent original thinking in the
revolution of information technology, or was it a rhetorical adaptation of something more limited
and conventional? According to Steven Levy, Google later came to modify and even regret the
sentiment of avoiding evil because of the hopeless subjectivity involved with the concept of evil.
Did that mean Google had changed corporate priorities? Did Google become something else, or
had it always been something else? As management of labor, immigration connects Google to
the economic exclusiveness of Industrial Modernity, suggesting the transfer to knowledge work
of a mentality that could limit the benefits of technology and even discourage innovation, what
Bill Gates argues to be fundamental challenges for America. At the same time, immigration as
opportunity in competition with the management of labor for commercial enterprise suggests
questions about the social responsibility of information technology and the Industry of
Knowledge Work. Is there any social responsibility?
While Thomas Friedman, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri were predicting that
information technology would democratically “flatten” the world and empower a new empire of
the masses, Google went about assembling an elite staff of technology experts and quickly
expanded from search engine service to comprehensive commercial information exploitation,
such as Google Earth and Google Books, attempting to electronically record the content of every
book ever written. In the dot.com aftermath, the demographics changed for the Industry of
Knowledge Work, but Google continued to expand and anticipate increasing demands.
Central to expansion has been the integration of consumers into a reflexive community of
production and use reminiscent of the “culture machine” proposed by Max Adorno and Theodor
Horkheimer that involves exactly such a cycle. The logical extremes of the culture machine
appear as a delusional existence for human beings in the speculative science fiction of The
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Matrix. Unconsciously assimilated as components in a vast machine, human beings know only a
consciousness provided for them by electronic media. To what extent The Matrix and the culture
machine represent realistic predictions remains speculative, but Thomas Friedman, Andrew
Feenberg, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and others, argue the critical importance of “social
responsibility” and the need to consider social consequences in the global development of
information technology enterprise and the Industry of Knowledge Work, not just as a matter of
humanitarian concern, but also as a matter of enlightened self-interest in the global expansion of
commerce. A world without social responsibility will be an ultimately self-destructive world.
From the standpoint of education, Alan Liu in particular considered the persistence of
Industrial Modernity as a way of thinking about social responsibility for knowledge work and
information technology enterprise. Industrial Modernity treated technology as a tool for the
primary benefit of the industrial elite and managed human beings as a resource of production, the
ideological origin of the term “Human Resources” in the machine age. Liu’s concern is the
ability to recognize and deconstruct the connections as an educational effect, but the educational
effect depends on the same conclusion. Information technology and the industry of knowledge
work have obligations to social responsibility.
For Liu, the management of labor measured the connection to machine-age Industrial
Modernity. The Ford Motor company, as an example, adopted the “scientific” management
principles of Frederick Taylor for development of a comprehensive personnel system as a
resource of production. On a global scale, Arjun Appadurai and Aiwa Ong identify an even
more comprehensive and widely recognized indicator of social responsibility. The indicator is
migration. In the same way that immigration says “a lot about the nation” with regard to social
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responsibility for Robert Chang and Keith Aoki, immigration also says a lot about social
responsibility and expectations for the Industry of Knowledge Work.
More specifically, immigration as management of labor determined the concerns of the
immigration argument that continue to be expressed in policy, law, and discussion. The
pragmatism of policy argument by Google also took into account the formalized regulatory
objectives that have evolved from the heritage of immigration as management of labor. Nor did
the Google argument depend on attempts to reconcile international diversity and inclusion with
labor control. Labor has been a separate issue. Diversity played a rhetorical part in the argument,
but Google relied on an expectation of control in a way that invokes the exclusive thinking
associated with Industrial Modernity. Ultimately, Google wanted limits increased because
Google is Google, and Google controls what Google controls, including information.
Jean Baudrillard and Katherine Hayles suggest that we are information. If that is true,
then we are resources in Google’s corporate objectives of universal information management. As
resources, our part in the enterprise would be less consistent with diversity and inclusion than
with Industrial Modernity’s management of labor.
Over the course of the industrial revolutions, the dominant, technology-based business
corporations learned to think of themselves as the foundation for the nation, the standard for their
own performance, and the only real authority for production management. Industrial
corporations learned to think of decisions about production as their own territory as much as the
resources and equipment, and even the people, consumed in the process. Political and
organizational objections, such as labor disputes, were not just practical issues of production and
profit, or even necessarily legal and moral issues, as much as they were potential challenges to
the mythically endowed authority of industrial management, challenges that had to be, not just
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met, but thoroughly derailed, to make the world safe for supremacy. If that strikes an ironic tone,
it must be taken in the context of global challenges to traditional aristocratic control in the late
1800s.
Management rules because management rules. Management is management, a notion that
was planted with the first commercial seeds of American colonization and developed to maturity
in the labor disputes and immigration regulations of the 1880s. Class and competence are
relevant but not determinative. Management does not rule just because it is a superior class, even
though it may see itself that way. It does not rule even because it is a superior performer,
although it may see itself that way also. It rules because it is management. Otherwise, to the
extent that management represents Baudrillard’s expression of capital, it does not give a damn
about the resources of production beyond the function of resources, the “standing reserve” of
Martin Heidegger, human beings serving the needs of production. Henry Ford’s somewhat
backhanded proof that collaborative processes can be competitive and profitable did not disturb
management perspective. Ford raised the wages of factory workers, but social responsibility was
not especially Ford’s objective. What Ford cared about was management of human resources, the
supremacy of management, and by virtue of supremacy, the habit of control.
On an individual level, perhaps the intuitive effect is similar to the idea of doctors or
lawyers making lifestyle decisions for patients or clients. Superiority and class are not the issues
when the individual objection is simply the question of who are they to decide for us? We are in
the habit of control over some aspects of our existence. Class, qualifications, capabilities, even
good sense, may be disregarded for the sake of the habit. It is not necessarily a rational
expectation, yet it became a way of thinking adopted by Industrial Modernity.
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Google’s advocacy for additional exceptions did not particularly succeed. The limit
reverted from the temporary 115,000 enacted in 2000, back to the previously established limit of
65,000 with an additional allowance of 20,000 for MA degrees obtained by foreign nationals
educated in the United States (INS History). Why Google failed to secure the increase could
have been partly a consequence of economic trends, a downturn that affected both politics and
growth, thereby creating conditions that affected the urgency for increasing the number of
exceptions (Google Archives), but the revealing questions about the industry of knowledge work
are how Google chose to argue the issue and how the argument translated in the public sphere.
For Google, immigration (or at least exceptions to immigration) became a kind of operational
point of friction, what Marshal McLuhan referred to as an “interval” in technology. As a
representation of community with fundamental connections to the industrial production of
Modernity, immigration became a point of operational intersection as a resource of production
for Google.
As a business and technology phenomenon, Google gets a lot of soul-searching
journalistic and academic analytical attention. In the dot.com era of the early 2000s, Google
looked like both the supreme example of information technology innovation and potentially the
realization of global inclusion characterized as a flattened world of universal access and
imminent empire of the masses. In less than ten years from start-up to industry domination, the
combination of resources and community offered by the search-engine enterprise attracted
unprecedented numbers of customers. Google provided, not just access to information through
search engine operations, but also expanded information production by generating communities
of interests and commerce. As Google expanded, it both produced and acquired socially and
functionally innovative projects, such as Orkut and Youtube. These innovative variations gave it
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the look of participation and identity as well as information access. Customers were invited, not
just to use Google products for management of information, but to produce content of their own,
such as comments, photographs, blogs, stored documents, web pages, even custom-programmed
applications that then became part of the information and information management to which
Google provides access. In that sense, customer-users immediately became part of the product
that Google provided, and Google became a comprehensive part of what people are in an
information technology world, in a sense the unification of public and private spheres, a lifeworld of combined work and personal affairs.
The Rhetorical Situation: The Myth of Democratic Technology
What are the effects of this expansive and intimate relationship concerning identity,
information access, and Google? For Max Adorno and Theodor Horkheimer, the circular
assimilation of consumers by the culture machine “commodified” consumers in participatory
connections of information production, including phenomena such as licensing and organizations
with common interests. Commodification reduces consumers to an exploited product of
commerce, a commodity. Commodification also reflects potential for the confusion of identity
resulting from the relationship to the virtual experience of information examined by Sherry
Turkle. The speculative extremes of exploitation exceed even slavery in science-fiction
projections of the future, such as the movies Brazil and The Matrix. Other rhetorical perspectives
also illustrate the integration of consumer with enterprise such as Jonathan Ford’s more recent
emphasis on Google’s concern for explaining the issues of disagreement with the government of
China in terms ideologically consistent with the ”free information” priorities of customers.
Following conflicts over information control, Google withdrew rather than concede. Google used
the conflict to emphasize the unity of enterprise with consumer in spite of potential irony in the
need to protect free information. Protection presumes some kind of intervention, at which point
13

the definition of freedom becomes complicated. Perhaps any degree of freedom necessarily
depends on some kind of corresponding protection, but Google responded to concern for the
Chinese population, whose freedom of speech would be limited and without access to neutral
means of communication, by emphasizing the global nature of the internet, further suggesting
that the transfer of information could be accomplished and defended outside the sovereignty of
the Chinese government (10). For Google, the reach of the Internet represents an alternative kind
of power that exceeds that of government, a power represented by Google.
Google has expressed itself in multiple ways, therefore, as the champion of a consumer
constituency with which it identifies, hardly a new idea. The integration of individuals with
corporate production preceded Matrix fictions and even the culture machine, as the effect of
employment practices represented by Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford in the age of Industrial
Modernity. Charlie Chaplain’s portrayal of an employee as a dysfunctional component of the
tyrannical corporation’s machine technology in Modern Times was more a representation of
existing conditions than a projection of the future. Will the future look back at The Matrix as an
equivalent representation of our relationship with the virtual reality of electronic information?
In the labor practices of Taylor and Ford, however, there is also a more comprehensive
connection to industries of technology in our own era, such as Google. As industrial production
developed, especially in the late 1800s, individual corporations achieved dominance in their
fields of production, exemplified by the Union Pacific Railroad, United States Steel, General
Electric, Standard Oil, and the Ford Motor Company. As they achieved prominence, they
developed expectations of entitlement to power over their own management, a habit of control
that Edward Said considered to be typical of Industrial Modernity’s imperialist impulses. Said’s
colonial imperialism and the associated practices of the industrial revolution tend to constitute a
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characteristic feature of Industrial Modernity. Commentary such as Friedman, and Hardt and
Negri, suggests that information technology has in some sense progressed beyond the industrial
mentality. Others, such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, and Alan Liu, have been
more doubtful about the possibility of achieving a balance of interests, if not doubtful of the
potential, at least skeptical of the results achieved in the age of information technology as
different from Industrial Modernity.
Independent of traditional research and development financing, the dot.com
entrepreneurs of Microsoft, Apple, Google, and other technology initiatives bucked the system
and survived economic turbulence to produce the technology revolution that built Friedman’s
house of technological optimism, a systemic revolution from which Google emerged, if not
supreme, then at least advantageously positioned, according to David Vise. So another way to
express the questions may be, are we really progressing into a flat world of democratic
technology and popular hegemony, or are more conventional forces still in command? According
to analysis by Jean Baudrillard and Alan Liu, whether technology primarily serves the interests
of the many or the few depends a lot on the answer to that fundamental question. Did the
dot.com era produce new attitudes toward corporate performance, information technology, and
the Industry of Knowledge Work, or did Industrial Modernity continue to call the shots?
Immigration also connected to technological exclusiveness. The global reach of
information technology made encounters with immigration a kind of foregone conclusion for
Google. Google founder Sergey Brin was himself an immigrant to an extent, and Google
logically emphasized diversity in employment as the enterprise expanded. When Google got
involved with immigration questions more directly in the dot.com era, the argument made both
overt and implied statements about mentality or ideology and corporate identity. In those
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statements, however, Google revealed ambiguity about commitments to globalized democratic
inclusion and a distinct tendency to reflect an industrial heritage. Those are issues which Lisa
Flores and Anne Demo considered rhetorically in media as continuing effects of Industrial
Modernity. I extend that commentary to the rhetoric of Google’s own immigration interests and
compare it to the more complete rhetorical representation of corporate identity, the possibility of
Google as a kind of agent for Industrial Modernity. Flores and Demo describe the rhetorical
manipulation of immigration for economic and political purposes in which Nietzsche’s
“moveable host of metaphors” comes into play for the representation of immigrants. Appadurai
and Ong explain contemporary immigration developments as a response to global conditions
affected by information technology. Combined with the rhetorical commentary of Flores and
Demo, Appadurai and Ong inform the relationship of immigration to the Industry of Knowledge
Work dictated by the rhetoric and demands of commercial interests. Immigration became an
integral part of the idea that technology could make dreams come true for everybody.
The Rhetorical Situation: Confusing the Tool with the Mission
To some extent this discussion of contemporary knowledge work and information
technology must revisit Auguste Comte and the old positivist idea that science and technology
solve problems with information. Information drove Industrial Modernity where science and
exploration played essential parts. In our own times and in a more subtle and social form,
Thomas Friedman and Francis Fukuyama applied the idea of the information solution to a kind
of giddy technological optimism for universal opportunities in a flat world where major conflicts
have been resolved by the End of History on the threshold of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s
empire of the masses. In this mythic view, Moore's Law of exponentially increasing information
processing capacity irresistibly propels the placation and reconciliation of the globe by
technology.
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My response to the rhetoric of this technological optimism examines the potential for the
principles and practices of Industrial Modernity to influence social concerns for capitalist
purposes through information technology and knowledge work. My objective, however, is not to
indict Google or any other enterprise for crimes of evil as much as to ask whether we can
develop new ways to manage social questions along with new technology if Industrial Modernity
continues to frame our thinking. For Daniel Headrick, for Alan Liu, for Michael Hardt with
Antonio Negri, and for Paul Scheffer, social responsibility regarding technology depends on
universal benefit. Everybody gains advantage from the technology. In that sense, social
responsibility and the technologies of industrial production do not have to be mutually exclusive.
Technology includes multiple benefits, from household convenience to economic development,
but even resolution in the form of Bruno Latour's insistence that social issues are an inherent
concern of technology, does not also mean that the Industry of Knowledge Work automatically
solves social problems or produces a more just society than the machine mentality of Industrial
Modernity. Social responsibility has not been the priority of industrial production, and the
historical effects of other priorities are not so easy to escape. If Jean Baudrillard is correct, the
iterations of capitalism always include imperialist and supremacist tendencies.
As suggested by Andrew Feenberg, solutions to problems from the standpoint of
technology actually do depend on information, but the proliferation of information and the
management of information do not automatically make problems go away any more than the fact
of technology development makes problems go away. Social responsibility requires more than
technological development and more than information management. Social responsibility
requires inclusion. For Baudrillard, Hardt and Negri, Alan Liu, Paul Scheffer, and Stuart Selber,
the production industries of Industrial Modernity were not committed to inclusion. The priorities
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of Industrial Modernity have been problems of production, not problems of social responsibility.
Louis Althusser suggested that management of the working class concerned the capitalist state of
Industrial Modernity more than equity and inclusion. For Althusser, the social services of
education and law serve the interests of capitalist supremacy. Perhaps Althusser’s concern also
represents a variation on the theme of popular opiates, intervention intended to sedate or distract
rather than to encourage and support. The social relationship with Industrial Modernity will also
become more clear in the history of immigration. The question is whether the ideology of
information technology enterprise and the Industry of Knowledge Work that we see before us as
consumers and users represent anything different from the institutions of the industrial
revolutions that reflect the possessive and exclusive self-interest of capitalism. Have the mission
and the tool been confused? As Alan Liu argues, the management of labor, of Human Resources
in the Fordist model served for the industrial equivalent of social responsibility. The corporation
determined social responsibility, much as it had even in early considerations of who would be
responsible for colonial poverty and indigence. Poverty and indigence were not the responsibility
of commerce.
The Rhetorical Situation: A Global Perspective
In the widest sense, the questions apply to whether technology makes the world better for
everybody or continues primarily to privilege the interests of a limited capitalist aristocracy
established through the effects of the industrial revolutions and colonial imperialism. A doctor
uses laser equipment with controls like a video game to repair a detached retina in five minutes, a
procedure that required difficult surgery before technology made alternatives available. The
internet makes banking a simple connection from home. Agricultural technologies vastly
increase the efficiency and yields of food production. A wide variety of entertainment has
become both conveniently available and interactive. All over the world we experience the
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benefits of technology in many forms, inspiring the optimistic predictions of universal
empowerment and the flat world matured beyond the conflicts that constitute conventional
recorded history.
In spite of technological advances, however, even optimists such as Friedman concede
that social and political disparities remain, in some cases intensifying. Literally millions of
children die every year from malnutrition and disease while resolution of political conflicts such
as Syria and Afghanistan drag on with predictable lack of resolution. There are convenient
explanations, including population, ideology, and a variety of conflicting interests, yet the
conditions argued by Friedman and Hardt and Negri really suggest the potential for abundance
assured by technology, enough for all, subject only to artificial obstacles that continually impede
distribution. Perhaps the exploited themselves fail to take responsibility for their own political
and economic conditions, an explanation Gillian Hart attributes to neoliberal theory that will be
more thoroughly examined. Is that an arbitrary chicken-and-egg attribution of blame to the
victims, even as our technical capabilities continue to develop? In conjunction with technology,
is anything changing other than the convenience of devices for the few? How can the conditions
that promote and maintain disparities persist in an enlightened, global, Industry of Knowledge
Work that seems to make all things possible? Does the development of information technology
mean expanded opportunities for everyone? Have we moved beyond the limitations and
privileging of culture in the design and application of technology?
The simple answer is no. In many ways we have not resolved the difficulties, or the
answers at least remain speculative, but the trends can be examined. Taking responsibility means
the application of values, morality, and ideology as much as practical necessity, and choices
must be realistic possibilities. Choices for many parts of the world may not be realistic
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possibilities unless the Industry of Knowledge Work moves beyond a discriminatory, imperialist
heritage of Industrial Modernity, which so far seems less promising. There are different kinds of
evidence for that, some economic, some political. Some of the evidence consists of the subtle but
extensive rhetorical context apparent in knowledge work enterprise as represented by Google.
Google relied on Industrial Modernity to establish technical credibility and to engage
global flow as a human resource management strategy through immigration. Science and
technology made Industrial Modernity possible. Technology as railroads and mining produced
conditions of employment that affected immigration. The heritage of information technology and
knowledge work as an extension of Industrial Modernity rather than as a global network of
inclusion or the Flat World suggests that Google and information technology in some ways
participate only reluctantly in the democratization of opportunities. The world is not politically,
economically, and socially flat, constituted by the resources of information technology. Even
Friedman admits that to an extent. The world is an industrial vortex funneling wealth and
resources into the society of a small but voracious capitalist aristocracy. The rest of us have the
illusion of opportunity to sustain us. Whether encouraging the illusion of opportunity represents
evil is another question, although, perhaps in the sense of Marx, opportunity (or at least the
perception of it) has become another opiate alternative to religion in the company of social
responsibility. As the examination of rhetoric will explain, Google as a reflexive community of
production and use may represent a participatory kind of commodification.
Discriminatory political and social conditions likewise suggest consideration of whether
information and globalization mean new ways of thinking about ourselves and our place in the
world, or whether electronic information and information processing are only more products of
technology in a familiar production system. Like virtue, is information technology its own
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reward? Should we expect more from the industry of knowledge work than the maximization of
profit? Should social responsibility in a global context be an issue, like the environmental
impacts of real estate development or mining on a smaller scale? Should information technology
make the world any more secure and equitable, and if so, at what price? Should anyone be
willing to make any compromises at all for the sake of concern with social justice in the
knowledge work economy expressed by Liu, Scheffer, and Hardt and Negri?
Industrial Modernity, the system that conclusively privileged technology over humanity
in the processes of production, contemplated Other as a resource of the enterprise, the heritage of
imperialism collectively described by Edward Said as an appropriation, Martin Heidigger as
subjugation, and Marshall McLuhan as dependence. The demands of the capitalist enterprise that
developed Industrial Modernity are also intimately related to issues of control, perhaps as class
conflict, but even more fundamentally as the simple fact of supremacy, quite aside from even the
imperialist impulse for acquisition, a habit of control, the expectation that supremacy means
absolute self-determination.
Response to social concerns on a global scale ranges from military intervention to
religious charity. In between, the self-styled economic empowerment of neoliberal capitalist
democracy and the hands-on targeting of specific problems by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as Oxfam represent less strictly partisan alternatives where economics are
concerned, and certainly less potentially destructive alternatives with respect to military
extremes. The global extent of intervention, however, neither guarantees success nor
predetermines failure. The only assurance has been the complexity of the problems, and the
potential for culturally-charged confrontations.
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The Rhetorical Situation: The Global Perspective and Neoliberal Response
Much of the moral or ideological discussion of a globalized Industry of Knowledge Work
also depends on economic empowerment that has been far from immediate. Questions of choice
and responsibility are invoked by the ambitions of the neoliberal capitalist project. From a
neoliberal perspective, empowerment is a matter of choosing to accept (or submit to?) the
principles of western capitalist economics and political democracy represented in domestic
supremacy observed by Leo Panitch and Matijn Konings, as well as what Gillian Hart referred
to as having the proper “attitude” (814). The decision to join the community of western capitalist
economic enterprise and democratic government solves the cultural, social, and political
obstacles to economic exclusion/inclusion.
As a social project, the neoliberal points to at least an experiment in global democracy
where the disadvantaged agitate for political reform and meet expectations of conformity in
exchange for global economic enfranchisement through such quasi-regulatory institutions as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. For Edward Said, the expectations
represented by financial controls have been discriminatory on a transnational scale. There is also
a tendency to blame the rapid globalization of enterprise for some of the disconnect, but the
significance of rhetorical effects can be overlooked in the grand context of transnational critique.
The transnational or global nature of neoliberal enterprise is not determinative in and of itself,
however. The fact of global reach does not determine universal effects for good or ill. NGOs
target a range of problems and locations for customized intervention, thereby suggesting, as for
Hardt and Negri, that transnationalization and the global extent of information technology also
represent the potential for social responsibility on an extended scale, but obstacles to social
solutions are not strictly transnational. Transnational enterprise does not impose exclusion
simply because it is transnational and therefore capable of global discrimination or exploitation.
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Even transnational interests dedicated to social responsibility and inclusion have not yet
produced comprehensive answers to questions of fundamental fairness and global effects,
compounded by ambiguity in the application of technology illustrated by Benjamin Bratton’s
commentary on the use of Google Earth to plan violent political attacks in Mumbai. “The street
finds its own uses for things” (Liu 308). Cell phones are adapted, not just to multiple design
functions, such as clocks, but also the less formally contemplated detonation of explosives. The
global or transnational nature of technology does not determine local application. Globalization
does not assure consistent application or response, for better or worse.
Global agreement and comprehensive governance therefore remain conflicted and
elusive. Social responsibility tests the control limits of globalized technology interests and
requires consideration of culture in economic intervention as well as commitment.
Transnationalization and globalization are neither automatically exclusive nor inclusive,
although inclusion and exclusion are the critical issues. As Bratton explains in the context of the
Mumbai attacks, the outcome involves ideology and local conditions, not just the global reach of
technology and enterprise, but that also suggests for better or worse, the power to do something
about it. The power to do something about it depends in turn on inclusion as access to the
technology. Information technology may only include those with access, yet those with access
may only be included to the extent that they are a resource of the business.
As Alan Liu points out, globalization as the ability of information to transcend borders
does not necessarily assure vertical as well as lateral or horizontal dispersion. What a situation
such as the Mumbai terrorist attacks makes clear is that access to information provides enhanced
capability as much or more than the simple fact of global reach. A Google Earth may be
repurposed, but regardless of theoretical availability, a Google Earth only serves those with the
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resources to apply it. The periphery of the community may present a different kind of problem,
separate from the concerns of the majority, yet they also illustrate that the effect of technology
depends on the use to which it is put as much as the simple fact of availability.
Bonnie and Clyde drove a stolen Ford, an interval of operation that distinguished
technology. The V-8 Ford and the Browning Automatic Rifle provided technical parity for the
outlaws. Without it, the story would have been different, but availability of the technology did
not determine the use to which it was put. Bonnie and Clyde were to Ford what hackers and
radicals are to Google. As far as we know, the manufacturer took no responsibility for the
distribution and use of the vehicle in anti-social activities, and nobody sued the company for
providing the vehicle. Likewise, nobody sued Google for the Mumbai attacks. However, the
relationship to technology is clear. The problem is in the motivation of the consumer, not in the
availability of the technology, and avoiding responsibility for the use of the product became
another industrial characteristic.
As an explanation of economic conditions, globalization is therefore a conflicted effect as
much as it is a cause, perhaps a semantic cause to the extent of accounting for extended
initiative, yet misleading nonetheless. Semantically, globalization causes conflicts. Realistically,
the conflicts are more specific, but resort to the neoliberal explanation also falls short. The
neoliberal response to economic exclusion attempts to explain economic disparity as a failure of
self-help, “bad attitude” referred to previously. Even the transnationalization or globalization of
capitalist democracy offers no assurance of any change other than the reorganization of capitalist
aristocracy as a nominally democratic institution. Changes of government in Iraq and
Afghanistan did not even pacify the masses as much as shifting the locus of corruption.
Corruption goes where the money goes, and the politics of democracy do not guarantee any
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equitable redistribution of wealth. Such reorganization or rebranding merely allows technical
escape from the charges of exploitation and inequity. Democratic government may exist in
theory with the practical effect in doubt. The neoliberal transnationalization of interests provides
only a highly speculative degree of inclusion and empowerment at best. Globalization and
neoliberal intervention have left issues of exclusion unresolved, and in some cases unaddressed.
Skepticism about financial and political traditions in emerging economies that do not
conveniently mesh with a globalized agenda of capitalist economics and democratic government
fails to explain unsuccessful reform where development of information technology products,
such as social media and information management, are supposed to accelerate the effects of
social reform. Twitter in Somalia, Syria, or the Sudan can publicize conflicts but has not proven
effective as a resolution any more than more traditional interventions, even military. More
people may be involved in the discussion in a superficial way, but whether that transcends
conventional issues of sovereignty, politics, and space remains contested, as in the examples of
terrorist attacks in Mumbai, or Google with the government of China.
What accounts for this apparent ambiguity in the results of intervention? As people are
displaced and relocated in response to economic and political conditions they join global flows
that in a sense measure effects, as in the case of refugees from Syria and the Sudan. As migration
responds to economic conditions it encounters policies and regulations that reflect the values in
the communities of origin and destination (Ong 215, Money 685). Examination of the
relationship between immigration and the values of the knowledge work industry where
immigration encounters these policies and regulations, as in the immigration and employment
concerns of Google, also suggests connections to the fundamental ideology of Industrial
Modernity in globalized economic conditions. Although not necessarily definitive, there is an
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accompanying ideological momentum grounded in traditions of imperialism and exploitation
associated with production that can resist globalized inclusion and empowerment, momentum
that depends on the nature of economic enterprise as capitalist industrial production (Hardt and
Negri 138). Exclusion is not the consequence of over-enthusiastic globalization leaving the
disenfranchised in the cyber dust as much as it is the consequence of more fundamental ideology.
Call it a hidden agenda of the neoliberal project if you want, but it may be less hidden than it is
an inherent and inescapable feature of a dominant economic ideology carried forward, not
necessarily by subterfuge or deceit as much as the sheer momentum of the industrial revolutions.
This is why globalization and the neoliberal project fail to establish comprehensive solutions to
economic disparity and in fact resist the empire of the masses envisioned by Hardt and Negri.
Industrial Modernity constrains the globalization of information technology and the knowledge
work industry.
The nature of the knowledge work industry depends on the individual operations that
constitute and sustain it, the Mircrosofts, Apples, Adobes, and Googles, especially the Googles.
As a corporation, the emphasis Google places on involvement with global communities makes
the search engine enterprise a premier example of the relationship between knowledge work
production and global social effects. Google and its intervention in the global flow of
immigration during the dot.com era make an instructive subject of study for understanding the
tendencies and trajectories in the technologies of knowledge work.
The Industry of Knowledge Work can be considered objectively with respect to an
individual enterprise, but the values of the enterprise have to be put in a context of their own.
Google as an individual enterprise represents the Industry of Knowledge Work, but how Google
operates depends on the source of inspiration. Sergey Brin and Larry Page wanted to produce
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something “that mattered” (Levy 60). To some extent the relationship with Industrial Modernity
and questions of social responsibility in the knowledge work industry are relative and ambiguous
effects of self-determined corporate identity. These are connections expressed in the objectives,
policies, and operations of the individual corporation that generate networks and trends of the
transnational knowledge work industry represented by Google (as characterized by the famous
corporate commitment to avoid evil). Perhaps Google can be considered objectively as a
technology business, but what happens to claims regarding evil?
Evil, as Google discovered the hard way, is a loaded argument. A showdown with evil
appeals to dramatic moral consciousness but resides in rhetoric. In a financially determined
society where evil and justice depend on interpretation and argument, such as a neoliberal
ideology, we should not be rhetorically misled into thinking we are protected by an enterprise
with priorities that do not necessarily reflect everyone's best interests. Democracy does not
assure parity, or perhaps more to the point, may not even assure opportunity. Does the
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, for example, promise universal well-being in a
neoliberal industry of global knowledge work anymore than it did in British and American textile
industries or the mines of South Africa?
Is that evil? The question has no absolute answer, but at the very least, we should, like
Alan Liu and Stuart Selber, recognize that it remains open and consider how close of a
relationship exists between this representative enterprise of the knowledge work industry and the
imperialist enterprise of Industrial Modernity. Is the global industry of knowledge work
distinguished from the industry of railroad construction or assembly-line automobile
manufacture in any meaningful way? Evil can be a relative condition.
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The Rhetorical Situation: Technology, Migration, and Constriction of Space

Figure 2: Colorado in One Night, constriction of space by the railroads, 1892
Source: Puck 31.803 (1892): 368. babel.hathitrust.org. Library of Congress. Web 9 June 2014.
The rhetorical situation has come about in response to the combined effects of technology
and migration, a trajectory of perception elaborated by events from the histories of the past to the
imagination of the future. Paul Scheffer characterized the completion of the transcontinental
railroad as a “constriction” of space that changed the trajectory of perception from expansion to
development. The railroad advertisement in Figure 2 above illustrates the progressively
perceived constriction of space. Constricted space will inevitably be contested, but other events

29

more literally represent the effects. An example of such an event will serve to illustrate and
introduce the combined, historical effects of technology and migration.
The beginning of relevant immigration history precedes the American nation by three
hundred years. That will be more thoroughly explained in Chapter Two, along with the
convergence in the late 1800s of social and economic conditions. After the Civil War, pressure
on immigration increased in a number of ways. Space became a more complex issue of
occupancy as communication, transportation, and, economics divided and configured the
territory of the continental United States, sometimes more literally, as for the Indian Wars,
sometimes more theoretically, as in Scheffer’s symbolic constriction and Benjamin Bratton’s
”partitioning” of territory, “the very verb and noun of cleaving space and of instantiating that
gesture with a solid plane, as perhaps the fundamental grammar of territory and closure” (333), a
technology in itself as the solution to problems of territorial distribution.
Yet symbolism and even partition perhaps imply a deceptively dignified and even
civilized distribution compared to the similar but more literal and prejudicial function of fences
that followed symbolic constriction. Fences and fencing, while mundane and utilitarian
compared to the diplomatic application of partitions, suggest equivalent functions with the
somewhat more contentious or at least isolationistic qualities associated with the structure of the
fence and perhaps even the war-like sport of fencing. Partitions may separate and isolate, which
in itself defines identity, but fencing as structure or architecture and fencing as a conflict guard
territory, a dimension of violence. The partitioning of territory, while perhaps representing a
degree of violence in practice, also appeals to a genteel if imperialistic quality of conciliation, the
victorious sitting down to complete a theoretical and measured dismemberment of conquered
space.
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Defeated nations are partitioned, not fenced. Gardens, ranches, and prisons are fenced,
not partitioned. Partitions are barriers by acclimation of authority. Fences may serve an identical
purpose, but a fence can add the physical power of securing territory from violation for which a
partition remains theoretical and perhaps vulnerable. When does a partition ever prevent invasion
in other than a visual or theoretical way? In Bratton’s terms the boundaries of partition only
constrain violation in limited ways, while the fence defines the territory of a geoscape as a
defended space. Fences may therefore definitively elaborate and intervene where flow and vista
otherwise depend on speculation, and even more significantly, fences also represent a structural
response to technology. That was the nature of the fence on the American Great Plains in the late
1800s as the effects of technology and migration closed in on the frontier.
In the thirty-five year period from the end of the Civil War to the end of that century,
American continental expansion reached the projected territorial limits of Manifest Destiny and
Paul Scheffer’s symbolic restriction, but there were also more literal effects as migration
continued. Despite unification, demarcation, and the potential for access, the railroad made a
very small and civilized footprint relative to the physical space contemplated by national
consolidation. More directly and extensively traumatic events, such as Wounded Knee in 1890,
emphasized progressively literal and continuing territorial constriction, including resistance by
Native Americans, but even the disgraceful efficiency of vengeance by the United States Cavalry
at Wounded Knee did not illustrate the effects as neatly and effectively as the convergence of
industry, policy, politics, ideology, migration, and technology in literal space as an obscure little
war inspired by fences in an obscure corner of the Wyoming territory in 1892.
The little war in question seems far removed from the immigration issues of California,
the future technology of Google in Silicon Valley, and especially the Other Coast, where the

31

effects of international migration were accumulating. In retrospect the entire event seems almost
quixotic. Yet that little war was not very far away at all as an illustration of space constricted by
technology and migration that could have been both orderly and acceptable. It was neither.
Wounded Knee marked the end of effective Native American resistance to spacial
distribution for purposes of European colonization. In a sense, the space became unified, yet the
little war in Wyoming two years later both repeated the pattern and illustrated the effects with
significant consequences in a different context, a context of conflicted colonial sovereign
interests. Native Americans had conceded. National sovereignty prevailed, yet the conflicts of
migration continued to occur.
War on the American Great plains at the end of the 1800s might logically involve
indigenous natives, but that is not the case, at least not directly. This war was beyond the
displacement of the plains Indians, except perhaps in the sense of dividing the spoils. The
representative community of the Sioux had been subdued by Gatling guns and collective
vengeance at Wounded Knee only two years before as compensation for the tactical deficiencies
of George Armstrong Custer.
That war was done. This little war was a war between competing groups of immigrant
claimants for newly vacated Sioux territory. One group assumed characteristics of an established
commercial aristocracy empowered by agricultural practices derived from distance and
resources. Open-range ranching required access to relatively huge spaces for economically
feasible cattle production in response to distant markets. Another group, though of equally
European origin, became immigrants in both a real and symbolic sense, while the advent of
technologies invoked conflict over borders and partitions expressed as property lines, and even
more specifically as fences, literal fences of the barbed-wire kind.
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John Misa described how technologies of everything from paper to beer changed the
dynamics of migration and place. The Johnson County War, as it came to be known for the
location of the most substantial events, ensued from development in fencing technology of the
short, sharp spikes twisted into dual strands of iron wire at regular intervals, commonly known as
“barbed wire” for the effect. Prior to the development of barbed wire, there was no suitable fence
material available on the open plains that could be employed economically to make fencing of
any substantial area practical. Despite extermination of the American Bison, without fences, the
roaming cattle of the open-range ranching system made cultivation of agricultural crops
impossible, as well as complicating ownership of the livestock where more than a few widely
dispersed ranching operations were involved.
Open-range ranching needed a lot of empty space, creating a number of ironic conflicts in
principle with regard to the history of immigration and European colonization. Open-range
ranching did not make very good use of the space, the same reasoning cited by Reimers for the
displacement of native inhabitants by European colonists. Fence wire was around a long time
and theoretically feasible as a material on the plains but also inadequate for deterrence of cattle
until the simple expedient of adding sharp points solved the problem, an ingenious technological
innovation.
Finding increasing obstruction of the usual routes of access to grazing areas blocked by
fenced homestead land, and either oblivious to or unconcerned about the metaphorical
relationship to their own heritage as well as the relationship to Native American displacement by
the naming, framing, and taming of the wilderness from which they benefitted, the early adopters
in open-range ranching, accustomed to their own version of conditions, responded with a simple
expedient of their own. Cattle might not be willing to take down a barbed-wire fence, but a pair
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of cutting pliers could do the job straight away, an issue of violence that should be appreciated
by adherents of Georges Bataille and Joseph Beuys as philosophical observers of intrusion.
Likewise, the arbitrary appropriation of loose cattle, known colloquially as “rustling,”
always caused problems on the open range, but established ranchers on the plains also used
rustling as a rhetorical excuse to resist migratory occupation of public land under the homestead
authorizations of federal law. Homesteaders, for their own part, took exception to both the
destruction of their fences and incursions on their land, which the ranchers escalated by hiring a
private mercenary force more or less equivalent to a Victorian-era Blackwater with a similar
informal license to kill.
As much as anywhere, that episode itself may as well begin a couple of years earlier, with
the lynching of Emma “Cattle Kate” Watson and Jim Averell outside Rawlins, Wyoming in
1889, shortly before the winter that reduced the Rosebud Sioux to starvation. Watson and
Averell both arrived in the area to start new lives as homesteaders and found each other as well.
Together they established a small but growing roadhouse and fenced-ranching business on a
cattle-drive route from Texas to Salt Lake City, but they soon ran up against an older and larger
local open-range ranching operation with ties to an organization established for the benefit of the
ranching aristocracy of large and established open-range ranches, the Wyoming Stock Growers
Association (WSGA). WSGA members were used to unimpeded property access and expected it
to continue as something like a divine right.
Unable to discourage the enterprising pair of Watson and Averell, the WSGA ranchers
eventually sent their own hired hands to round up their competitors under specious charges of
rustling. The WSGA ranchers, however, had no intention of legal action in any sense. In spite of
witnesses and an attempt to rescue them, Watson and Averell were hanged together from a pine
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tree by their captors a short time later. The killers were subsequently arrested, but newspapers in
Wyoming controlled by ranching interests successfully portrayed Averell and Watson as habitual
criminals, a variation on the demonization of immigrants. Key witnesses suddenly came into
money and changed their stories, disappeared entirely, or met untimely ends. The cost of
prosecution together with the lack of reliable witnesses ultimately made conviction of the killers
impossible.
The outcome of this event helped convince the association of large ranches that they
could successfully intimidate competing homesteaders and independent ranchers. The WSGA
recruited fifty men in Texas for a mercenary army designated “The Regulators,” equipped them
with dynamite and the best rifles available, then shipped the entire force by train to Cheyenne,
Wyoming, from where they continued north on horses. Their mission was to eliminate a list of
“rustlers” that included primarily homesteaders and independent ranchers in the Johnson County
area of what was at the time central to northeastern Wyoming. To prevent organized resistance,
the Regulators cut the telegraph line to Buffalo, the Johnson County seat, where homesteading
and independent ranches had a lot of support.
The first Regulators target was Nate Champion, organizer of a group of homesteading
ranchers. The Regulators set Champion’s cabin on fire, forcing him out, where he was gunned
down, hit twenty-eight times. The Regulators left a note pinned to his chest promising a similar
fate for sympathizers.
The gunfire at Champion’s cabin, however, alerted neighboring ranchers who rode to the
Johnson County Sheriff in Buffalo. The Sheriff gathered a posse of two hundred local men to
round up the Regulators. The posse from Buffalo caught up with the open-range mercenaries
camped out in the log barn of another ranch. A gunfight followed. The posse captured the

35

wagons containing supplies and dynamite. With better rifles, the Regulators prevented the posse
from closing in to dynamite the barn, but an attempt by Regulators to get out under covering fire
to go for help failed. The posse killed three and the rest retreated to the barn.
The posse then built an improvised assault vehicle out of a wagon that would get them
close enough to throw dynamite and gunpowder into the barn. With the posse distracted by
preparations, one Regulator finally managed to escape and reached a working telegraph office to
notify the WSGA ranchers that the Regulators were about to be captured by the posse and
probably worse. The governor of Wyoming telegraphed the U.S. President to request assistance.
Within a day, cavalry arrived from Fort McKinney and took protective custody of the
Regulators. News reports at the time estimated the posse was within an hour of dynamiting the
barn when the cavalry arrived. As the WSGA had expected, they were able to prevent
prosecution of Regulators for the murder of Nate Champion, but publicity spread so widely that
public outrage ended the careers of the politicians involved, including the Wyoming governor,
and unlimited open-range ranching had reached the end of the trail.
The Regulators were saved by the intervention of information technology in a context
mediated by print capitalism. Essentially the fencing technology of barbed wire, through solution
of a technical problem, directed a migratory flow into a collision of economic interests in a
constricted space, an instructive consequence of technological development. The nature of
migration and geography invoked issues of divided or undetermined sovereignty. The mediation
of print capitalism accorded mythic, although conflicted narrative valor to the Johnson County
War in the imagination of the American West, even as the constriction of space noted by Paul
Scheffer took place. The conflict represented effects that were far more than symbolic in a world
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where global concerns would combine with the constriction of space and the development of
technology to affect the management of immigration in an industrial context.
The Johnson County war illustrates how constriction of space affected immigration
where the effect was more localized, specific, and literal than symbolic unification of California
with the colonial East Coast by railroad, and comparison explains how some features of
immigration control make sense. Constriction of space produced the attempt by the open-range
industry to control regional migration. The established commercial industry represented by the
cattlemen’s association made assumptions about management entitlement similar to more
nationally distributed dominant industrial corporations, such as the Union Pacific Railroad. In
spite of law and principle, the open-range ranchers were in the habit of having things their own
way, and the comparison is instructive also. Unlike California ten years earlier, immigration
prevailed in the Johnson County War, a logical progression in a sense. Despite initial success, the
tactic of vilification as a mediated rhetorical characterization failed, partly because the
connection between the information and the source became apparent. Vilification too obviously
served the interests of nobody else, similar to the effects of Credit Mobilier for the railroads.
Social subterfuge of that order had to be kept confidential or it became a liability, which the
railroads apparently learned, but the open-range ranchers did not particularly profit from, and
could barely bring themselves to take seriously. When the extent to which the rancher’s
association employed homicide, defamation, witness-tampering, and general arrogance with
regard to law became apparent, unlike immigration connected to labor disputes, the credibility of
negative characterizations lost effect.
Similar to the later reaction of industrialists with regard to immigration, the open-range
ranchers disregarded the rhetoric of their own heritage. Western migration, like the history of
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immigration for the nation in general, had a mythic quality of individual actualization and
approval that the ranchers failed to address or probably even recognize. After the Johnson
County War, nobody seriously believed open-range cattle ranchers had any valid complaints
about anything. The WSGA went into bankruptcy and ceased to exist. Perhaps these events
should have been a lesson for labor organizations as well. Industrial corporations employed their
own violent enforcers and strike-breakers, but successful vilification of immigrant communities
such as the Chinese and Jews prevented wide-spread resistance by diversion to ethnic and racial
conflicts, an imposed variation of Julia Kristeva’s “positioning in language” referred to by
Richard Hebdige (119-20) in the clash of cultures. The objectives of industrial corporations are
usually described in terms of economics and class, but industrial enterprise also gained a logical
advantage from the failure of labor communities to unite. As will be considered more
extensively, vilification is usually attributed to inherent prejudice and the economic self-interest
of competing communities, which is partly true, but does not necessarily account for the
advantage to industrial production. The WSGA did not successfully divide the opposition as
industrial corporations did in California. Consequently, in the end they had no popular sympathy,
and their disregard for even the most superficial concessions to the myth of the Immigrant
Nation made their failure rather unsurprising.
In their purest form, borders are theoretical fences, sometimes more theoretical, as with
most of the border between the U.S. and Canada, but also designated by literal fences as well as
theoretical ones, such as the Great Wall of China or the more recent American border along the
Rio Grande. Technologies of fences have changed, but occupation of space invariably defines
fences, whatever form that space may take, and occupation invokes technology. The activity of
occupation requires the solution of problems, Andrew Feenberg’s definition of technology, of
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which fences are a part. The solution of problems in turn defines the nature of the threshold or
interval, the interface of borders at gates, although as a point of entry, perhaps a gate can also
take on the characteristics of a wound, another intrusion or transgression of bounded space or the
“body” of the community. Like the immune system of the individual, the community maintains
the fences and guards the gates where immigrants become after all, immigrants.
In the case of Johnson County, fences are therefore the literal proof of a theoretically
constricted space that ten years earlier produced immigration regulation. Not only was the West
symbolically constricted by completion of the transcontinental railroad, the technological
intervention of fences more literally constricted the West, in itself a kind of logical progression.
Much as the established open-range ranching enterprise of Johnson County assumed supremacy
in management of the ranching industry, in national conflicts of constricted space other
commercial interests assumed supremacy in the management of labor for industrial production.
The fence completed a physical constriction of what had previously been more theoretical and
symbolic, as in the case of the transcontinental railroad, or a more ideological community
migration, such as that represented by the Mormon relocation.
The Rhetorical Situation: Arguing the H-1B Limit
The dot.com-era discussion framed H-1B in terms of argument for and against higher
limits. Google argued for higher limits based on American supremacy and competitive capability
achieved with the superior performance of immigrants. The success of immigrants also connects
to a variety of concerns related to Google and to the H-1B argument in different ways, including
diversity, support for nuclear families, and the heritage of the Immigrant Nation. Opposition to
increased limits primarily took the form of concern with effects on employment for American
citizens in competition with personnel from foreign countries. Eventually the discussion
extended to more theoretical academic and research interests as well, such as Prof. Michelle
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Rodino-Colocino’s feminist analysis of objections from unemployed technology workers and the
Cato Institute’s evaluation of economic effects. Funding for some of these efforts might be a fair
question, although in the end the outcome of the legislatively determined limit reduction did not
favor findings in support of increased H-1B limits, regardless. In addition, analysis by RodinoColocino, as an example, concentrates less on the competing concerns of domestic and foreign
labor and emphasizes more rhetorical issues. Rather than economics, Rodino-Colocino
represents a feminist critique of the argument that concentrates on what seems to be
characterized as a white-male expectation of entitlement to constituency in the new empire of
information technology.
Rodino-Colocino’s focus has been deliberately placed on comments originating with
white-male technology employees affected by lay-offs. Exactly how such a determination has
been made is less clear, other than the logical associations of names commonly perceived to be
of white, Western-European origin, which could be taken as a kind of reverse prejudice of its
own. Likewise, the potential for misrepresentation by information gathered from statements on
the internet is perhaps less of a problem than the lack of any concern for response from the
women who, according to Rodino-Colocino, account for about a third of the layoffs, and the
racial minorities accounting for another ten percent.
To an extent, Rodino-Colocino relies on a trajectory of discrimination-connected
rhetorical criticism represented by Demo, Flores, and Streitmatter, somewhat ironic considering
the invocation of Chinese exclusion and concern for the danger of tactics that become habits with
respect to political action (26-27). If white males were appealing to knee-jerk arguments of
superiority, it was a pattern established by the prevailing corporations of Industrial Modernity.
The tendency, as I will demonstrate, applies just as emphatically to corporate attitudes as to
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individual politics. This concern will also be considered in relation to historical development.
Moreover, Rodino-Colocino asserts that white males depended on female support to give them
adequate leisure time for their predictable rants about the threat of foreign information
technology labor. This kind of commentary does not directly address issues of supply and
demand or innovative supremacy in the labor dispute, but it does serve to illustrate what have
become some of the assumptions and associated reactions applied to H-1B discussion.
In general, the academic commentary represented by Rodino-Colocino and research
findings from other interests, such as the more economics–oriented Cato Institute, seemed to
support Courtney Cromwell’s conclusion that H-1B limits should be increased as economically
advantageous based on claims that wages paid to employees under H-1B actually exceeded those
paid to U.S. citizens, and that business activity produced with support of H-1B employees
resulted in additional domestic opportunities. While that may be true overall, whether the
numbers depend on equivalent positions and whether the opportunities produced represent equal
potential is also less clear, provoking response represented by Josh Harkinson’s anguished claim
in Mother Jones that American workers are getting “screwed” by H-1B. Likewise, the Cato
institute’s conclusion that hiring foreign workers did not affect countries of origin seems to
contradict Google’s subsequent claim of dependence on foreign sources for competitive growth.
If hiring employees from foreign countries does not constrain the countries of origin in some
way, then in what way does it insure American competitive “advantage” in Bill Gates’ terms, or
“strength” in the words of Laszlo Bock? What will be the relative advantage gained if
competitors are not somehow defeated?
Google connected with immigration in terms of employment, a connection explained by
the commercial history of immigration and the H-1B exception, essentially arguing that the
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domestic labor market could not supply the specialized technology skills the corporation needed
to maintain competitive capability, echoing (or anticipating) Bill Gates’ concern for encouraging
innovation. Essentially, in support of H-1B restriction, Senator Richard Durbin summarized
concerns with the effects of H-1B exceptions as those three objections, conditions of
employment (including wages and employment security), opportunities, and the comparative
international distribution of technology expertise, although a striking feature of the H-1B
discussion has been a prominent lack of comprehensive and reliable information. Courtney Cox
implicitly acknowledged the problem with refutation such as “Studies cited by critics point
mainly to methodological problems in the data and analysis of the ITAA reports, rather than
actually providing data counter-indicative” (465). The studies to which Mary Swanton referred
from the 1990s were largely irrelevant by 2001, leading the General Accounting Office to
observe in connection to data collection for the Department of Homeland Security that “Much of
the information policymakers need to effectively oversee the H-1B program is not available”
(32).
In an attempt to gather more complete information, Senator Durbin carried out his own
investigation of employment related to H-1B to determine, among other things, whether
brokering of personnel by monopolization of H-1B visas known as “bodyshopping” actually
represented a significant effect in the H-1B argument, an effect that Cox attributed to limited
supply rather than exploitation of foreign personnel. There is likewise, however, little evidence
that an increased H-1B limit before 2000 reduced bodyshopping in IT, leading to somewhat
convoluted conclusions, such as Congressional testimony to the effect that “When the economy
is strong demand is high, when the economy drops it plunges. If the H-1B were a source of cheap
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labor the exact opposite would happen” (GPO). Exactly how that mechanism would operate is
unclear. Threats of exploitation through vulnerability have also been a concern with respect to H1B admission in other occupations (Grow 54), illustrating the difficulty encountered in making
informed decisions about the H-1B argument.
Should the American IT industry have additional advantages for access to the
international supply of IT labor anyway? For more legislators than Senators Durbin and
Grassley, the answer was no, or at least no more than already determined, since the lower limit
went into effect. The threat of competitive disadvantage was not convincing. Expansion of
economic activity does not necessarily require restriction of corporate operations to the physical
space of the United States. Studies such as those of the Cato Institute and Cox suggest that
contract “offshoring” of work to other countries threatens American jobs, but even if true,
offshoring is not the only way to organize global enterprise, as Mary Swanton’s example of
branch offices and Google’s own international expansion illustrates. Bratton’s alternative view of
technology resources adapted to local situations could mean that local business relationships
might also affect the application of the technology. Such a view suggests extension of global
markets and global communities to the local level, not just as access to the product by electronic
distribution, as in the example of Google Earth, but with local business locations. Could a
Google operations center in Mumbai change the dynamics of competing interest groups? Local
operation does not insure constructive use of products, but it does insure a degree of local
intervention while benefitting both local economies and remote interests. The extension of
business operations involves challenges of its own, illustrated more recently by the Google
experience in China, but the alternative is the experience of Google Earth in Mumbai. Would the
necessity of adding physical locations necessarily be a bad thing? While meant to argue the

43

convenience of H-1B availability, examples of remote locations also illustrate the potential for
global alternatives. As Cox explains, offshoring is a relatively simple solution to some
complexities of international commerce. Sign a contract and avoid the local complications of
social and political relationships, yet the social and political aspects of economic activity
expressed as morality are exactly the controversies ultimately confronted by companies such as
Nike in Indonesia.
Following failure of the H-1B initiative, Google somewhat ironically began opening
engineering offices in other locations. So far, however, the initiative remains strikingly in the
mode of locations (as in employment) “like us” with respect to business, such as Switzerland and
Israel. Even in India, the effect was to recreate a virtual Mountain View California, a commercial
compound with overtones of an East India Company of information (Levy 272). Even a globally
extended expansion does insure inclusive economic activity without a realistic commitment to
social responsibility, if nothing else, perhaps a degree of enlightened self-interest, yet it
continues to take the form of corporate supremacy instead. As Edward Said explained, the
remote association through the altern or sub-altern has always been a factor in the extension of
colonial imperialism. Hardt and Negri extend the altern relationship to self-determination in
resistance to imperialism. Said, however, as well as Manuel Castells, makes it clear that such a
management structure does not prevent exploitation in a centralized imperial network where
resources are directed to the point of hegemonic origin. A token or constrained degree of selfdetermination, as for the neoliberal project, does not insure independence. As a socially
responsible effort, a transnationally extended enterprise has to recognize the value of local
independence as well as the potential for repurposing. The potential therefore exists to promote
both exploitation and democratic flattening, independent local enterprise and adventure of
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Western European capitalist imperialism into the technologies of information and the
information industry. American business does not have to confine itself to the North American
continent to compete successfully, but does successful competition mean the enterprise cannot
adapt to local culture?
The information management that goes along with information enterprise requires skill
sets that are not unique, but in the frenzied information technology economy, they have been
highly desirable. Looking to the future, Google predicted a conflagration of technologies
endlessly consuming capable personnel. Google had to manage that market. Whether or not
domestic supply has been sufficient to meet all needs has been less of an issue than manipulation
of the argument. Either way, perhaps as a matter of kairos, a situation that produces an
opportunity for argument, Google took the rhetorical opportunity to argue that Google could not
confidently rely on domestic supply, both as a matter of competition and logistics. They
encouraged consideration of alternate sources. Alternate sources, however, meant foreign
sources. Foreign sources meant immigration, at least in the sense of admission. Immigration
meant opposition, but Google was aware of the issues.
It is worth repeating here that Google used the immigration argument for what is not
technically an immigration issue. Sergey Brin, for instance, technically qualified as an immigrant
himself as the child of Russian immigrants, although his Russian immigrant parents were
academic mathematicians, and he himself did not suffer disproportionately for want of resources
in the course of his Stanford graduate school education. Brin is an immigrant in the sense of
relocation and citizenship, but Brin was not necessarily an immigrant in the rhetorical sense of
the Immigrant Nation invoked by Laszlo Bock as the impoverished refugee making good. Ethnic
or religious considerations may have played a part in Brin’s history, but Google’s argument did
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not acknowledge the mediation of immigration mythology in pointing out the contributions of
immigrants to Google success. The Google argument alluded, not to the reality of advantages
enjoyed by Sergey Brin, but to the determined immigrant overcoming adversity to make good in
the land of opportunity. Google avoided engaging arguments of educational quality and labor
management other than supply, and even that was expressed in terms of national interests. The
Google argument made connections to immigrants deprived of a fair opportunity to show what
they could do and to contribute to the strength of the nation. That will become more clear in
Chapter Two.
Google's corporate concern with immigration also measures ideology. Google attempted
to secure legislative approval for increases to the number of immigration admission exceptions
under immigration regulation H-1B. The justification for this argument was not the
encouragement of global economic development or even democratic access to information
resources. The argument was to insure American economic supremacy, self-actualization of
entitled individuals, and family integrity. At least one answer to the question of what Google is
resides in connections to those ideological arguments. Google relied, not on a progressive social
argument of possibilities for inclusion, but on what has been the historic attitude of Industrial
Modernity toward immigration, arguments of nationalism, patriotism, social integrity, and
successful enterprise. In spite of references to inclusive cultural, racial, and national diversity,
Google did not even argue from the stance of neoliberal democratic capitalism. Google argued
from a more reactionary stance of Industrial Modernity.
As a feature of the knowledge work industry, the Google immigration argument
represents an ironic contradiction to the potential for global effects. To argue based on
discriminatory, historical stereotypes rather than the potential for global development suggests
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alignment with pragmatic interests. Such an association invites what is perhaps cynical yet
unavoidable speculation about whether encouragement to participate in Google communities
serves appropriation as a resource of the enterprise rather than opportunities for inclusion as a
collaborative participant in the enterprise. To appreciate the contradiction requires consideration
of what Google looks like to the user as both a corporate and media representation, as well as
how the history of immigration has established rhetorical standards of argument with respect to
practical concerns.
In terms of Industrial Modernity, immigration is not necessarily an inherent feature of
what it means to be American. As a matter of politics or ideological rhetoric, we may be a Nation
of Immigrants, but not as a matter of production. On the contrary, rather than an essential
ideological feature, immigration is expendable. When times are good (for ROI), immigration is
an exploitable resource. When times are bad for ROI, immigration is an expendable parasite. As
will be apparent from the manipulation of the rhetorical argument, rather than a democratic
collaboration, Google actually and ironically performed as a "creature" of Modernity (alluding to
The Google Book), an industrial enterprise determined to establish, not democratic access to
information as much as universal control of information, empire in the mode of the Industrial
Revolution. This empire is something even removed from a neoliberal preoccupation with the
extension of democratic capitalism. The ultimate effect of such an outcome may be that as users,
we become, not adventurers in a democratic enterprise, or even collaborative participants in a
neoliberal democracy, but subordinate resources exploited for the continued benefit of a
capitalist project.
The Rhetorical Situation: Looking at Google
When users look at Google, the rhetorical view is benign, perhaps even philanthropic.
The bright colors and goofy title suggest toy stores and an almost juvenile sense of play, qualities
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reinforced through what has been the public face of Google's corporate culture with beanbag
chairs and Burning Man retreats. Yet the focused lack of other distractions emphasized by
expansive white space on the Google main page makes it clear that whatever the information
may be, this is about the information, and we can feel good about that also. We can feel
confident about the information, and we can feel good about the supportive culture at Google.
Pursuing the representation into the corporate descriptions of culture and mission confirms that
this perception of playful interaction has been encouraged throughout the operation. Google
welcomed us to the experience of collaboratively connecting with information. Google joined us
in the experience of sharing information. Like a delusion in The Matrix, Google wants us to
experience the joy of information.
Underlying this rhetorical desire for our informational well-being is the commercial
enterprise, which is no mystery to anyone with the consciousness necessary to realize that as
users we are surrounded in our information experience by advertisements and suggestions guided
by economic considerations. We are, as for Adorno and Horkheimer, components of the culture
machine with respect to the Industry of Knowledge Work. In the case of Google, however, the
circular reduction of consumer to product has a more reactionary connection to the products of
Industrial Modernity than even the transnational neoliberal project might suggest.
History of Immigration
The significance of the immigration argument emerges from historical trajectories In
connection with evolving effects of the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, Lisa Flores
described a perception of immigrants dictated by the demands of prevailing economic power.
The observations of Flores articulated the historic tendency to treat immigration as a resource in
Martin Heidegger’s sense of technology as a hegemonic force. Heidegger may have over-
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determined the independent power of technology, yet the most determined critics of
technological autonomy, such as Andrew Feenberg, acknowledge and even emphasize that the
application and use of technology indicates extensions of power relationships. These power
relationships are reflected, not just in functional relationships with technology as tools of
production, or even so much in conflicts of included and excluded classes as in the perception
and treatment of the immigrant as a commodity, an additional resource of production.
Historically, prominent economic activities, such as railroads and agriculture, represent the
relationship of technology, capital, and immigration. These relationships have also been more
recently apparent in the development of information technology initiatives, such as Google.
As imperialist adventure, the commercial enterprise depends on historically conflicted
qualities of immigration. In principle, immigrants have never been denied the potential to
achieve economic prominence in the United States. In popular mythology, America is a land of
opportunity for immigrants, however challenging it may be. Yet the idea of sending your poor
and oppressed to our nation of immigrants is a rhetorical element of our imagined nation that
does not necessarily hold up quite so well in reality. The reality of economic success for
immigrants might depend on a lot of things, such as alternate resources and more complex
relationships, the availability of connections or the exploitation of a cultural community of origin
in some way. The Irish developed political connections, for instance. The Chinese had service
industry networks. Italians and Jewish immigrants had investment communities. Hispanic
immigrants were often connected by widespread occupation in specific agricultural industries.
The benefits, moreover, are also constrained by a kind of egotism. Because information
technology is at least theoretically less dependent on physical space than other device
technologies, the Industry of Knowledge Work suggests less emphasis on immigration as a
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response to social and economic conditions. The rhetorical arguments of contributions to the
nation become more important than the reality. This concern with opportunities for the aspiring
immigrant (and Sergey Brin is as good an example as any) has been employed by Google to
support the ideological desirability of legislation that allows additional immigration to make
America great. Google approval for immigration, however, achieves social responsibility only to
the extent that Southern hospitality at one time contemplated the right class. Google enthusiasm
for immigration only applies to the extent that the enthusiasm of industrial capitalism for
immigration applied, which is to say (with a Marxian twist) that it is socially responsible for the
aristocracy of production control. It is socially responsible for Google. For Google, the rest of the
world represents something else.
Whether that is good or evil, however, is not so much the point. The moral arguments for
and against open borders, social services, sovereignty and legal status are relevant, but oblique.
My question is whether globalization and diversity connected to innovative technology (that
Google includes in its corporate identity) reflect some kind of concern for social responsibility,
or instead, a less obvious industrial attitude. Is Google, in the terms of Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri, an agent of change, or an agent of a reactionary empire of Industrial Modernity?
Events and Artifacts
Google is by definition a technological artifact (the search engine), but as a study it is
specialized here with respect to immigration. In the public, legislative, and internal arguments
that Google applies to immigration policy, the study relies on ideology identified and explained
by analysts such as Flores. It is my purpose to investigate that connection through media
representation, legislative documents, and the internal statements of Google itself; the
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relationship of Google to the theoretical concept of immigration controlled by the technology of
Industrial Modernity.
As rhetorical analysis, this study also measures the specific example of Google against a
general construct or model of Industrial Modernity. Part of the discussion depends on theories
from the commentary of analysts concerned with the construction of community, including
Benedict Anderson, Jean Baudrillard, Timothy Mitchell, and Edward Said. A second part
depends on looking at Google from both within, as an effect of Google’s self-view, and from
without through intervening media considered by Anne Demo, Lisa Flores, Steven Levy, Alex
Magnusson, Matt Richtel, Roger Streitmatter, David Vise, and others. Review of literature is
therefore closely connected to what are actually the research objectives. Does Google represent a
new way of doing business in a new industry in a new world of information technology and
industry in the way of Thomas Friedman’s flat world, or is it something less charming, empire in
the way that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe discrimination by preceding industrial
applications of technology? To an extent, the nature and origin of the sources reflect the
questions as much as the information. The history of immigration has been compiled from a
group of scholars concerned with the effects of discrimination, both as historical fact and as
misconception. This group includes primarily Sigmund Diamond, Susan-Mary Grant, Derek
Heater, David Reimers, Paul Scheffer, and Aristide Zolberg with additional information from
alternate sources such as William Bailyn. Finally, the research includes documentation of
immigration law and policy, as well as sources from the Department of Homeland Security and
the prior Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The involvement of immigration in the analysis depends on the same kind of reasoning
Alan Liu applied to employment as a measure of Modernity. For the same reason that Liu chose
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business literature, I choose representations of Google, a reconsideration of Liu’s investigation
into postindustrialism and informationalism. The ideas of lateral corporate information flow
apply directly to Google as an explanation of an exclusive community where some kinds of
information remain confined, and in the idealized form invoked by the main page portal as an
explanation of a Google that is information. For the same reason that Liu chose labor as a
logically responsive component of capitalist organization, I choose immigration as a distinct
resource of enterprise by which the effects can be measured and described. Immigration as an
argument has both quantitative effects and qualitative rhetorical effects, but as an argument it
also becomes an analytical tool. The way in which, and degree to which, immigration is both
adopted by the corporation and employed as rhetorical argument become measures of
connections to modes of organization and production. Alan Liu therefore serves as a source for
argument about the relationship between the resource and the corporation in the rhetorical
analysis.
American immigration has always been an effect of labor supply for commercial
management. As a consequence of commercial interests, no direct limits were put on
immigration until labor management became contested territory in the late 1800s, but the effects
of immigration can also be considered in terms of space. The relationship of space as a resource
and as a location of production activity affects management control. Also in historical terms,
technology has affected the concept or perception of spacial relationships in two ways. One is the
kind of compression associated with communication, transportation, and reduction of theoretical
regional and national barriers to migration. The relative compression of distance, and even time,
produces phenomena such as Aiwa Ong’s “global citizen.” The migratory flows encouraged by
compression also produce changes in population concentration. Shifts in population become a
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more relevant effect as the “symbolic” constriction of space represented by technology produces
a second more immediate and pragmatic constriction in terms of place. Where technology makes
increased occupation of space possible, as for California and the trans-continental railroad, new
conflicts develop over access, rights, and sovereignty, illustrated and summarized in a focused
way by such representative and iconic events as the subsequent Johnson County War in
Wyoming.
Much of the evidence for the relationship with social responsibility, a relationship
including the combined effects of immigration, Google, and Industrial Modernity in the study
here, comes from the discussion of H-1B limits, partly rhetoric and partly history. Google argued
that America could best ensure competitive vitality by acquiring talent from international sources
that also would provide opportunities for American citizens by producing new business along
with traditional immigration objectives of making America great while encouraging family unity
and individual success.
Rhetorically, the information originates in media reports, legislative consideration,
history, and Google comments from a more internal perspective, such as policy blogs, but the
effect of the argument also depends on a rhetorical context created by interaction of Google with
consumers and their interests, a context of consumer community. The rhetoric of the consumer
community relationship involves both a heritage of print capitalism and the considerations of
contemporary web page design. Closely connected to Industrial Modernity, what Walter Ong
called the “authority of text” in print capitalism affirms Google expertise through messages from
the graphic imagery used for web page control and navigation, an additional context of visual
associations. Analysts of visual imagery in conventional media and information technology,
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including Roland Barthes, Jay Bolter, Ron Burnett, and Lev Manovich, suggest that such visual
imagery has a subtle but powerful effect in the expression of argument.
The rhetoric of Google’s relationship with consumers comes from Google web pages and
from a variety of sources documenting Google’s advocacy for the H-1B limit increase based on
maintaining American competitive capability. The rhetorical effects of Google and immigration
depend on Google’s representation both with respect to its own statements and to media
consideration. Anne Demo described the perception of immigration as spectacle, represented by
such notable circumstances as the Elian Gonzalez confrontation (for which a more ironic
signification than an "Elian" alien could hardly be imagined in the English language). One
connection to that spectacle is the history of cultural appropriation by visual display in the age of
Industrial Modernity. Such a cultural appropriation is the act of Exhibition. Theorists in
electronic media, such as Lev Manovich and Jay Bolter, suggest that visual effects have been
intensified and spread by the convenience of information technology. Such visual effects are
behind Bolter's ekphrasis of the electronic in a variety of ways, including the iconography of
interface, photographic transfer, and the convenient adaptation of images for communication.
These visual and visualized images all contribute to the distribution (and even the expectation) of
images in connection with all kinds of information. The function remains substantially the same
for Google. As Demo and Mitchell agree, the emphasis on visualization invokes an empowered
point of view, a standpoint from which the phenomena of culture and community can be
conveniently examined as a possession, or at least as a subordinated curiosity relative to the
viewer, the same kind of standpoint that led Sarah Harding to suggest science has been
inherently discriminatory. That is a powerful visual context within which immigration functions
in contemporary American society, a collection of images that imagine the communities of both
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immigrants and observers. Like orality, the history and significance of ekphrasis tend to restrain
the symbolic abstractions of print text while privileging visual representation. What has been
somewhat ambiguously and esoterically referred to as an “I-text,” for instance, really cannot
exist at all except as resistance to the rediscovery of connections to reality in the symbolic and as
an adaptation of the capitalist messages of Modernity. In contemporary information technology,
ekphrasis functions to favor visual representation, both as a supplement and replacement for
symbolic abstractions. Google recognizes the significance of the ekphratic in such visual
interventions as the Google Logos (Doodles), which represent wide-ranging cultural incursion.
As a form of Exhibition, Logos take possession of cultural events in which Google involves
itself. We will use this event for our purposes by interpreting it and displaying it as we choose.
Michel Foucault’s claims about power and Timothy Mitchell’s evaluation of imperialism include
the inability of the subjugated to resist the arbitrary, capricious, and even promiscuous,
appropriation and distribution of their representations and artifacts.
With respect to rhetoric, in discussion of the relationship between print and electronic
text, ekphrasis functions as a kind of subliminal dependence on imagery and a desire for the
assurance of the recognizable representation as a connection between the symbol and the visual
source, the spectacle and media representation. The fascination of Jay Bolter and Jerome
McGann with the possibilities of the electronic may be, like Friedman's optimism for global
effects and Heidegger's confrontation with technology, somewhat exaggerated, but ekphrasis
functions heavily in the rhetorical appeals of Google. Google provides plenty of opportunities to
look at things. Beyond text, the visual includes the evolution of Google logos as cultural
references; spectacle and voyeurism through such strategies as image archives and satellite
imagery; visual allusions to print capitalism and the authority of print text through web page
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design and origin of the term "Google" itself. Ultimately, as in allusions to the mythology of the
Immigrant Nation, Google developed visual representations that referenced a history of industrial
production, even as the superficial statements of policy and ideology seemed to suggest
something else.
In this connection to the visual, immigration is not just a technology of unbalanced
economic forces constrained by imperialism or neoliberal demands, but has itself become Anne
Demo’s spectacle and the historic dimension of the spectacle, Exhibition. How does such an
intersection function in contemporary society? The search engine is one answer, a technology
that both distributes the spectacle as access to information by a kind of associative indexing, and
through the corporate mechanism of employment. Google has been the most prominent example
from the period spanning dot.com expansion to economic retraction, 2000-2008. More definite
corporate statements are available through the connections of the corporate web page, public
release of prepared information, and reports of legislative proceedings. In addition to such
esoteric content as the previously mentioned corporate mission to "manage the world’s
information," Google provides access to blogs, archives of information classified according to
corporate priorities, and communities of interest designed to attract attention in ways that
promote Google priorities, including immigration. The content in all of these classifications
provides clues to how and why Google develops policies and manages public interaction. More
definite corporate statements are available through the connections of the corporate web page,
public release of prepared information, and reports of legislative proceedings. In addition to such
esoteric content as the previously mentioned corporate mission to "manage the world’s
information," Google provides access to blogs, archives of information classified according to
corporate priorities, and communities of interest designed to attract attention in ways that
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promote Google priorities, including immigration. The content in all of these classifications
provides clues to how and why Google develops policies and manages public interaction.
As a collection of artifacts, Google also represents a range of effects. In the beginning of
the surge to information access, there was Google, and it was good, in economic terms at least,
exploding in less than ten years from a college research project into the goliamoth of search
engine operations, with millions, even billion of hits a day. In terms of technology, Google is a
spectacular application of information management, and by the word according to Google
dedicated to “organize the world‘s information and make it universally accessible and useful”
(About Us), an ambitious project by any measure. To the enterprising consumer/user in search of
specific information, such as medical conditions, historical curiosities, geographical destinations,
news of the day, or significant personalities, as examples, the intuitive answer may seem simple
enough. If media descriptions and the corporation's own declarations are even partly accurate,
Google intended to be a variation of a system transferred from libraries to the convenience of
electronic key words and tags, technology as a gateway to information access. On the other hand,
to consider more rhetorical connections, a personalized Google start page and evolving Google
Logos (or even connections to the iconic design of the original portal) suggest more complicated,
and perhaps even more opportunistic, associations. Google is not just an information gateway.
Google is an information territory, an information nation, “virtually” even a knowledge work
industry of its own.
Consider a simple example of Google as enterprise from the original main page menu in
Figure 2 below. To the right of the menu at the top of the page, users were invited to extend their
interaction with queries and images to connection with the cryptic invitation of "More"
resources, thereby drawing them along to extensive, individualized content and communities of
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interests, from culture to electronic control. As a web page feature, a link with More usually
accounts for a small number of miscellaneous extras or remaining content that cannot be
accounted for any other way. For Google, the connection mean something else.

Figure 3: Google and the invitation to More
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. ©2010 Google, Inc. “More.” Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.

Figure 4: Google and some of More
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. “Even More.” Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
As Figure 4 above illustrates, for Google, More means a lot more. The strategy and extent
of the Invitation to More suggest the true nature of the enterprise because it has not been the
technology of the search engine device that propelled development as much as it has it been the
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idea of expanding interests, both theoretical and literal. Google used communities of common
interests to exploit extension of the enterprise. In terms of Benedict Anderson, communities
discourage transience and encourage commitment, or at least involvement. But Google did not
just elaborate communities. By virtue of the interactions that constitute community, Google does
not just connect to information. Google makes information. Google makes the information that
makes us. If, as Jean Baudrillard and Katherine Hayles suggest, we are information, then the
logical extension of Google's determination to manage all information includes us.
Framing the Study
Two general considerations explain the relationship of Google and Industrial Modernity.
One is historical and includes legislative connections to immigration, to some extent political,
but distinguished from rhetoric as more factual and less interpretive. Alan Liu argues that
cultural criticism is primarily historical. The history of the immigration argument explains how
Industrial Modernity has shaped perception of immigration and determined legislation. The
relationship of historical development to the rhetorical position of Google in support of
immigration exceptions logically follows from the heritage of Industrial Modernity and explains
how Google applied the reasoning of Industrial Modernity to the issue of immigration. The other
consideration is a strongly (and somewhat paradoxically with respect to electronic information)
rhetorical connection to visual imagery. Rhetoric and the history of immigration intersect for
Google in the H-1B argument, especially regarding spectacle and some aspects of immigration
stereotyping.
For two hundred years, what people are, both in terms of identity and perception, has
been determined by Industrial Modernity, the Western European culture of the industrial
revolutions. Medical concepts of the body as an assembly of components, for example, or a view
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of the future that incorporates industrial technology in Jules Verne and Flash Gordon, reflect the
relationship of human beings and technological surroundings in the sense of Heidegger’s reserve.
The assembly line determined the relationship of human beings to technology that inspired such
culturally significant effects as Chaplain's Modern Times, Gilliam's Brazil, and Disney’s
Tomorrowland. The result is the same whether the demand depends on an autonomous
technological consciousness or an extension of power from the hegemonic authority of
production, like Tomorrowland, a future frozen in time. Either way, industrial production
determines the effect. Either way, the subordinate personnel of the industrial organization
assume the nature of resources, commodities to be managed and consumed in the interests of
production. Nemo's submarine, Flash Gordon's spaceship, and Sam Lowery's computers suggest
industrial production as the determination of existence. Either way, the view of the future
elaborates what was the present. This is the status described by Flores and the status for which
the immigrant, in the company of labor, has been one of the most apparent measures of industrial
effects. The immigrant has been positioned in a wider context of Industrial Modernity, both as
part of the ideological community of the industrial revolutions and as part of the corporate
community of knowledge work enterprise that is Google.
Labor disputes as social effects are premised on assumptions of community, us and them.
The immigrant is precariously positioned. Without recognition, without status, the immigrant is
excluded, denied a bargaining position, and potentially subject to more convenient management
as a resource. To some extent that threshold always threatens the immigrant with reduction to the
status of resource, a liminal condition. The condition of resource is one of the arguments through
which Google somewhat paradoxically looked for legislative accommodation. Demonstrating
that this is true requires historical consideration of immigration policy and regulation. The
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condition of resource justifies the relative value of the immigrant for Industrial Modernity. In
Fordist terms (the management systems of Frederick Taylor) as a human being the immigrant is
of marginal value to production, sometimes a liability. The industrial alternative controls and
manages immigration as a resource, sometimes using deportation, sometimes proxy (the
subaltern), sometimes importation with compensation control (as in the threat of strike-breakers),
depending on the demands of production, always with an eye to divided loyalties.
In the production community, the subaltern and the immigrant reside on what Michael
Billig described as the periphery, an area of the community occupied by the strange and the
suspicious. The periphery both identifies, and to some extent makes, the unacceptable or the
marginal, and the immigrant becomes a cultural artifact out of context, such as the California
Chinese in the late 1800s. What does that mean to Google? Without meaningful membership in
the citizen community, the immigrant suffers objectification and possession on one hand, or
complete exclusion on the other hand, a potentially wasted resource or unnecessary burden
depending on the demands of production. In that respect, Google operates in a zone of amorality.
Google identifies with the immigrant as needed for purposes of production.
As a study of the Google search engine enterprise with respect to immigration concerns,
this discussion also partly follows the example of Alan Liu in analysis of the Ford Motor
company and other "progressive" industrial enterprise, although it is also important to understand
that progressive in that sense meant progressive with respect to maximized production, not social
responsibility. These progressive enterprises went through a phase of initial explosive
development comparable to the expansion of Google. In the course of expansion, industrial
enterprise imposed increased control and regulation on relationships between labor and
management as well as the community of the production worker. The corporations of Industrial
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Modernity established conditions of employment for labor. An example is the rules controlling
employee behavior that made labor essentially the property of the production process. Industry
attempted to subordinate individual identity to the demands of production and incorporate
individual identity into the corporate culture as a means to facilitate production. Google likewise
maneuvered to capture immigrants as a labor component of a Google corporate community. As a
"human resource" of production (in the terms of Taylor) or “People Operations” in Google lingo,
immigration is potentially a measure or assessment criteria for the influence of Industrial
Modernity.
Disregarding the Unseen
Communities and the exploitation of information are a rhetorical part of Google. Another
part, the technical part, also suggests entry points into industrial connections, but it is also a
separate issue. This is a rhetorical analysis. Google is interactive in more ways than the functions
of its electronic applications, its interface. As an example, the interactive nature of information
technology that Google did not totally predict has been periodically evident in manipulation by
users of the formulas that determine Google search results, unplanned repurposing of the
technology. Search results are affected by use. Google claims that use is a democratic process. In
reality, voting is controlled by the ability to buy votes, to either generate artificial votes or pay to
make information more accessible by intervention. In a sense Google becomes its own product at
a technical level, managed by users with their own agendas (the ultimate integration?). That level
of integration, along with the technical aspects of Google operation, the algorithms and
specifications that control the products and services engaging users, is beyond the scope of the
rhetorical and historical considerations of this discussion.
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Knowledge of those technical features is also closely controlled corporate information,
revealed only to the extent recognized by the enterprise as productively self-interested, such as in
the course of management "Conversations" (online reports) or developer blogs. The technical
parts of Google, therefore, are much less accessible in terms of communication and perception
than the rhetorical effects of routine use and media. The Google portal page reveals, for instance,
rhetorical connections with more direct authoritative confirmation than the programming
language that makes it possible. We know that a "cookie" connects a business with a user,
privileging the language and culture of the term's origin. However, the use of such a term is an
argument at a different level as it spreads through other cultures in connection with technology.
Therefore, the technical operations of programming and display have been deferred.
The Terminology of Enterprise
Terminology has been considered contextually. What exactly is management, for
instance? I rely not so much on technical definitions as on the meaning suggested in expert
analysis. There is no “exactly” for abstract concepts like management in the process of history.
There are only practiced concepts, such as Manuel Castells’ sense of management as
responsibility for controlling the details of labor relationships and assignments (171).
Terminology has therefore been included in the context of narrative, addressed as it occurs.
Some additional explanation has been included here.
Technically, H-1B is not now an immigration argument, because the term “immigration”
has been limited legislatively to admission for permanent residence. H-1B does not directly
establish permanent residence, and does not therefore qualify as an immigration problem.
Permanent residence must be established separately, but the essential issues apply to both
immigration as permanent residence and to temporary admission for work, including competitive
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advantages, family coherence, immigrant opportunities, exploitation, displacement, and
discrimination.
For Alan Liu as well as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, social responsibility depends
on an equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. Equity, like evil, is a slippery term,
but depends on fundamental notions of fairness and basic necessities. Other terms of
significance for the discussion are less relative. Also for Liu and Hardt and Negri, the industrial
revolutions produced Modernity as characteristic ways of thinking and expression, such as
psychoanalysis, the assembly line, and Art Deco. Ways of thinking about the industrial
revolutions were considered advanced and modern. That mental or intellectual orientation has
been characterized as Modernity. For Liu, as for Paul Scheffer, the science, imperialism, and
capitalism that accompanied the industrial revolutions are the most critical attributes of the
processes and the mentality that constitute the ideological conditions of Industrial Modernity as I
reflect on it here.
Science is considered here as Thomas Kuhn’s idea of thorough, systematic, reflexive
study motivated by problem-solving. Edward Said describes imperialism as a kind of nominally
custodial acquisition/possession of separate communities that provide resources to the empire,
regardless of how responsibility of the colonizer is perceived. The trajectories of science and
empire intersect where the acquisition of knowledge becomes the possession of the subject, as
determined by Timothy Mitchell in the effects of Exhibition as a kind of subordinate cultural
possession or acquisition. We will possess by knowing. Exhibition takes multiple forms,
including publication and education. The classic Exhibition simply displays what the exhibitor
claims to be representative of the subject.
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Science and imperialism are fundamentally consistent in the sense that knowing requires
a kind or degree of possession (at least to the extent of the privileged vantage point). Possession
is, therefore, as much rhetorical as practical. I possess because I say it is mine, or I possess in the
sense that I have knowledge of it, knowledge and the symbolic relationship expressed as
Exhibition. I may only directly possess what I can get my hands on or manage physically, but I
can also possess what I can exert a rhetorical influence over by the act of Exhibition, the act of
display and view. It is this rhetorical influence that concerns the effects of information
technology. What does the rhetorical nature of possession reveal about an information
technology enterprise like Google in the conflicted contexts of globalization and Industrial
Modernity?
Capitalism is the system of production and wealth management that theoretically and
rhetorically invokes free enterprise, unrestricted opportunity for participation in economic
activity through investment and initiative. In reality, either through the logical outcomes of free
enterprise (venture capital and survival of the meanest, for instance), or through the effects of
prior empowerment (such as inherited wealth and financial dynasties), capitalism tends to
concentrate wealth and resources in the control of a small part of the population, the capitalist
aristocracy.
Science, imperialism, and capitalist industrial production combine to form the foundation
of Modernity for analysts such as Liu. As a characteristic process, industrial ideology examined
things, took possession of them, and used them as resources for the production of Modernity.
The characteristic corporate organization of Industrial Modernity reflects the priorities and
principles of production, including device technologies and scientific methodology, and the
rhetorical expressions of possession. These characteristics become more clear with respect to
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specific industrial enterprise, such as General Electric or the Ford Motor Company, that
integrated knowledge and possession as interests or resources of production, and for Google
(with respect to the industry of knowledge work).
This is a rhetorical study of a collision (or at least an intersection) of trajectories in the
flows of technology that define an information enterprise known to us as the search engine,
Google. Yet Google is really much more than a search engine. It is a comprehensive enterprise
for the manufacture and distribution of information through development and manipulation of
consumer and labor communities, a Ford Motor Company of information beyond the wildest
imagination of any assembly line. How that is true and why it matters become apparent by
considering Google as it represented itself where it engaged global interests through the flow of
immigration and the effects of its own corporate identity, what we see when we see Google.
Significance
Significance: The Effect of Industrial Modernity
Arguments of achievement aside, fulfillment can be about doing something you like to
do. Otherwise, life as for Foucault, is a state of constant tension motivated by greed, brutality and
survival instinct, rewarded only by ego and power. If what Google represents is less democratic
opportunity, and more the acquisition of million dollar homes in Silicon Valley (capitalist
adventure in the manner of Industrial Modernity), then the prospects for technologically inspired
prosperity and social reconciliation are constrained by related limits, and the agenda of the
neoliberal project could represent less democratic opportunity and more exclusion. The
discernible relationship between the Industry of Knowledge Work and the objectives of capitalist
industrial production do not suggest a Postmodern kind of collaboration.
The information industry has been subject to extensive academic scrutiny regarding
capitalist industrial power relationships, sometimes with skeptical results, such as Theodor
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Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Jean Baudrillard, Martin Heidegger, Alan Liu and Marshall
McLuhan, and Stuart Selber; sometimes with more optimism for Thomas Friedman, Francis
Fukuyama, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. I cannot revolutionize perceptions of
technology that have evolved from three hundred years of industrial development. However,
through consideration of the immigrant as a resource of production, I can contribute insight from
another perspective to our relationship with a technology that we use every day. This is a toaster
with unseen hands reaching out from the machine age. If that does not scare you, nothing will.
Significance: The Habit of Control
The imperial ways of thinking depend on the expansion of enterprise illustrated in the
history of immigration. Historically, immigration has been one of the most direct and extensive
responses to enterprise. The managers of enterprise took control of immigration as “human
resources” in the production process. In some fashion, every observer of migration, from
Appadurai to Zolberg eventually confronts the overwhelmingly economic conditions affecting
the push and pull of migratory flows. Like the degrees of prejudice and discrimination that play
into destructive conflicts, the policies of asylum and refugee status vary substantially, but the
constant pressure of relocation depends even more on the nature of commercial enterprise and
the economic activity produced from technological development. Economic effects have been
considered at the level of employment in terms of competition for jobs, but this is also
misleading. Competition for jobs depends on the management of production. The relationship of
jobs, competition, and management becomes more apparent at times of economic stress. When
the economy is more favorable, the discussion tends to involve equity and community, the
imagined culture of opportunity.
Imperialism and Industrial Modernity, however, represent ways of thinking about labor
as a resource of production, human resources, rather than human beings performing tasks. Even
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more than that, the imperialist mentality includes the inherent assumption that capitalist
aristocracy and industrial management are entitled to control. As a class, that can be a class
conflict, but beyond class conflict, it is simply a way of thinking, the habit of control, another
perspective on the mentality of Industrial Modernity.
Significance: Ambiguity
Ambiguity is an accepted feature of technology, but perhaps the extent and
characterization of effects have not been fully appreciated. As analysts such as Andrew
Feenberg, as well as Hardt and Negri, suggest, one danger of reliance on technology is the
perception (or misconception) that technology somehow inherently escapes from the control of
structures and organizations, as if technology has a life of its own, independent of its makers and
users; that technology manages us. The history and rhetoric of how information technology, in
the form of an enterprise like Google, continues to perceive resources according to policies and
objectives designed to manage wealth suggests that the effect is not the result of knowledge and
machines as independent forces. The effect is the result of knowledge and machines managed by
human beings with the same motivation and priorities of what would be a hardly less subtle
middle school student, only having the advantage of possessing some specialized knowledge.
This is a lesson worth appreciating. Whether that is reassuring or discouraging, good or evil, is
not the point as much as the need to consider whether technology can be applied and employed
in ways that encourage constructive relationships among human beings or whether technology
will continue to be the means to impose inequalities and exclusion.
Significance: The Future
In the realm of technological effects, the development of information technology to some
extent returned expertise to the Bill Gates and Steve Jobs community of garage-based tinkering,
at least in the mind of popular perception. As Jondan Eilola-Johnson suggested, in the popular
68

mind’s eye, web developers and social marketers have been geeky high school students obsessed
with the intricacies of online communication. The necessary engineering and programming that
now enable highly technical equipment and controls, like the industrial heritage of production,
can be obscured by the convenient façade of information management applications, by apps and
authoring systems as well as the Graphical User Interface, and by the ready availability of
components on ebay. The production behind a toaster becomes obscured by the reliable
convenience of operating a switch to activate the device. Likewise, the convenience of clicking
an icon obscures the production behind information access. The complexity and operational
demands of technology are hidden, or at least disguised, by the deceptive convenience of the
interface.
In some ways, how Google accomplishes such objectives is as mysterious as the formulas
that control their search results, yet Google is not strictly an opaque enterprise in terms of public
presence. Like an ideal theory of information, Google is all about transparency, at least in a
rhetorical way. We are invited to examine their corporate structure and culture, officers,
employees, and statements of ideology. We are invited to participate in a wide variety of
information access and management communities and resources. What we know about Google is
mediated, however, by both the print capitalism of Industrial Modernity and ekphrasis as a
supplement or alternative to the abstractions of conventional print text. Possibly never before in
history has an organization had such comprehensive control over the distribution of information
under the representation of exactly the opposite. What Google is, therefore, depends heavily on
selective information and perception of it, the rhetorics of information management, visual
interpretation, and community membership. Google is itself an interval in McLuhan’s terms, the
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collision of information with the seeker, and the result is a commodification of both information
and consumers. How far does that commodification extend?
Those considerations also suggest questions about the future, a complicated mix of the
immigrant in a culture defined by enterprise. At least since the first industrial revolution, the
view of the future has been controlled and determined by the nature of capitalism, industrial
production interpreted by acute observers such as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells; observers who
created various manifestations of Flash Gordon; and observers who designed Tomorrowland at
Disney World. Barthes’ “destruction of the past” by subculture as an indistinct view of the future
for Richard Hebdige, ironically, yet with perfect logic, invokes the concrete, frozen, even
reactionary future view of Industrial Modernity represented by Disney’s Tomorrowland,
“speaking” for Barthes, “excessively” of reality (137), on the threshold of Walter Benjamin’s
second technology. If the second technology is film, then that is an equal irony for Disney,
although whether the second technology has been fully realized is also a fair question. Is
Disney’s future view now a Tomorrowland of yesterday, a past present, elaborated by a past
future, or does the future still depend on industrial production and the immigrant as a resource,
meaning that it has not changed? Does the “future” continue to be defined by an industrial
combination of exposed machinery and art deco design? Success is nothing new in terms of
immigration and the Immigrant Nation, but is success always a reflexive effect? Is it ever a
reflexive effect? Do we all benefit, or is the benefit channeled in predictable ways? As
commodification of the future suggests, and the kind of international interaction commodified by
Disney suggests, the view of the future that emerged from Industrial Modernity privileged the
consumption of resources (represented as much by the immigrant as anything) for industrial
production. Did the contemporary view of the future suggest development in new directions, or
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did it continue to be, like the dysfunctional future in the cinematic fiction, Brazil, a cynical
product of Industrial Modernity, where escape is only a fatally hazardous fantasy and the
immigrant, in fact any minority, virtually disappears?
Review
If the ideology of capitalist industrial production persists as a gratification of the few, or
especially persists that way in the disguise of something more democratic and collaborative, then
the underlying disparities that produce intense and extensive conflict go unresolved. For that
reason, it is important to understand how an enterprise such as Google, with global influence and
effect, continues to represent, not necessarily some kind of resurrected/reborn international
enterprise with opportunities for all, but a continuation of capitalist Industrial Modernity. The
difficulty of Industrial Modernity with respect to morality is the potential for discrimination and
oppression that employ technology, not as a universal benefit and inherent interest, but as an
opportunity for exploitation. Where production represents investment opportunity, it is activity to
be encouraged primarily for the advantage of the privileged. In and of itself, that does not have to
be a bad thing, but if the end result is even more intense exclusion, then we should be asking
ourselves how we can achieve something a little less discriminatory. Otherwise, the effect of
benefit is incidental to exploitation. As Liu and Baudrillard emphasize, Modernity has one
comprehensive priority, the perpetuation of control. The issues of anti-trust legislation and
banking regulation illustrate the effects of resistance and contention in the Age of Industrial
Modernity, and Industrial Modernity does not easily relinquish control. Other than for profit,
Baudrillard reminds us, "Capital doesn't give a damn" what anybody thinks.
As a business enterprise, Google represents a characteristic pattern of explosive IT
development, from inception to an IPO of unprecedented dimensions in less than a decade, while
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the Google corporate culture invokes the jeans and adolescent-entrepreneur-in-the-garage
qualities associated with a new era of Steve Jobs and Bill Gates info-tech-style enterprise. In
character and image, Google has been an enterprise cowboy of the IT frontier, blazing a trail into
information access for a likewise unprecedented community of users, (and perhaps the frontier is
a suitable metaphor where borders and fences are involved), but there are more puzzling
dimensions of inclusion and exclusion represented by this wide-open quest for information
resources. Does the self-proclaimed benign and casual information community engineered by
Google represent a social paradigm shift in the way of Thomas Friedman's flat world, a move
toward some kind of more democratic social equity, or is information technology enterprise
represented by Google (and the industry of knowledge work) really another way of circulating
resources among the privileged, a continuation of empire in the tradition of Modernity? If a
technology enterprise operates according to the expectations of Industrial Modernity, then it may
privilege discrimination and imperialism, an environment which does not encourage the
productive majority. How Google managed the push for acquisition of additional immigrant
personnel suggests direct connections to industrial production, not so much an economy of free
access for all, but of targeted dependence, the immigrant as acolyte in a cult of technology.
Google may operate as the production industry of an empire, not as a universal resource. With
respect to the neoliberal project, perhaps that would not be such a bad thing, but it does not
support democracy and opportunity in the sense of universal availability.
If a contentious, brutal, and exploited world is the consequence of unmediated industrial
capitalism, the capitalist industrial production of Modernity, then the role of knowledge work
might be worth some thought. Google has academic, social, and humanitarian dimensions. The
claim is not that Google deliberately promotes some kind of secret capitalist industrial agenda.
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Google may even believe that it is benignly academic, social, and humanitarian (do no evil), but
the truth is that by virtue of its critical ideology, Google is not, at least not yet, as circumstances
such as Chinese censorship illustrate. Google is an industrial project with some academic, social,
and humanitarian angles. Whether those angles have the potential for a better world is not a
question with a comfortable answer in any sense. The relationship of Google to immigration
illustrates how that ambiguity has played out in principle.
Who is this for?
This is an appeal to a scholarly community as an audience that questions the relationship
of technology and society while looking for solutions to problems independent of political
considerations, but an audience that also questions careless disregard for the influence of
technology in both routine affairs and policy issues; an audience familiar with the capabilities of
technology and the theorists concerned with technology but suspicious of technological
extremism, the educated critical thinker. I speak to those for whom technology means more than
scientific method and engineering. I speak to those who ask questions about the relationships of
privilege and discrimination, regardless of whether their inclinations are deterministic or
instrumental. What does the information industry bring to social responsibility and ethics? Does
it bring opportunities for reconciliation, or merely the extension of entrenched supremacy in the
form of capitalist aristocracy?
What I hope to accomplish is an understanding of how Google and the information
industry relate to the development of technology and the application of technological solutions to
problems of information management, in combination with managing social aspects of the
business process. Is information technology the solution to communication problems in a
Postmodern condition, or is it another way to sell informational rocks and air for a reactionary
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economic enterprise, or a quantifiable combination? Using immigration as the lens and the
standard, some of the potential focal points are arguments about the sufficiency of technical
expertise and the relationship to the production values of Industrial Modernity, the immigrant in
contemporary society, the nature of Google as a business practice, and speculation about the
future effects of technology in a highly interactive global society.
Overview of Chapters
Chapter Two Overview: Immigration History
In Chapter Two the history of immigration explains that originally the United States had
no immigration laws as such. Immigration and colonization were often indistinguishable.
Immigrants were desirable. If you could get to the English colonies, you could live in the English
colonies and benefit from all the rights and privileges accruing hereto, whatever they might be.
There were some exceptions. Individual communities had varying standards of undesirable
character qualities that might result in encouraging an individual to move on. Eventually some
notion of the criminally insane came to be applied in principle, but the idea of discouraging
entrance into North America based on race or ethnic origin did not get a lot of traction until
development of an “American” identity that assumed a kind of entitlement to a share of
resources that could be impacted by “unfair” competition from culturally competitive
immigrants. The history of non-regulation has been disputed by Aristide Zolberg’s observation
that as English subjects, immigration was not under control of the colonies anyway, but the
practical effect of immigration control by the English government was not always apparent.
Chapter Three Overview: Legislation and Regulation
Chapter Three extends consideration of the idea that discriminatory attitudes and the
Exclusion Acts were conceived through arguments of unfair competition. The Exclusion Acts
essentially formalized economically and “patriotically” inspired attitudes. However, the
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Exclusion Acts set precedents that ultimately justified such discriminatory regulation as the
internment of Americans during WWII for the crime of Japanese ancestry, and formalized a
trajectory expressed in current law and legislative records. Therefore, the relevant legal
statements and appropriate documentation are the next focus. After establishing the legal status
of H-1B, the chapter examines the rhetorical effects of Google statements in Congressional
hearings to consider testimony regarding H-1B limits
Chapter Four Overview: Rhetorical Effects
Chapter Four considers Google as a self-concept and as a rhetorical media construct.
What do we see when we see Google? How does Google present and perceive itself in terms of
its own documentation and content? What do web connections, corporate sources, and media
representation reveal about Google as a practice and an ideology? In a sense, Google is a selfgenerating enterprise, producing information in the process of managing information. What
Google produces is a reflexive part of what it manages. Into this reflexive cycle, Google literally
incorporates communities of interest, ranging from users seeking information to the immigrant
expert appropriated to provide it. Examining Google from an internal perspective reveals the
ultimate economic relationships and the necessity of commodification as a business practice. As
capitalist enterprise, Google relies on the industrial model that cannot avoid adopting and
developing operating practices of commodification for both the product and the resources of
production, and commodification affects the nature of the information available.
After the internal view, the discussion addresses what Google looked like from the
outside with respect to the immigration question. With reference to Anne Demo, The New York
Times, spectacle, and the effects of visual rhetoric, the discussion focuses on representation of
the immigrant through specific examples, (reminiscent of the Elian Gonzales case) including
Google personnel. While presenting sympathetic portrayals of immigrants struggling with the
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demands of immigration regulations, this information also reveals that the effect of H-1B
exceptions does not necessarily apply directly to the interests of personnel acquisition. Besides
providing insight into potential manipulation of the H-1B exception, visual effects establish
revealing connections between the “objective” standpoints of media information and Google’s
interests. Through visual imagery, Google emphasizes concern with information. Through visual
imagery, Google involves itself in culture. Through visual imagery, Google connects with
communities. Through visual imagery, connections are established with external media, the view
from the outside. Whether these connections are deliberate or not (the question of evil) is even
less important than the fact of the effect. Google connects with immigration in a context
managed by visual imagery. Visual imagery provides organizational, navigational, and
ideological guidance in the Google enterprise. Visual imagery helps determine the immigrant in
the organization and explain the argument.
Chapter Five Overview: Discussion and Conclusion
As Aihwa Ong explained, loyalty in a complex, global, economic relationship is not a
simple thing. It is apparent from Google’s management of the H-1B discussion that more may be
at stake than simple acquisition of trained technology personnel. Google’s argument has a
metaphor in white space, a visual form that turns transparency “on its head” by both directing
and concealing information. Direct opponents of Google’s enthusiasm for additional H-1B
exceptions, such as Senator Richard Durbin, have emphasized the predatory nature of selectively
removing educated and experienced technology personnel from their land of origin, although the
unspoken argument may be suspicion of the loyalty that can be expected from an immigrant who
changes countries, not especially to escape poverty and oppression as much as for additional
compensation. The rationale of an argument may be inherently inconsistent if it contemplates on
one hand the potential to encourage foreign connections while on the other hand it contemplates
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the contributions of immigrants to American interests (an inconsistency that Kenneth Burke
developed with respect to motives). Appreciating such issues and motives requires sustained
critical thinking. An immigrant could be valuable as much for connections to other countries as
for technical expertise. There is also a strange incongruity with respect to industrial capitalism
that appropriates labor as a resource in a comprehensive way. That appropriation then both
demands the loyalty of the worker and assures the loyalty of the worker by incorporating the life
world into the corporate world.
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CHAPTER TWO: IMMIGRATION AND COMMERCE
Connecting to History
In the course of United States history, industry eventually took over as the dominant
economic force, replacing exploration, colonization, and the traditional family farming culture
that preceded agri-business. Industrial management made immigration a “human resources”
concern, not so much for control of wages, but to protect what was by then a kind of hegemony
taken for granted by the foremost commercial industries of the late 1800s; what I characterize as
the “habit of control” for management.
The first formal legislative expression of national immigration regulation as labor
management took effect with approval of the original Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. When
Google intervened to influence immigration legislation a hundred and fifty years later, the
argument reflected the attempts of Industrial Modernity to insure continued control of labor as a
resource of production with the help of prejudice and discrimination. This part explains how
control of labor through immigration became a characteristic feature of Industrial Modernity and
what that means for Google.
Represented by a range of scholars, including Bernard Bailyn, Sigmund Diamond, Derek
Heater, David Reimers, Aristide Zolberg, and more recently, Susan Mary-Grant, one thing
becomes apparent from the prevailing view of immigration history in the American United
States. Although immigration has always involved the effects of discrimination and prejudice, no
comprehensive kind of exclusion took place prior to the late 1800s. Reimers, for instance, cites
George Washington’s encouragement for immigration and the lack of constitutional restrictions
(8-9) to illustrate approval for immigration. In spite of prejudice and discrimination, immigration
was routine. In addition, prejudice, discrimination, and exploitation are not the qualities that
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determine the imagined “Immigrant Nation”. The Immigrant Nation reflects ideological
principles of freedom and opportunity. “Americans throughout their history have prized the ideal
of freedom” (Heater 72). In the context of idealism and identity, the commercial concerns that
prompted and sustained immigration tend to be either minimized or taken for granted.
Yet commercial investment and return, Susan-Mary Grant’s “hope for profit” (28), has
been the real basis of immigration. Christopher Columbus searched for trade routes to the orient,
not higher consciousness, and commerce was the force behind immigration. Most colonial
initiatives were corporate, government-authorized, agricultural and mercantile projects involved
with the "acquisition of wealth" (Diamond 562), and designed to produce revenue in
consideration of investor financing, both private and royal, as in the case of Sir Walter Raleigh.
Even the Puritans were expected to make a profit. Individuals might join a colonial enterprise as
an opportunity to escape oppressive circumstances and achieve individual accomplishment, and
groups might have political motivation for independence, but otherwise economic opportunity
trumped moral discipline in Plymouth Colony (Diamond 568), and “profit trumped piety” in
Virginia (Grant 45), the level of individual concern included. Investors themselves might be
motivated by ideological concerns, such as Lord Baltimore in Maryland, but prosperity of
colonies and the businesses that constituted colonies depended on the fundamental premise of
investment and return. This is not, however, a valorization of commerce. The point is that
through the effects of commerce, manipulation of immigration became a characteristic feature of
Industrial Modernity adopted by Google.
As industry developed, the need for labor increased, and eventually an associated
resistance to exploitation of labor evolved as well (Zolberg 174). Railroads as an industrial
enterprise later became particularly significant because the first specific and national restriction
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of immigration took place in connection with railroad construction, and the commercial nature of
the railroad industry illustrates the close connection of commerce and industry to immigration as
a labor resource. Nor does the mythological ideal of resistance to oppression and the associated
guarantees of individual rights change the facts of commercial enterprise throughout the
American colonies. Colonies, including Plymouth, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, were
commercial in nature, not just by necessity, but by inspiration and authorization. Maryland, for
instance, one of the most likely candidates for ideological inspiration as the originator of the Act
of Tolerance through the efforts of Lord Baltimore, eventually evolved, not into a utopian refuge
of acceptance and equality, but into a competitive tobacco industry notable for slavery, while
Virginia commoditized not only servitude, but even the importation of women at one hundred
and twenty leaves of good tobacco (Grant 42-43, 66). What the history of colonial enterprise
makes apparent in the accounts of Reimers, Diamond, and even Aristide Zolberg’s response to
unregulated immigration, has been that the origin of most colonial enterprise depended on
elements of investment and return as opposed to humanistic ideological principles, including the
expectation of profit for the storied Puritan Pilgrims (Grant 50).
Control of immigration policy as a kind of labor management strategy became a
characteristic of Industrial Modernity when industrial enterprise, such as railroads, achieved
national scope and concurrent expectations of supremacy. Google subsequently aligned itself
with Industrial Modernity through this typical industrial practice. What Steven Levy described as
Google’s “admittedly” elitist attitude with respect to employment may also suggest the
possibility of class concerns, but this is not meant to be a Marxist critique any more than a
valorization of commerce. Analysis of labor relations tends to invoke class conflicts in a socialist
or humanitarian context, but this review concerns, not class conflict as much as the consolidation
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and expression of power in Baudrillard’s sense of capital without regard for class or resistance,
only for the fact of control; the habit of control, rather than the struggle to prevail in a conflict of
principle.
Here I explain how immigration became a labor management effect of Industrial
Modernity, and presupposed Google’s eventual legislative intervention in the way of industrial
interests rather than encouragement for diversity or a wider distribution of opportunities. There
are no imperative requirements for diversity and distribution of wealth in the development and
application of information technology, yet appreciating the effects of global enterprise and
making informed choices about the use of technology depend on understanding connections to
technology in the sense that Alan Liu, Paul Scheffer, and Aristide Zolberg use social
responsibility and social justice, suggesting equity and conflict resolution. Thomas Friedman, for
instance, saw information technology as the gateway to a new democracy of global inclusion, a
“flat” world. The potential reality of such an optimistic view depends on moral responsibility and
ways of thinking about information. If social responsibility is the appearance we buy into
through engagement with technology and representations of community associated with a
technology enterprise like Google, then if nothing else, as a matter of critical thinking, we should
understand the actual ideology and the actual effects. We should not rely on an implied rhetorical
neutrality of the information. In spite of the emphasis on information and universal community,
Google is not neutral, and involvement with immigration suggests the kind of thinking that
guided Google on the way to technological prominence.
I review immigration history from English colonial development and the early nation of
the United States to the time of the contentious conditions Lisa Flores describes in connection
with the Great Depression. Initially that history reveals a consistent lack of immigration
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regulation. The lack of regulation does not establish that immigration was ever free of
controversy or “tension” in Flores’ terms, but immigration was a normal condition of affairs.
Immigration was the way life was. Through historical review, it becomes apparent that
immigration characterized colonial development. Commercial interests also encouraged
favorable perceptions of immigration to the New World, such as Richard Hakluyt’s encouraging
accounts, as a way to insure a supply of labor, but immigration in America has never been
primarily for the defense of principles or the benefit of immigrants. Escape from tyranny and
fulfillment of individual opportunity have not been the real priorities of immigration.
Immigration has always been more for the benefit of investors, but the ideology of immigration
as a gateway to freedom and opportunity has been emphasized as a rhetorical encouragement.
Equality has been even more problematic, as the struggle to maintain discipline and organization
in the colonies illustrates. Prejudice and discrimination later served to discourage unity among
groups providing labor, while the connection to commercial and industrial interests remained
less apparent.
History
History: Open Borders
As the population of America increased during the first three hundred years of
colonization and independence, immigration in the sense of arrival for purposes of extended
enterprise, both individual and corporate, continued without significant limitation. As will be
explained in more detail, Derek Heater, David Reimers, Paul Scheffer, and Aristide Zolberg
suggest that the accepted view has been a view of immigration without comprehensive control,
and that immigration control did not interest England’s American colonies beyond the necessity
of supporting residents. Economic conditions made immigrants welcome. There was no need to
limit immigration.
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While acknowledging the nature of the established view, Zolberg suggests that taxes and
citizenship requirements actually controlled immigration indirectly, and that the colonies lacked
authority for more direct action. According to Zolberg, lack of legislative authority explains the
apparent disinterest that seemed characteristic of colonial immigration control. Immigration, if it
could have been controlled at all, would have been the responsibility of England’s Parliament.
Zolberg argues that immigration was only a British concern to the extent that British commerce
might benefit. Zolberg’s ideas of indirect control and legislative disconnect require a response
because the determination to impose de facto controls suggests a wider colonial and early
national consensus about concern with immigration management than the argument supports.
While the ideology of xenophobia, religious or political discrimination, and extreme, exclusive
patriotism has always been part of the response to immigration to some extent, it is important to
realize that none of these excessive kinds of reactions resulted in significant consensus about
regulation of immigration prior to intervention by prominent commercial interests in the late
1800s. Conflicts took place in connection with Nativists and immigrant groups, such as the
Know Nothings and Catholic Irish, but these conflicts did not comprehensively affect
immigration policies. As Zolberg’s own review of immigration trends confirms, overall
immigration continued to increase without direct limitation until the involvement of immigrants
in labor issues became a threat to industrial management.
Immigration has always been an effect of enterprise in America, a consequence of what
Bernard Bailyn and Sigmund Diamond collectively regard as belief in wealth, the previously
mentioned “profit motive” of colonial enterprise. Again, Columbus wanted a trade route to the
Orient, not higher consciousness, although perhaps in that very quality of economic no-brainers,
we have come to accept the effects of commerce as a kind of underlying neutral assumption.
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Consideration of commerce and colonial history invites a response in the way of blithe
acknowledgment that colonists cared about business, but we can talk about something more
interesting, like starvation, war, and persecution. Columbus discovered unfamiliar territory. The
drama of discovery, in and of itself, tends to push the commercial nature of the enterprise into
the background. Without consideration for financial aspects, the Fountain of Youth, the City of
Gold, and pirate voyages may capture adventurous imagination, but where’s the glory in the
colonial equivalent of retail chains and agribusiness? The Puritan colonists have been valorized
as examples of courage and determination in the face of adversity rather than the Englishinvestor-supported MacFarm franchise that Grant refers to in connection with the profit motive.
David Reimers attributes the lack of concern for immigration regulation and management
to the desirability of cheap labor rather than escape from tyranny or self-actualization (8).
Morality and individual belief mediate commerce, such as in the establishment of the Plymouth
Colony, yet the commercial nature of the American project has been consistently subordinated to
the rhetoric of ideals and principles. Heater's emphasis on freedom as motivation for emigration
to the United States in the colonial era for the New England Puritans (72), as an example,
oversimplifies the economic nature of most colonization, including the importation of hundreds
of thousands of slaves (Zolberg 27). Despite Heater's desire to set aside slavery’s "gross
hypocrisy" for the sake of argument, diverting the focus from slavery obscures not just the moral
and ideological issues which concern Heater, but more significantly, the underlying economic
motivation. Slavery was not just a subjugation of human beings. It was fundamentally an
economic exploitation, a resource of cheap and manageable labor for chartered colonial
enterprise, the same qualities that made other immigrants desirable (Heater 78, Reimers 8, 88).
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The clamor over "social and moral inferiority" that Reimers refers to (12) in connection
with the development of the Chinese Exclusion Acts followed a substantial history of
encouragement for immigration as a resource of colonial enterprise, positive contributions to the
Nation of Immigrants that America knew itself as (Heater 71, Zolberg 70). The Immigrant
Nation of America, as Heater describes it, imagines a community not only made up of
immigrants, but welcoming immigrants as well. The rhetoric of ideals became the privileged
public expression. In this imagined Immigrant Nation, the motivation for immigration depends
on escape from tyranny represented by such iconic spectacles as the Massachusetts Bay colony
and the Statue of Liberty (Heater 72). In the imagined Immigrant Nation, regulation is not a
problem because there is none. With George Washington’s approval, the poor, downtrodden,
and weak in spirit arrive unobstructed and welcomed.
History: Vacant Land of the Free
Freedom in America has some specific Constitutional forms, such as Freedom of Speech
and the Press in the Bill of Rights. Other common perceptions of freedom are less formalized
and somewhat more qualified, but equally familiar, such as the freedom to move about. For
some observers, including Heater, Aiwa Ong and Paul Scheffer, in totality this expression of
individual and ideological freedom has always been a feature of immigration and remains an
ongoing concern to individual immigrants. Freedom and opportunity concerned and motivated
immigrants from the earliest promotion of colonial enterprise, but as motivation for immigration,
freedom and opportunity have been more significant as a rhetorical incentive than as substantial
effects, more of a marketing strategy rather than the basic objective, and the valorized ideals of
freedom upstage other prominent commercial connections to the enterprise, including working
relationships, regulation, and resources.
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Reference to Puritan work ethic is legendary, for instance. The Puritans brought with
them, not just escape from tyranny, but also dedication to labor, yet even the practical connection
of the work ethic to labor has been subordinated to Heater’s ideological inspiration of resistance
to oppression, while personal responsibility to work hard and mind your own business partly
contradicts the corporate capitalist investment nature of the enterprise. In the imagined
immigration ideology of the Immigrant Nation, humanist concern for the individual and the
mutual benefit of the social contract with the nation takes precedence over responsibility to the
commercial corporate mission, which became a problem in a very real sense when colonists
insisted on pursuing individual projects that were not necessarily productive in terms of the
corporate enterprise. Some Jamestown colonists, for instance, insisted on hunting where there
was no game or looking for nonexistent gold rather than preparing for a winter that proved to be
mostly unendurable. The expectation of individual performance takes place in the context of
commercial enterprise.
The working relationships determined by the commercial nature of colonial enterprise
and the subsequent demands of industrial development shaped the concept of freedom. For
Michael Cohen and Ibrahim Sirkeci, as well as Diamond, Heater, and Scheffer, the economics
of investment and return propelled most labor-connected initiatives, from slavery and indentured
servitude to the enlightened tinkering that developed innovative technology (partly borrowed
from England), such as steam power and all the consequent Dickensian enterprise included.
Opposition to slavery increased, but the demand for labor also increased along with
manufacturing, especially in the southern textile industries. Independence from England
disrupted supplies of manufactured goods. Industrial development further accelerated, with the
Northern states gaining the most varied and intense economic activity (Zolberg 131-132).
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Increased manufacturing was not totally a result of supply and demand affected by the
American Revolution, however, not totally an effect of the open market. Regulation, or lack of it,
had a profound effect on the control of commercial enterprise. One of the obstacles to industrial
development in the colonies had been legislative protection for English business. Independence
and the end of English sovereignty also ended those restrictions, creating another kind of
freedom, a regulatory vacuum exploited by free enterprise. Patent and copyright protection by
the Crown for English industrial development, such as railroads and glass production, no longer
applied. American entrepreneurs were free to take advantage of any technology that could be
successfully borrowed (to put it kindly) from British sources. According to Lawrence Lessig,
however, American entrepreneurs developing borrowed technologies, promptly and somewhat
ironically demanded government protection from similar exploitation by their own countrymen
in cases such as their own railroads, helping to fuel the evolution of enterprise, but also
extending the expectation that industry would make the choices.
To the extent that commerce ruled, freedom therefore could not prosper without
enterprise and enterprise could not prosper without resources, particularly what seemed at one
time to be an endless supply of productive land (Grant 186, Diamond 561). It is not exactly a
coincidence that the advent of national immigration legislation coincided with actual unification
of the continental United States by the railroads, what Scheffer described as a symbolic
constriction of space (233), but that does not totally explain the result. To some extent,
Americans could be free, as Diamond and Grant suggest, because they had alternatives
represented by a frontier of empty space, at least empty according to European standards of
development. Indigenous occupants had a different perspective, but they underwent periodic
attitude adjustment at the behest of their European competitors. The land also provided abundant
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materials, materials that represent, as Diamond goes on to argue, freedom in the form of
resources as much as freedom from tyranny or any other kind of freedom. Escape from
persecution has little real value without exploitable resources, as the Pilgrims and Jamestown
Colony could appreciate well enough after they were reduced to starvation by a combination of
want and the previously mentioned refusal of some colonists to accept responsibility for
corporate interests.
Development of technology compressed space with more efficient transportation and
communication. Competition for some resources, such as water, became more complex, and
freedom came under constant re-examination and adjustment. In the context of regulation, the
connection of freedom to practical opportunities became even more closely associated with the
opportunity to work, however limited that employment might be. The availability of land for
occupation continued to represent a theoretical ideal of freedom, but the practical effects of
socialization and finance often made employment the most realistic option for immigrants as
opposed to homesteading on the frontier, while immigrants tended to congregate around existing
communities of origin, such as the Irish in New York and Boston (Scheffer 230). Even
considering the availability of suitable land, moving west and starting a farm required varying
degrees of expertise, investment, and social support. In the factory communities of the Northeast,
low-skill employment made income available without further initiative, an advantage well-suited
to the need for cheap industrial labor. Encouragement for immigration continued to involve
freedom and opportunity as rhetorical arguments. Manufacturing and transportation industries
promoted freedom and opportunity as incentives, but the decisive concerns were not ideological.
They were economic, and more specifically, they depended on the economics of industrial
production. As the industrial revolution gained traction in the United States before the Civil War,
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the concerns of labor and industry were not primarily rural, agricultural, or even (one of
Zolberg’s claims) religious. The concerns were financial, commercial, and industrial.
History: Citizenship and Exclusion
Before the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the environment of active enterprise resulted
in continuing encouragement for immigration without significant regulation. Regardless of
whether or not, as Zolberg contends, colonists lacked authority to enact regulations and the
English Parliament had more immediate concerns than colonial immigration, concern with
numbers as much as concern with quality motivated financial intervention by taxes and tariffs.
The intent Zolberg describes was not to limit the number of immigrants. The intent was to steer
responsibility for social services away from commercial enterprise by making immigrants better
prepared to fend for themselves and to finance support for those who suffered misfortune.
Zolberg’s argument does not seem to escape the effects of economics any more than the
idealistic Immigrant Nation escapes the effects of economics. Zolberg’s alternate regulatory view
serves to emphasize the economic concerns. Citizenship, as for Etienne Balibar, is a complex
concept, although Leslie Kurke explains that citizenship somewhat paradoxically demands
conformity, rather than individuality (324-26). The worthy citizen meets the standards. Similar to
Balibar’s later proposals for degrees of citizenship to address conflicting interests, the threat of
additional requirements by groups such as the Know Nothings aimed to control representation
for what were perceived to be competing groups, such as Catholics, whose conservative interests
might affect the established commercial priorities of government, rather than to bring about the
outright exclusion of immigrants. Control of representation was the objective as much as
controlling alternate religious beliefs. The patriarchal history of the Catholic Church meant that
the Irish tended to be notoriously conservative and resistant to innovations represented by
industrial development (Scheffer 230). Echoing the expectations of freedom-loving Plymouth
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Colony, even immigrants with potentially problematic religious affiliation were okay as long as
they kept their mouths shut, did their work, and could not vote. That is not the same thing as
preventing their arrival. The technical distinction between temporary and permanent legal
residence really affects the discussion of status more than admission, especially after revision of
immigration regulations in 1990, but for purposes of this discussion, immigration and admission
are used interchangeably unless otherwise noted.
The number of immigrants had no specific limits in the United States because
immigration was commercially important. The ideology of the Immigrant Nation had rhetorical
effects for the imagined community, but fundamentally, immigration provided cheap labor.
Zolberg's response to unrestricted immigration, that the colonies lacked authority and that the
independent nation controlled immigration indirectly by taxation and citizenship, is instructive
but inconclusive and seems to conflate the discussions of immigration and citizenship in
misleading ways. Immigration and citizenship are not the same. Zolberg argues that the nature of
citizenship translates to immigration control by making residence in the sovereign territory more
desirable or less desirable according to the prospect of benefitting from the protections of
government. In spite of Zolberg's contention, controlling citizenship is not the same as
controlling immigration. Besides the failure to secure extreme requirements for citizenship, such
as rejection of the Know Nothing’s twenty-one-year residence requirement, the numbers do not
correlate well with results other than intermittent concerns about criminal history, indigency, and
health, which were periodically alarming, but never comprehensive obstacles to immigration.
Zolberg provides no convincing evidence that stringent citizenship requirements could have ever
controlled American immigration, especially where the economic interests of employment and
labor remained largely independent of citizenship. Nobody had to be a citizen to work (at least in
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limited occupations), and the point was the work. On the contrary, slavery was a firm guarantee
of employment. Citizenship was irrelevant to slavery, except perhaps for the lack of it. There
were attempts to insure that immigrants were self-supporting and socially functional, but
regardless of any attempts by England to retain valuable skills or the colonies to prevent
indigency, prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, there were never specific limits put on
immigrants from any particular place. The analysts, including Zolberg, tend to agree that
industrial transformation and availability of work remained the most significant factors in
voluntary immigration trends. Citizenship and immigration can be related issues, but
immigration never depended strictly on citizenship.
The contemporary relationship of immigration to citizenship could be considered more
dependent, but to some extent the argument about citizenship is a matter of definition. American
immigration law includes permanent legal residence in the definition of immigration. Other
arrivals are either legal or illegal aliens, in which case immigration is not an issue, strictly
speaking. In theory, citizenship does not apply to the status of alien. In most cases, immigration
as an expectation of permanent residence also technically presumes eventual citizenship, but
admission to the place is not the same thing as admission to the community, regardless. The
immigrant does not have political empowerment without citizenship, but residence or presence is
not and has never been the same thing as citizenship.
Following independence, Nativist resistance to immigrant communities emerged as the
kind of patriotic extremism expressed in the Leo DiCaprio film drama Gangs of New York. The
idea of protecting America for the benefit of native-born American citizens can be taken as a
response to the idea of unrestricted immigration where numbers become a threat to employment,
but the selective nature of Nativist opposition, such as focusing on Catholics or Eastern
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Europeans or Jews, further emphasizes the significance or force of immigration as a theoretical
ideal. We can be a nation of immigrants. Maybe some immigrants are more equal than others.
That does not necessarily demand resistance to immigration, however. Resistance to immigration
and discrimination against immigrants are not the same things either. In spite of their
xenophobia, the Nativists were not necessarily concerned about immigration as such. The
concern of the Nativists did not depend strictly on protecting the United States from immigrants.
The intent was to prevent large numbers of Catholic immigrants from attaining citizenship. In the
end, the initiative failed anyway. Regardless of whether additional citizenship requirements were
meant to control immigration or political opposition or both, the requirements were rejected by
opposition from the industrial Northeast and never took effect (Zolberg 174-175).
As noted, there was probably some religious attitude in this, but if the concern was with
an unacceptable theology, why allow the practitioners to take up residence at all? Why not
simply forbid their entrance into the country? In the case of the Know Nothings, part of that
strategy could have been derived from maneuvering against support for immigration to overcome
arguments of immigrant heritage, the Immigrant Nation, but the success of opposition to
immigration control shows that approval for immigration continued to prevail in one form or
another in spite of prejudicial interests. Nativists discriminated, but immigration continued,
largely unimpeded.
Immigration therefore continued without serious interruption until after the Civil War.
Why immigration was not regulated did not depend on ideological sympathy for immigrants as
refugees, however, which has never been more than nominal, nor did it depend on practical
obstacles to border control, which were never tested until Haitian and Mexican immigrants
became an issue in the twentieth century. The real motivation for continuing approval and lack of
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intervention was industrial expansion. Immigrants as factory and construction labor were
welcome. Immigrants as indigent dependents and voting citizens with competing interests were
less welcome, but the advantage of extensive Irish slums in Boston is, also as noted previously,
low wages, and more significantly, as Scheffer observes, competing groups can be played against
each other (234), a critical factor as the Irish and Chinese labor communities collided over
railroad construction in California after the Civil War.
The Know Nothings were fine with Irish Catholic immigrants as long as the Irish
Catholic immigrants were contained in the Boston and New York ghettos as cheap labor for
manufacturing, without citizenship, and without any recourse to legal and political representation
(ironically, the same kind of limitations that the Chinese faced later in competition with the
Irish). What concerned the Know Nothings most was the threat of equal representation. The
states of the United States did care whether immigrants were indigent and whether immigrants
were capable of supporting themselves, and the states did care about qualifications for
citizenship, but those concerns did not translate to any numerical restrictions of immigration.
Otherwise, race, financial status, religious affiliation, and national origin were never criteria for
immigration. They might affect where immigrants ended up once they got here, sometimes in
extremely negative ways, such as the Irish slums, but in principle they did not prevent
immigrants from entering the country and engaging in employment. The effects of commercial
interests, such as wage suppression, are not effects that have been ignored, but they are easily
minimized and misinterpreted where they compete with the more dramatic and spectacular
aspects of slavery and discrimination.
Prior to independence, whether or not the colonies had direct control of admission or not
was less important than the immediate effect of finding somebody to do the work, and the gates
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were not slammed shut upon establishment of independence from what had previously been the
legislative prerogative of the English Parliament. The colonies welcomed cheap labor, and
thanks to the benefits of technology, much of it originating in England, the independent United
States did not significantly change that attitude. The concerns were with personal dependence.
Social services were not a priority of commercial enterprise. Immigrants had to be selfsupporting and more or less socially constructive for community approval. Otherwise, where
they came from was less important. “The colonial labor shortage made the English and the
colonists ignore differences among the immigrants” (Reimers 8). Even questions of slavery and
indentured servitude were questions of status rather than value. Discrimination associated with
religious affiliation and geo-political origin or race existed and could be vicious, but
discrimination did not determine the regulation of immigration. With some exceptions imported
in the process of immigration, such as the heritage of English/Irish opposition, this relatively
tolerant attitude toward diverse origins persisted into the late 1800s, when the pressure of
competing interests contained within the progressively constricted space of the nation produced
tension that could only be relieved by either concessions or conflicts (Scheffer 233).
Did discrimination take place? Without doubt. Was immigration restricted based on
discrimination? Not significantly prior to 1882, the year of the first legislative Chinese exclusion.
The colonists and early American political leaders discriminated in every conceivable way, from
slavery to religion, but those prejudices did not result in immigration restrictions. As the
presence of slaves numbering hundreds of thousands in a national population around four million
illustrates well enough, in the American colonies, the demand for cheap labor overwhelmed
ideological concerns, without even counting indentured servitude (Zolberg 174).
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History: Management of Labor
In 1857, a financial panic with international effects gave industrial enterprise some
indication of how globally-connected financial interests had become. At the same time,
international labor organizations were successfully challenging exclusive management control of
employment conditions, and Karl Marx was redefining the relationship of labor and capital. Even
though this is not meant as a Marxist critique, in a gross sense Marx is the go-to guy for class
conflict, and to an extent, the entire aristocratic structure of investment and return was under
assault, along with the more visible manifestations associated with monarchy and class
distinctions. As Lawrence Lessig explains, attempts to collectively negotiate wages had always
been rejected by American courts as contrary to the public good, but widespread collective
bargaining became more of a practical challenge to commercial enterprise where the legality of
the action was somewhat irrelevant. Fines and imprisonment of “conspirators” only marginally
benefitted employers if production continued to be disrupted, and organized labor achieved
increasing influence (Zolberg 174), although it was not an achievement that labor would be able
to consolidate in America.
The ten years or so following the Civil War were economically active but confusing. In
1875, a combination of bad weather affecting agriculture, combined with an abundance of overreactions, brought about another widespread economic downturn. Previous economic stress had
produced no truly national reactions to immigration, partly because the availability of land
provided a release valve, but by 1875 the Civil War and advancing industrialization produced the
potential for a different mind-set. Completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 added
psychologically to Scheffer’s previously mentioned sense of restricted space with the more literal
consequences of events like the Johnson County War in Wyoming. Along with the sense of
impaired opportunity, unemployment rose in most sectors. Railroads, however, including the
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recently completed transcontinental railroad, had government backing and construction went on.
Profitability was a separate issue highlighted by accounting fraud in the Union Pacific’s Credit
Mobilier scandal, but the railroads had legislative assurance of financing for construction. The
industry continued to operate, even in California, where effects of the slowdown were
widespread, and conflicts developed. Too big to fail in the sense of national scope and
government financing, the railroads were insulated to an extent from economic effects, but their
own bad behavior and the threat of labor issues called their performance and future profitability
into question, as Credit Mobilier illustrated. In 1877 a railroad strike added anxiety to the
financial condition of the industry. In this environment the railroads were looking for any useful
leverage to manage operations for assurance of future income, and the collision in labor gave
them an opportunity.
As the supply of labor in the general economy continued to exceed the availability of
employment, perhaps for the first time on that scale in the history of U.S. industry, the issue
became, both casually and formally, who would be employed and who would not. Heater and
Reimers describe the situation. As a socio-political community heavily invested in the work of
railroad construction, the Irish believed their dues had been paid for the right to prosper, while a
significant community of Chinese origin that had arrived with the approval of railroad and
mining employers also believed they were particularly capable of performing the work and had
as much right to it. As de facto labor communities, the Irish and the Chinese squared off in
competition for limited employment in California, but it was a conflict in which the Chinese as a
community were not well prepared to engage. Relatively reclusive and deferential by culture
compared to the ebullient, aggressive, and widely-distributed Irish (who also outnumbered
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them), the Chinese community did not have either the political connections or general social
status to engage in legislative contests for approval.
With language challenges and more recent connections to their place of origin, the
Chinese tended to congregate in supportive communities and kept to themselves, sometimes
sharing communal housing. In the view of opposition, they could never fit in American society
(Reimers 12). Insular communities were nothing new to the Irish, but by that time, they were a
selective-memory-mediating generation and a Civil War beyond the most intense of those
conditions. The Chinese workers, primarily single men, were also extraordinarily frugal, and to
some extent they actually were willing to work for less. They had to be. They were contributing
to support of the communities they had left behind, or were trying to finance a variety of projects
from additional immigration of families to new business ventures. Based on the combination of
reclusiveness and exclusiveness they were accused of conspiring to depress wages below
subsistence level to drive away their competitors, charges which suited railroad business
management well. Consistent with Scheffer's observation about manipulating groups, conflict
between competing groups of workers served to both justify depressed wages and distract labor
from contentious relationships with employers.
In the prevailing view, the Exclusion Acts were the consequence of discrimination.
Reimers states flat-out that “Racism prompted this action,” regarding the Exclusion Act of 1882
(12). Yet discrimination conflates and oversimplifies the reaction that even Reimers goes on to
describe as a labor conflict. A conflict does not result strictly from discrimination where the
conflict depends partly on labor issues. While racism and discrimination characterize the
conflict, racism and discrimination also distract from the underlying economics. Opposition to
immigration was a benefit for business interests not because of successful Chinese exclusion. In
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a period of less than ten years from completion of the Union Pacific to the economic downturn,
the Chinese did not somehow lose their capability as a workforce, although as Roger Streitmatter
observes, something like that entered into the rhetorical claims of Nativist opposition. The
benefit to business, in the manner of Scheffer’s group manipulation, was the ability to manage
and control labor, the appearance of acknowledgement for concerns of organized labor while
eliminating potential labor support. The turnaround from employment to exclusion with respect
to the Chinese made it clear enough that the railroads were less concerned about the racial
qualities of labor. The Chinese were perfectly suitable for employment. The railroads cared more
about whether labor made those decisions for them as organizational and political forces
(Zolberg 189).
There may be an issue of conscience for those facing questions of why they should be
employed while others are not, most things being equal. Racism provided an answer. The answer
was that other things must not be equal. The reclusive Chinese workers, obviously indolent
(They did not mingle.); ignorant (They might not speak English.); physically grotesque (Their
features were distinctive.); and morally challenged (They participated in unfamiliar forms of
recreation, religion, and social relations.); living in gangs; doing who knew what; entertained by
gambling and smoking (what was assumed to be narcotics); without women of the right sort,
families, or Christian values and beliefs; willing to work for wages that were an insult to any
hard-working, god-fearing, self-respecting American with a family to support (Streitmatter 67478). Those were the criteria that emerged from the railroad labor disputes (Reimers 11-12). The
Chinese, unsurprisingly, were classified by the ensuing legislation with lunatics and criminals as
undesirable immigrants, indicating quite clearly what the rhetorical argument for the legislation
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had been based on (Grant 180). That part of it, at least, was discrimination, but the discrimination
served interests that were less obvious than the Nativists who made the discriminatory claims.
As industrialization progressed before and after the Civil War, labor issues associated
with production also escalated. Workers who believed that production and profit depended as
much on their own participation as on finance and management agitated for a larger share of the
rewards as well. In terms of events and rhetorical representation, what followed historically
made perfect sense. Immigrants and immigration served the purposes of industrial production.
To a large extent the railroads did not care who worked for them. That was plain enough from
fifty years of expansion with few if any exclusionary policies. What the railroads cared about
was the same thing textile, shipping, and manufacturing businesses cared about before the
railroads, that workers did not have the opportunity and inclination to organize. The Chinese
represented a coherent labor community with common interests and a cause. To the railroads as
profitable enterprise, that could be a serious threat. The beauty of the response in terms of
corporate strategy was that it cast the interests of industrial production in the heroic terms of
national patriotism, while conveniently managing the labor supply without any responsibility or
risk on the part of the industry concerned. When you need labor, bring them in from a convenient
source at a price that suits you. When you do not need labor, send them back where they came
from without any power to negotiate or resist. What could be more perfect from a management
perspective? This rather pragmatic opportunism led to the controversy described by Susan-Mary
Grant in connection with subsequent immigration legislation when prominent business
personalities, such as Vanderbilt and Carnegie, were accused of hypocritically ignoring their own
heritage, and some of the concern was exported as “remote control” in the form of agreements
such as the Bradley Treaty prohibiting the practice of Coolie indenture.
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The real message was not so much that American interests would be protected as that a
patriotic duty would be fulfilled. The patriotic duty to protect Americans, as previously noted by
Scheffer, was a rhetorical stance that divided immigrant loyalties. The Irish accepted the status of
entitled Americans that had been denied to them by the Nativists before the Civil War, and labor
organizations joined the opposition to Chinese immigration. How could real Americans expect to
live the life they were entitled to in competition with “single Chinese coolies” (Reimers 12) who
exhibited the catalogue of rhetorical deficiencies documented by Streitmatter? The ultimate and
perhaps more critical message was that immigrants who did not cooperate would be excluded.
They would be excluded from employment, they would be excluded from citizenship, and if
necessary, they would be excluded from sea to shining sea. Immigrants were only useful as a
resource if they were manageable. Resistance to perception of an immigrant threat subsequently
accompanied the early failure of labor unions to achieve effective growth in opposition to the
power of commercial enterprise in America (Grant 235). Criticism and isolation of immigrant
communities did more to prevent immigrants from becoming part of labor organizations that
might have otherwise defended the interests of immigrants, and less to affect immigration
control. Negative characterization of immigrants helped keep recent immigrants out of labor
organizations while encouragement for immigrant labor helped control wages and minimal
working conditions, a tricky combination of interests that only makes sense as labor
management. Unions should have welcomed immigrant membership for organizational and
political effect, while industrialists with immigrant heritage should have appreciated the negative
effects of exploitation. Instead, labor unions in America struggled, as noted by Grant, while
wages and working conditions remained under control of industrial enterprise.
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In the history of American immigration, national and international labor organization was
an unprecedented threat to capitalist enterprise, and the economics of 1875 took place in
unusually complicated conditions. With strong European connections, the capitalist aristocracy
controlling the Union Pacific Railroad would hardly have been unaware of such significant
conditions as the global extent of financial conditions, or such social initiatives as the Chartists in
England, as well as labor disputes in England and Ireland. The first labor union in the United
States had been successfully resisted by strike-breakers and intimidation only three years before
in 1872, and European industrial interests were feeling the initial effects of Marxist influence. In
this peculiar social and economic confluence, the recession of 1875 added extensive and
ominous complications. The railroad strike in 1877 only confirmed and aggravated the urgency
of the situation. With the protection of government financing, railroad construction continued
despite the downturn, despite the graft, and despite the conflicts, but it was not a situation that
had great promise for the future prosperity of capitalist enterprise, regardless of selfidentification as the founding and sustaining power of the nation.
Those were the circumstances when the status of workers became an issue on the
railroad in California. Following completion of the transcontinental railroad, the Chinese from
the West and the Irish from the East found themselves in competition for continued employment.
With the advent of labor organizations, that posed potential problems for both railroads and
mining. Why this was true is apparent from the nature of labor management during the first one
hundred years of independence. Labor organizations were consistently and successfully resisted,
not necessarily in principle as organizations, but at least in fact by the English legal principal of
conspiracy endangering the good of society. By circumstance and culture, Chinese immigrants
were both inclined and forced to adopt loyalty to their own ethno-political community. Chinese
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immigrants were neither prepared nor expected to take individual political initiative. They were,
however, viewed as a community, and in that respect, they represented a potentially serious
threat to what could be euphemistically described as the normal interests of the public good, or
what would be more realistically described as resistance to the redistribution of wealth. Capitalist
aristocracy was not interested in redistributing wealth for the benefit of any unified labor
community. If the redistribution of wealth through labor organization could be prevented by
sacrificing Chinese immigrants, what was the downside?
The Irish had some social and cultural cohesion, but unlike the Chinese, the status of the
Irish had evolved beyond the necessity of unconditional mutual support. By a combination of
numbers, perseverance, and the somewhat misleading but iconic opportunities of participation in
the Civil War, the Irish had earned, in their own minds if nowhere else, the right to individual
prosperity. As modern incarnations of right-to-work principles demonstrate, almost nothing
insures successful opposition to collective bargaining as effectively as perceptions of individual
opportunity. The labor issue with regard to the railroads therefore had a fairly selective
dimension. The Irish were regarded as workers with a strong sense of economic loyalty but
personal independence and priorities which translated to both easy distraction from political
issues and suspicion of organized initiatives, at least, as Reimers and Scheffer suggest, compared
to the Chinese.
One solution would have been to give the jobs to the cheapest workers and leave the
disenfranchised to make of it what they could, but that posed a number of problems. As the
history of the Irish themselves demonstrated, discrimination in America was common enough,
yet perhaps the commonness was as much an effect of spontaneity and localized concerns as it
was comprehensive antagonism, especially in less socially stratified areas such as California,
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where the gold rush and colonial history created a thoroughly mixed society and culture (Grant
197). Despite occasional extremism, the somewhat paradoxical normality of discrimination made
it an unreliable inspiration for a campaign of social management. Keeping people apart based on
discrimination only works as long as they do not accidentally become accustomed to each other,
or at least find some way to coexist, which, according to Reimers previous observation, had been
the actual overall historical tendency. Discrimination could not be counted on for reliable longterm exclusion of any particular community, including the Chinese, who were originally
welcomed. Not only were community conflicts inconsistent, however, but labor agitation also
threatened to make deliberate suppression of wages a challenging proposition, and any action
that seemed to suggest disregard for general welfare could have the unintended consequence of
uniting opposition. As a cohesive community, the Chinese represented the potential for serious
contributions to labor disputes. The tentative efforts of organizations such as the Knights of
Labor were nothing compared to the potential represented by the Chinese immigrant community
in California. The Chinese therefore posed a formidable organizational threat at a time when
disruption of operations could least be afforded. The problem, in terms of Scheffer and the
opposition of groups, was how to prevent the unification of labor without causing reactions that
would inadvertently provoke the unintended consequence of the unified labor that the industry
hoped to avoid.
The solution was to neutralize the threat by removing it from contention. The Chinese
were already separated and isolated from the general labor population. Employing them only
promised to escalate disruption and potentially benefit organized labor. Was it any surprise that
newspaper articles appeared vilifying the Chinese? George Hearst, a major player in the Union
Pacific, also took over publication of a prominent San Francisco newspaper, later transferred to
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his son, William Randolph, of Spanish American War and Yellow Journalism fame. Labor
organizations took the bait of what they perceived as an opportunity to be seen standing up for
the interests of legitimate “American men, women, and children” (Reimers 11-12), and there was
less danger to railroad business operations from the contentiously self-absorbed Irish who, if
nothing else, still out-numbered the Chinese. The Irish tended to busy themselves fighting each
other as much as fighting external social obstacles. They even prided themselves on their cultural
introversion.
Taken as a context, the information in these sources suggests that the inspiration for
opposition to Chinese immigrants came less directly from workers looking for jobs than from
corporate executives managing risk. The history depends on accounts and comments by
personalities with agendas, such as George Hearst and his San Francisco Examiner. The
negative impact of Chinese competition on Irish–American families is a characterization derived
from enterprising labor organizers and amplified by cooperative media, not a documented effect.
Otherwise, the outcome is a mediation of the established argument that the original Chinese
Exclusion Acts resulted from discrimination and competition between groups, especially with
Irish immigrants. Although targeting the Chinese, the imposition of immigration control
represented by the Exclusion Acts was not strictly a protection of employment for proven
American patriots. It was a risk management strategy by corporate interests characteristic of
“labor control” and management accomplished by regulation of immigration in the era of
industrial expansion (Cohen and Sirkeci 70, Scheffer 234).
Original passage of the Exclusion Act in 1882 marked both intervention by industrial
interests to control immigration and the effective rhetorical demonization of the immigrant as a
way to deal with the uncomfortable national sense that all real Americans somehow depended on
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immigration for their identity as much as on their connections to the dirt, their place of origin. As
Flores comments in connection with later issues of Mexican immigration, expansion of the
simple idea that immigrants could be classified as good or bad had a profound effect on the
management of immigration. It helped free the citizen from responsibility to the imagined
Immigrant Nation, the heritage of immigration. If immigrants are needed, they are good. If they
are not needed, they are bad. The rhetoric of demonization gets around the problem of the
Immigrant Nation by designating those immigrants who are not worthy to be included, an idea
that never really took hold in America until it became a commercial concern of Industrial
Modernity.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXCLUSION AND EXCEPTION
Examining Motives
What the Foran Act of 1885 made abundantly clear was that socialist and trade-class
employment interests did not trust the immigration concerns of industrial corporations. The
Foran Act prohibited temporary importation of foreign work crews to break strikes. According to
Zolberg, no strikes were ever broken by imported labor, but the mere idea of low-cost contract
work crews from foreign countries was enough to assure approval of the legislation by labor
organizations. More importantly, however, the concern of labor organizations was not so much
the demon immigrant or even the principle of immigration control. The concern was
manipulation of immigration by industrial corporations. In terms of commercial interests, what
Zolberg refers to as the “failure” of the legislation to have the effect of controlling contract
initiatives may have had more to do with the practice never being workable in the first place than
with the difficulty of enforcement. Any kind of foreign labor recruitment under restrictive terms
risked provoking accusations of indentured servitude of the kind associated with the Chinese
coolies that resulted in the Bradley Treaty with China. In spite of labor issues, immigrants in
1880, as immigrants in the H-1B discussion, were considered vulnerable. After the Civil War in
the United States, any arrangement that might constitute the importation of some kind of slavery
became more of a problem for both the public and the government. The labor unions were less
concerned about the character defects of demon immigrants. They were concerned about the
character defects of demon management.
And in fact, from a management point of view, these conditions made control of
immigration by commercial interests imperative. Industrial corporations resented scrutiny and
opposition. Somewhat analogous to a faucet and a flow, prior to the Civil War, commerce only
106

needed to dip from the supply as needed. The faucet was open. Following the Civil War, socialist
influences and organized labor threatened to become a force to be reckoned with, and
immigration only swelled the ranks of potential labor sympathizers as much as continuing to
insure competitive supply, while targeted exploitive strategies, such as the importation of coolies
addressed by the Bradley Treaty, and European contract crews addressed by the Foran Act, met
with both popular and legal resistance.
Control meant getting hold of the faucet. Contract crews were a minor issue. Their
numbers were small compared to the number of immigrants arriving through the usual process.
The issue, as in the case of H-1B, was more a matter of who would make decisions than a matter
of labor supply. According to Zolberg, the effect was never significant. The question would be
why risk public backlash over ineffective tactics? Attempting to confront labor organizations by
the apparent enslavement of immigrants could have the same potential for unintended
consequences associated with Chinese exclusion. The same kind of negative rhetoric that had
been applied to the Chinese ap0peared for Eastern Europeans. The usual explanation has been
racism and discrimination, which makes sense in terms of competition from growing ethnic
communities, yet it also makes sense in terms of opposition to growing unified labor
communities.
The faucet meant legislation, and legislation meant, logically enough, popular approval,
at least to some extent. Immigration control was not quite like railroad finance that could be
conveniently managed under the table without public attention. Considering the obstacle of the
imagined Immigrant Nation, the only way to create a favorable climate for immigration control
was to somehow call immigrants into question, which is in fact exactly what happened. Grant,
Zolberg, and Streitmatter, not to mention Reimer’s definitive statement, all found inherent
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prejudice rather than commercial interests behind original “demonization” of the immigrant, but
another truth, as Scheffer observes in connection with Otto Bauer and the effect on wages, is that
Lisa Flores’ rhetorical process of accommodation for commercial interests was already at work.
While the attitudes and prejudices expressed in the Nativist Press speak for themselves,
the rather mysterious sources of publication are more problematic. Streitmatter attributes
editorial anonymity and lack of disclosure to claims that revealing identities would have resulted
in retaliation by aggressive and hostile immigrants, but that in itself was misleading. No evidence
of such retaliation ever appeared. The defamation cases described by Streitmatter that forced
some Nativist publishers into public scrutiny also do not seem to have revealed much about the
origin and operation of the publications. They quickly ceased operation rather than resist public
scrutiny. Streitmatter draws some rather astonishing conclusions from limited information, but
what exactly the Nativist Press was up to and who was behind it remain tantalizing and
unresolved questions. What is clear from the trajectory of immigration, starting with the
Exclusion Acts of 1882 to the quotas of 1924 is that demonization served the purpose of bringing
immigration under commercial control. Without public attitudes of suspicion and resentment
toward immigrants, legislative limitations were unlikely and might not have been possible.
Immigrants from China may have been a problem in terms of competition for jobs, for example,
and historically the situation in California and the country in general had some unusual labor and
demographic features. A local oversupply of labor, however, tended to be a temporary condition
and quite limited in scope compared to previous episodes of the Irish in Boston and New York.
The problem was not just the Chinese in California or just the Chinese, period. The problem was
the more general tendencies of labor and immigrant communities to resist commercial
management. Industrial commercial interests, represented primarily by railroads, mining, and
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steel at the time, had to get immigration under control, not strictly to maximize profit and return
on investment, but for the simple fact of control.
Association of the Chinese with criminality and illness in the terms of the Exclusion Acts
is in itself a revealing attitude. Prejudice regularly figured in discriminatory determinations, from
employment of the Irish in factories to more recent conflicts over Black voters in the south.
Prejudice conveniently accounts for the shift in dynamics from resistance expressed as the
ideology of freedom, to approval for immigration control with regard to the Chinese and Eastern
Europeans, but there was also a rhetorical strategy at work for a commercial agenda. If there is
any truth in Streitmatter’s assessment of the Nativist Press, then public attitudes toward the
Chinese were heavily informed by media, and not just the mysteriously prejudicial media of the
Nativists. Exclusion of the Chinese actually had connections to preventing prejudice and
exploitation, as in the Bradley Treaty, as much as connections to discriminatory racial prejudice,
but in the context of labor issues, preventing exploitation did not particularly serve commercial
interests. Racial prejudice did. Like a simple illusion based on distraction, to get ahold of the
faucet handle, attention had to be directed at the quality of the flow that the immigrant
represented, not at the hand reaching for the faucet. Public concern was as much for preventing
slavery as for preventing competition, as much for assuring opportunity as for assuring moral
character (although that would change to an extent). To gain direct commercial control of
immigration absolutely required that the rhetorical representation in the public sphere reflect
inferiority of the immigrant. A more reflective and measured ideological consideration only
reminded people of their inconvenient connections to the imagined Immigrant Nation, the
expectations of freedom and opportunity, and exacerbated the issue of control.
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Although the original Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Foran Act in the 1880s established
the pattern for control, at that point, the project was still up for grabs. Limited exclusion hardly
represented comprehensive control of immigration management. As developments in the
technologies of transportation, steel, mining, chemicals, textiles, electricity, media, construction,
agriculture, and so forth, continued to produce an active economic environment at the turn of the
century, immigrants continued to arrive and find opportunities for participation. World War I
complicated immigration with respect to German origin, but more as a question of allegiance
than migration. Immigration was not restricted, but immigrants were required to make more
specific statements of loyalty to America and American culture, including an oath of allegiance
and acceptance of the English language (Scheffer).
These were exigencies of the situation, but concern for English language also reflected a
more persistent and widespread concern than the temporary condition of war with Germany.
Once introduced and established, the incompetence and sloth of immigrants were embellished to
include ignorance and dishonesty. Attempts to fine-tune exclusions, such as Jews or Italians, to
suit particular interest groups were generally rejected, but there was another possible point of
contention related to inferiority. In spite of the American tradition welcoming the disadvantaged,
concern for literacy seemed to resonate with both demands for citizenship requirements and
expectations for productive labor.
Academic researchers such as Josiah Strong and Gustave LeBon determined by
“scientific” analysis that immigrants were not capable of performing citizenship’s intellectual
demands (Zolberg 226). Academic and elite policy organizations, such as the Harvard-connected
Restrictionist League, argued that the lack of intellect and education on the part of recent
immigrants, especially from Eastern European countries, made them a threat to the vitality of
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America (Grant 230). This detrimental effect could be alleviated by requiring the ability to read
as a condition of admission. Literate immigrants would not require the expense of schools and
social services to make them productive. This concern for intellectual quality resulted in a
literacy test finally enacted over the opposition of Woodrow Wilson in 1917, only four years
after publication of The Google Book. The literacy test required demonstration of the ability to
read by adult immigrants.
Widely perceived to be elitist, the literacy test was controversial, repeatedly considered
by Congress before eventual passage over Wilson’s veto. The public discussion focused on
claimed character deficiency associated with a lack of education, as opposed to the right of
individuals to prove their worth, but Scheffer notes that a more pragmatic concern figured in the
outcome with regard to commerce. Assurance of literacy made employees more suitable for
industrial employment. The Ford Motor Company, for instance, took the initiative of providing
English classes for immigrant employees, while keeping them under surveillance for evidence of
behavior not consistent with Ford’s expectations (Liu 95). Eliminating the need for concern with
language proficiency would only have been to the benefit of the corporation.
The literacy test was not very successful as immigration management, however. It turned
out that in reality immigrants arrived in America by-and-large prepared to cope with language. In
spite of extravagant claims by academic researchers and experts, such as Josiah Strong, that the
literacy test would reduce the number of immigrants, less than thirty percent of tested subjects
were found to lack proficiency, and almost none were found to be hopelessly ignorant, never
mind incapable of learning. A tiny percentage of immigrants, less than two thousand total were
ever actually denied access based on literacy. After five years, authorization for the literacy test
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quietly expired (Grant), and, as in the case of Zolberg’s explanation, literacy as criteria for
admission simply disappears from the discussion.
As Scheffer later observed, however, in somewhat dry terms, the failure of the literacy
test to affect immigration was largely irrelevant for purposes of industrial commerce. The
realization that immigrants were better prepared to perform employment tasks than academic
research indicated was merely a bonus. The real payoff for commercial interests was assurance
that through academic and media intervention, public opinion could be managed to enact
desirable legislation, even in the face of the Immigrant Nation and labor organizations.
In 1924 immigration quotas followed rhetorical capitulation of the Immigrant Nation to
political suspicion, although the pattern of legislative control had really been established by the
struggle with Chinese exclusion and the literacy test. Quotas came about largely as a
consequence of momentum from the issues of World War I and the perception of threats from
ongoing communist activity as well as socialism in general. The fear was not so much of
immigrants or immigration as that subversives might use the opportunity to infiltrate.
Whether or not quotas were fair, productive, or even necessary was largely irrelevant to
industrial corporations, however. Even Zolberg’s emphasis on the trajectory of immigration
control does not portray the war era between 1910 and 1920 as one of opportunities for labor to
challenge industrial management for control of production decisions. Likewise, the “Roaring
Twenties” were not a period in which industrial enterprise felt lack of confidence in control.
Industry did not care one way or the other about regulation as long as labor organizations were
under control. On the other hand, the success of legislation assured the potential to achieve
favorable results. Otherwise, they were content to let the trends continue. For management,
industrial employment was a declining issue as economic activity leveled off ahead of the Great
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Depression, except perhaps in the American West, where the cycle of approval and rejection
played out for migrant agricultural workers from Mexico.
Immigration from Mexico has unique features, but also follows the pattern of commercial
management. Transience, especially of the coolie, labor-contract kind, includes inherent
opportunities for exploitation. Exploitation was part of the effect in the transfer of Mexican
migrant agricultural workers back and forth across the border in the 1920s and 1930s, but
rhetoric became a critical feature. As Lisa Flores explains, the Mexicans were welcomed early in
the period as reliable, productive, and cooperative. They were needed. They were good. There
were no formal limits applied to admission or continued residence, but as the economy declined
around the stock market crash in 1929 and into the next decade, the reliable, productive migrant
workers from Mexico, like their Chinese predecessors, rhetorically evolved into lazy,
incompetent, even violent, illegal aliens spreading ruthlessly throughout the country. The
welcome turned to opposition. Ultimately the workers were encouraged to return to Mexico or
face deportation as criminals. Hundreds of thousands left America rather than risk a record that
would permanently exclude them, although they were heavily invested in their American
employment. To this extent, or at least in this sense, it is true that the rhetorical representation
fueled the application and enforcement of restrictive legislation in the same way that it “fueled
the stream of restrictive legislation” itself (Flores 366). Once again, however, the source of the
discrimination is suspicious.
In Flores’ view the cause for carrying out public and government campaigns to resist
Mexican immigration through rhetorical vilification “probably” depends on effects of the
economy, but what Flores did not take into account was that the rhetorical emphasis on numbers
that characterized Mexican presence at the time as “large” and “threatening” also represented a
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potential labor issue on the brink of an economic decline. Ironically the labor issue later became
exactly the focus of dispute in the era of Cesar Chavez. At most, competition for jobs was only
one way of looking at the presence of workers from Mexico.
Again, one thing is clear. Racism and prejudice were never in and of themselves the
explanation for opposition to immigration. Discriminatory rhetoric accompanied significant
policies in 1882, 1917, 1924, and into the 1930s. The Chinese became scheming, indolent, and
unreliable. Eastern Europeans were intellectually and morally inadequate. Mexicans were lazy,
hostile, and could not be trusted. The racist rhetoric, however, does not account for the policy
changes. As Flores contends, evidence for racist claims was never more than the most superficial
exaggerations. At the very least, Flores’ argument, and Anne Demo’s subsequent elaboration of
immigration as spectacle, explain that the expanded impact of racist attitudes required mediation,
amplification through media, as in the original outcome of the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the
Nativist Press. Opinions did not change because immigrants changed. Opinions changed because
the rhetoric changed.
Equally apparent, although somewhat less dramatic, is the connection of immigration to
commercial labor relations. The railroads faced multiple challenges from labor organizations and
socialist attitudes. Industry at the end of the nineteenth century saw opportunities to manage the
qualities of the labor force. Likewise, Mexican laborers represented additional potential for
substantial involvement in labor issues, which turned out to be exactly the problem in the 1960s.
In those terms, the resulting rhetoric, together with commercial support for quotas and the
repatriation of Mexican laborers, proves hardly surprising. Industrial management was gearing
up for the threat of expanded labor activity.
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The apparent contradiction of Immigrant Nation ideology that can welcome immigrants
on one hand and reject them on the other has something to do with ideals of freedom and
opportunity in conflict with the pragmatic interests of economics, but even more to do with
questions of who decides. The issues may be explained in terms of prejudice, as for Aristide
Zolberg and the Know Nothings, or David Reimers and the Exclusion Acts. It may be explained
as Roger Streitmatter’s combination of concern for employment combined with intensified
discrimination in the Nativist Press. The contrasting social binary or dichotomy of good and bad
immigrants eventually resolved some of the rhetorical tension for the Immigrant Nation. The
idea that these immigrants were good immigrants, but those immigrants were bad immigrants
allows reconciliation of sympathy for immigrants with opposition to immigration. What has been
even less directly acknowledged in the history of American immigration management and
control is that this outcome coincides with a history of labor and employment conditions
characterized by systematic suppression of labor organizations through politics, another way of
repeating the conclusion that control of immigration serves the interests of labor management.
The proof is not necessarily obvious, but considering persistent public skepticism about
corporate motives described by Paul Scheffer, such as response to the coolie transport industry,
literacy test, and quotas, the conclusion that commercial interests encouraged suspicion of
immigrants makes sense. In Figure 5 below a cartoon satirizes corporate support of immigration
limits in Susan-Mary Grant’s discussion of the attitudes expressed by industrial capitalists at the
turn of the century into the 1900s. There is a difference, however, between a genuine prejudice
against distinct groups, such as Henry Ford’s objections to Jews, and comprehensive opposition
to immigration. Corporations took some heat for the appearance of prejudice, but the real issue
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was not discrimination. The real issue was whether corporations would get what they wanted,
regardless of whether it meant more or less immigration. Only the corporations knew that.

Figure 5: Used by Susan-Mary Grant to illustrate opposition by prominent industrialists
Source: Puck 32.827 (1893): 334. babel.hathitrust.org. Library of Congress. Web 9 June 2014.
Either way, concern with immigration was apparent. What seemed to be less apparent
was the pattern of response described by Lisa Flores. When commerce needed immigrants,
immigrants were characterized with favorable rhetoric. When immigrants were a potential
complication, the rhetoric changed accordingly. Prior to the late 1800s, immigration was never
held accountable for economic effects. Laborers might blame a competing community or even
class for the scarcity of work in a decline, but nobody blamed immigration for the decline. The
government might be responsible. An act of God might be responsible. Poor judgment might be
responsible, but recessions came and went without any comprehensive agreement about effects
from immigration. Until organized labor and socialist ideology clashed with the expectations of
capitalism and commercial industrial enterprise, immigration never looked like anything other
than the usual way of doing things.
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That the usual way of doing things also included a less obvious acknowledgement of
commercial interests went understated. Commercial interests inspired a pattern of rhetorical
effects that produced legislative changes. The rhetorical effects either encourage immigration by
favoring the immigrant or contest immigration by demeaning the immigrant, but ideological
arguments are minimized and avoided. Control of immigration may protect loyal Americans, but
immigration as a right, or as a humanitarian concern of social responsibility, became
subordinated to more pragmatic interests (Zolberg 244).
Regulations and “People Operations”
Quota limits set in 1921 and 1924 based on demographics of national origin controlled
basic distribution of immigration admissions until 1965, subject to periodic review and
adjustment, such as the eventual re-authorization of Chinese immigration in consideration of
World War II alliance. In 1965, priority classifications, including employment, replaced national
origin to determine admission. Section H-1B (Sometimes H1-B), 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), of Public
Law 101-649, The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1990, allows priority admission of
workers from foreign countries who are qualified in “an occupation that requires theoretical and
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge.” Congress periodically reviews
and adjusts the limits allowed under H-1B. In 2004, reduction of the limit from 115,000 to
65,000 went before Congress. In subsequent committee hearings, Google sent the Vice President
of People Operations, Laszlo Bock, to argue against the reduction (Chavez).
The priority of American immigration policy, however, has not focused on overt control
of employment, at least not as a rhetorical effect. The vast majority of immigration admissions
are based on bringing in families of immigrants previously granted permanent residence. 66% of
approximately one million immigrants per year admitted to permanent residence at the time of
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Google’s intervention were made on the basis of family relationships, while admission of
immigrants to permanent residence based on employment represented 16% of the total number,
according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) evaluation of immigration policy. The
figures include both immediate relatives and the “family-based preference” for other family
relationships. Based on those numbers, the CBO and Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement under Homeland Security) sources
characterize “uniting families” as the primary responsibility of immigration policy, echoing
concerns of the original immigration management discussion in the 1880s.
Yet the unification of families misleads to the extent that the permanent residents with
whom relationships exist are themselves originally admitted under employment classification or
versions of asylum and refugee status. The numbers are typically vague due to incomplete exit
records and limited tracking, but the classifications reported by the CBO suggested that
employment accounted for admission of the majority of independent adults. As mentioned
previously, refugees accounted for less than ten per cent. Employment therefore remained a more
substantial factor in policy determination than reflected in the nominal categories and limits, or
even the qualitative statements of priorities, and the effect of employment tends to be concealed
by the effect of family relationships that employment has itself made significant. Yes, most
immigrants were admitted based on family relationships, but the family relationships depend on
the original employment.
While the relationship of employment to immigration in general seems somewhat
deceptive, the rhetorical quality of industrial immigration management can be recognized more
directly in statements concerning the legislation, such as the Congressional testimony of Laszlo
Bock for Google. Bock initially explained that his title was Vice President of “People
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Operations” instead of the more conventional “Human Resources” originating with Industrial
Modernity, People Operations because people are the most valuable “competitive asset” of the
Google enterprise. Presumably we are to be comforted by the humanistic distinction between
People Operations and Human Resources, although whether the qualitative difference should
give us more confidence as human beings about recognition and appreciation as a “competitive
asset” rather than a as a “human resource” may be an open question. The qualitative distinction
between a “human resource” and a “competitive asset” could be somewhat difficult to grasp.
Police and military may refer to “assets” in terms of people with guns, but that is distinguished
from commerce as language of the trade. The distinction in principle between resources and
assets in the usual course of business may be a little more technical. Assets are owned by
definition. Resources, as Heidegger happily insists, are not necessarily even owned, and may
only be available as a “standing reserve.”
Whether ownership improves the human condition might also be questioned. Opponents
of slavery do not seem to think so, but perhaps ownership has more benign potential. We’ll hope
so for the sake of Google employees. However, for the sake of argument, we will at least
acknowledge recognition of the issue by the Vice President of People Operations. Google
recognized the need to try and distinguish itself from the Human Resources of Ford, Heidegger,
and Industrial Modernity by acknowledgement of social concerns on the part of the knowledge
work industry, and the determination to avoid evil. The significance of the difference might be a
question for additional research in its own right. Operations have an unmistakable relationship
with the technical functions, people as computer components rather than resources of industrial
production. Suffice it to say for present purposes, that despite the Google effort to suggest a
humanist perspective, the selective rhetoric of People Operations does not significantly
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differentiate Google employment practices from the Human Resources of Industrial Modernity.
Ironically, the only distinguishable difference is rhetorical.
Emphasis on the employment relationship is more directly relevant than mere
terminology, however. Bock goes on to describe an employment environment in which the
distinction between life and work has been deliberately erased. Google provides, not just
compensation for employees, but socialization, recreation, child-care, even laundry service,
confirmation of the corporate culture described in the previous part (“Testimony of Laszlo Bock”
3). Not only does Google emphasize the self-acknowledged determination to employ people
most like themselves, Google strives to encompass the entire life-world of employees, an eerie
reflection of a Fordist industrial mentality. Bock’s comments suggest that even after less than ten
years of corporate existence, Google was losing, if it ever possessed in the first place, the ability
to differentiate a world not defined by Google.
In addition to himself and Sergey Brin, Bock offers other examples of immigrants who
have contributed significantly to Google success, some connected to H-1B and some less an
endorsement of H-1B than immigrant origins in general. Sergey Brin, for example, did not enter
the U.S. for either education or employment. H-1B allows employer-sponsored, three-year
admission with an additional three-year renewal. The transitory nature of admission under H-1B
serves as an introductory opportunity to an extent, perhaps for both employer and employee, but
a convenient effect of the H-1B program for employers is that an employee who does not prove
satisfactory for any reason has, for all practical purposes, no recourse, a condition not lost on
observers. Under H-1B, employers have a lot of “control” (Magnusson 2). The motivational
aspect is inherent. What would be the downside for the employer? That foreign-born employees
show unusual dedication under the H-1B program would hardly be surprising, another reflection
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of conditions from an earlier age, when Americans wondered about the exploitation of labor
from foreign countries under employment sponsorship arrangements.
There has been, therefore, a strange kind of “tension” in the Google relationship with H1B. While Bock advocates diversity, employment, and national supremacy through H-1B hiring,
those arguments were not necessarily consistent with either the effects of the H-1B program
itself, or of the interests that it claimed to represent. The emphasis on the permanent status of
immigration represented by Sergey Brin and Bock himself suggests the potential benefit of H-1B
as a gateway to permanent residence, yet the focus of H-1B is temporary. To the extent of labor
management, the implication is that H-1B has been used as a way around the limits of the
conventional yet labor-intensive and rhetorically misleading immigration process. Potential for
avoiding the process had in fact been one of the major objections to H-1B expressed by
opponents such as Senators Dick Durbin and Charles Grassley, as well as questioning the
morality of using superior economic force to strip capable employees from struggling
communities who are not our enemies, an additional characteristic of an imperial mentality noted
by Edward Said.
Bock outlines the benefit Google has realized from H-1B as a flexible source of labor.
What has not been stated is the heritage of Industrial Modernity at work. In the same way that
immigration served the Union Pacific, Ford, and United States Steel, from an industrial
perspective H-1B provides a way to manage labor. If Google wanted to be less evil in a social
sense, then it needed to get past the heritage of Industrial Modernity, but by 2004, maybe doing
less evil had become more of a rhetorical burden than a practical guide, an “unfortunate”
mission, according to Levy, that was subsequently modified if not abandoned.
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In this chapter I have made two essential points. The first is that immigration regulation
continued to follow the trends established in the original exclusion acts. Discrimination and
prejudice have always figured in Immigration, but immigration has always been a commercial
project. Prior to the 1880s immigration was never restricted in any comprehensive or essentially
discriminatory way. Discrimination became, not the cause of immigration control, but
justification for immigration control. The essential function of immigration has always been
labor management, a commercial practice eventually adopted as an inherent feature of Industrial
Modernity. The class conflicts associated with discrimination and labor management may be
significant, but those conflicts may also distract from the inherently commercial nature of
immigration and from the expectations or characteristic practice of Industrial Modernity.
The second point is that when Google testified through Laszlo Bock on behalf of
increased admissions under exception H-1B for employees from foreign countries, the business
practice invoked by Google was not derived from the global diversity associated with Google’s
rhetorical identity. The business practice Google invoked was derived from the characteristic
labor management practices of Industrial Modernity. The regulation of immigration through
legislation in the period of 1880 through 1925 gave industry continued control of labor resources
that industrial enterprise had learned to expect as a normal condition of business practice, the
habit of control.
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT GOOGLE LOOKS LIKE

Figure 6: Google, the information playground
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.
Introduction: Connecting with Google
Google engaged immigration to manage labor as an operational strategy and applied the
ideology of capitalist industrial production to the argument. That is not the only evidence or even
the most direct evidence of the relationship to Industrial Modernity, however. In the public
sphere immigration has become an argument of spectacle, a visual rhetoric. Through Google,
visual rhetoric points to Industrial Modernity on a trajectory that intersects immigration as a
visual project. The effect of visual rhetoric in Google's relationship with internal and external
communities combines with the rhetoric of immigration to reveal unmistakable connections to
the influences of Industrial Modernity. The visual rhetoric of immigration and Google are both
consistent with how Google managed the immigration argument as a project of Industrial
Modernity. This chapter explains how the rhetoric of information technology connects Google to
immigration and Industrial Modernity.
How does the rhetoric of visual spectacle inform the relationship of Google with
immigration? Examination of this relationship begins with Google’s practical connections to
users for the benefit of the business enterprise. The introduction of visual rhetoric in Chapter One
noted the entertaining quality of the visual in Google’s signature text, as in Figure 6 above. The
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most important connections depend on how the rhetorical effects of visual imagery work with the
context of the argument and with the ambiguity of technology. For Roland Barthes and Ron
Burnett, the context of the visual includes extended meaning of images, including both personal
and social connotations. Ambiguity is the potential for interpretation, not only repurposing in the
sense of Google Earth used for terrorist planning in the Mumbai attacks, but the opportunity to
capitalize on variable meanings such as search terms, as well as larger arguments about the
independence of technology. Ambiguity is an inherent characteristic of technology, making
technology rhetorically subjective and adaptable. As an analyst of rhetorical effects, Jay Bolter
suggests that context and ambiguity support rhetorical adaptation.
Without ambiguity argument might be less complex, but technology requires ambiguity
for both development and application. Jerome McGann considers the ambiguity of information
technology to be the inspiration of possibilities. Unambiguous solutions do not lend themselves
to innovation. With respect to the technology enterprise that is Google, explaining the
relationship of context, ambiguity, and visual effects depends on the combination as a rhetorical
attraction to communities of users as both consumers and to some extent as producers in the
technology enterprise. Communities connect with Google through a variety of modes, including
the search functions of text, maps, images, and so forth, but also as independent web-page
developers, bloggers, and endless combinations of special interests through which users engage
with interactive functions and the rhetoric of visual images. Engagement can be both direct and
indirect as graphic images and symbolic text, especially for the commercial side of advertising
and marketing. To an extent, interactive functions represent the device technology side of
Google, the controls and programs that make operations possible. That part is less directly
relevant. Controls and programs are not free of cultural effects and power relationships, such as
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the origin and application of programming languages, but that is not the focus here as much as
the face of interactivity. Although interactive functions are the most directly technical aspects of
Google, that kind of functional engagement has to be taken for granted as a prerequisite of the
technology. If users cannot connect, then the essential effects of the search engine are eliminated.
Google only exists for the vast majority of users as some degree of functional engagement, if
only the capacity to turn on a computer and open a link, which can be prejudiced actions, but
actions that are at least limited in scope as long as the expected performance ensues. The
underlying choices and prejudices are otherwise disguised by the appearance of consistent and
transparent presentation. The non-prejudicial appearance represents what Alan Liu described as
“turning transparency on its head” by suggesting transparency of operations that appear neutral,
but are inherently complex and opaque (72).
Novelty and variation serve as freedom of choice for an inverted transparency. For Liu,
however, choice is not free if ranking predetermines results targeted to the user. Visual
engagement depends on immediate and direct connections in the sense of what the user
recognizes as meaningful. What Google displays depends on the preferences of users, while
visual engagement includes both images and visual symbolic text with associated rhetorical
effects. We respond to what we look at in ways that allow the producers of the effects to
anticipate and manipulate the meaning of the messages displayed. Our choices set up
recognizable patterns.
Visual imagery in the sense of photographs and icons invokes a more extended and
complete context of meaning than limited symbolic text, however. For Jay Bolter, Ron Burnett,
and Lev Manovich, the privileging of imagery through information technology tends to produce
a wider and even more subjective context, suggesting the extended rhetorical range of visual
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imagery elaborated by technology to which Manovich particulary refers, the merging of image
and information (30).
How Images Think
Repurposing Ron Burnett’s phrase here has an ironic function because I am applying the
basic concept to a different way of explaining the effects. Images think, not only through context,
but through ambiguity. Privileging imagery in technology has a close relationship to relative and
extended meaning, the idea that the meaning associated with both visual imagery and technology
involves possibilities and imprecise interpretation which can be characterized as ambiguity. For
technology, the most apparent ambiguity can be explained with reference to analysis such as Don
Norman’s The Design of Everyday Things, pointing out that technology is ambiguous in the
sense of functions that are not necessarily anticipated by the designers, an ink pen to activate a
recessed switch, a cell phone as the detonator for a bomb. The potential for repurposing can be
considered a kind of functional ambiguity. I suggest functional ambiguity as a generalization of
technology adapted to unanticipated uses as in examples described by Norman, Alan Liu, and
Benjamin Bratton. The street adapts things for other uses (Liu 70).
The inherent ambiguity of technological applications represents only one aspect of
ambiguity, however. The larger argument of instrumental and determinist technology illustrates
an ambiguity of technological sovereignty, a kind of ideological ambiguity. Are we in charge of
technology, or is technology in charge of us? In the extreme case of Heidegger’s dependence, we
can consider ourselves the resource, but even as the masters of technological potential for a
Thomas Friedman, we may still be subject to the ultimate producers of the technology.
Ambiguity exists wherever there is substantial failure to resolve inconsistency, any
inconsistency, and there are other ambiguities to be considered, including cultural, and stylistic.
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The more significant general effect of ambiguity for the purpose of this discussion is that
Google leveraged the ambiguities of technology and visual rhetoric as argument in ways that
reflect rhetorical strategies of Industrial Modernity. Google used ambiguity in the same way to
produce the same visual arguments for the same purposes. Through visual rhetoric, Industrial
Modernity produced arguments aimed at appropriation of communities, most significantly a
community of immigrant labor, as a resource of production if not technology. Roger
Streitmatter’s examination of immigrant demonization in the Nativist press may have more to do
with the interests of industrial corporations than has been apparent in the past. Perhaps Marshall
McLuhan’s concern with the effects of media and Heidegger’s concern with a kind of
technological determinism also represent reaction to the threat of increasing domination by
capitalist aristocracy through extended technology as much as they represent recognition of
technology’s true nature. From the perspective of the street, technology constantly demands
response and threatens domination, no matter what advantages it provides or who it represents.
How much difference is there in perception of technology as a force and technology as an
extension of a user, extension that produced corporate projects like Google?
Rhetorical Artifacts
The rhetorical evidence for extension of Industrial Modernity into the Industry of
Knowledge Work that is Google begins with images connected to the organization in a variety of
ways, including corporate iconography and media representations. The artifacts here consist of
representative examples of imagery from web pages and media reporting. The interplay of visual
ambiguity characterizes visual perceptions associated with Google and with Google's
immigration concerns, such as a photograph of Sanjay Mavinkurve, a Google employee
confronted with immigration issues. Mavinkurve illustrates both the rhetorical effects of visual
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ambiguity and the accompanying inconsistency between the objectives of capitalist industrial
production compared with individual and social actualization or fulfillment. The reach of print
capitalism through connections to print text is another way Modernity finds expression in Google
operations illustrated by Google web pages, thematic symbolism, and even connections to print
capitalism through the historic literature of the name. The Google name and Google culture
reflect a heritage of industrial production. Google used visual ambiguity to establish the same
rhetorical arguments with regard to immigration in the same way that Industrial Modernity
regularly established and applied arguments about immigration according to the requirements of
production.
The rhetoric of visualization and the images that represent Google reflect connections
that characterize Google, not just with respect to immigration, but also as part of the fundamental
relationship with users. Like the Google employee caught up in immigration issues, users are a
resource in the production industry of knowledge work. The pervasive underlying connections to
Industrial Modernity tend to explain why Google adopted conservative arguments for
immigration legislation rather than something more innovative. Other ways of thinking could
have been applied. It was that, despite prominence with information technology innovations (or
because of it), Google is an enterprise of Industrial Modernity, and Google could not think any
other way.
The Culture and Style of Technology
With a number of customers three times the population of the United States by 2005
(Comscore), Google is and has been almost since its origin, a giant community that determines
membership primarily in two ways, interactively in the sense of operating controls, and visually
as the act of sight rather than imagination, although imagination applies to both interactivity and
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sight as extended potential. Interaction and visualization are not mutually exclusive, but the
visual disguises the technology, and the visual is the rhetoric on which Google relies for
credibility and effect. Users are encouraged to think of access to Google as secure, yet
independent, and unrestricted (Google Mission). With wide-ranging services, complex technical
resources, and profound statements of commitment to information access, Google produces a
sense of confidence and community, technical competence combined with shared experience in
navigation along the bewildering flow of traffic on the information superhighways.
In substance, Google remains concealed until conjured, like the genie in the bottle. The
underlying and invisible operation of electronic resources can be conveniently ignored. In that
way, the effects are potentially unlimited, but for the purposes of examining the relationship to
immigration, the most apparent manifestation of Google is symbolic, linguistic, and visual,
especially the images that represent Google operations and identity. Through the visual, Google
manifests the associations that insure credibility, confidence, and interest, and it is significant
that the relationship of Google with immigration has been escalated to the visual spectacle of
media representation, as well as its own corporate context.

Figure 7: Down home Google (Google corporate culture)
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. “About” Google web page. Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
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Following legislative revision of immigration regulations, the Google corporate
information web pages available in 2009 were still consistent with the descriptions of content by
David Vise and Mark Malseed in The Google Story from 2005 and 2008. Corporate information
described the laid-back, diverse, collaborative, and socially conscious community, the
inspiration-in-jeans organization associated with a more casual and populist approach to business
in the new millennium (at least by appearances), and the kind of operation Thomas Friedman
extended to the prospect of an economically flat world with universal, technologically-assured
access to resources and opportunities.
At lunchtime, almost everyone eats in the office café, sitting at whatever table has an
opening and enjoying conversations with Googlers (emphasis mine) from different
teams. Our commitment to innovation depends on everyone being comfortable sharing
ideas and opinions. Every employee is a hands-on contributor, and everyone wears
several hats. Because we believe that each Googler is an equally important part of our
success, no one hesitates to pose questions directly to Larry or Sergey in our weekly allhands (“TGIF”) meetings – or spike a volleyball across the net at a corporate officer.
(Google Corporate Culture)
The informal furniture, casual dress, foosball games, and abstract surfaces visible in Fig 7
suggest the unconventional, humanistic culture that Google describes in the text accompanying
the images, yet there are hints of a less experimental dimension in the rectangular architecture
and regular rows of windows across the background, as if more conventional forces lurk behind a
cheerful surface. Whether that implies additional offices, a cafeteria, computer servers, or a
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Figure 8: Something more conventional in the background?
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
dungeon for unsatisfactory personnel, is not apparent, but the inference is that not all of Google's
resources are totally devoted to the collaborative and unconventional, a reflection of ambiguity
that is unavoidable where technology is concerned, but also subject to interpretation. “Google
offices appeared to be a geek never-never land for unspeakably brainy Lost Boys (and Girls). If
you looked closely though, there were endless bureaucratic structures – data-driven, logically
drawn schemata – that kept a $23 billion business humming” (Levy 123), as Figure 8 points out.
Google leveraged enthusiasm for global consciousness into an expanding network of
information connections, translated into visual representation of spectacle such as Google Earth.
In a sense, at least visually/virtually, as in Figure 9 below, Google has made the earth its
proprietary domain. Yet, as Benjamin Bratton suggests, even the awe-inspiring objectivity of
Google Earth has been applied to conflicting objectives. Ideology determines technology.
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Figure 9: What the eye of Google contemplates.
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. “Google Maps.” (Comprehensive satellite view).
Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
As a business operation, however, Google encountered at least one conservative obstacle to the
giddy possibilities of globalization. In spite of the potential for transnational and international
cooperative enterprise, national boundaries still affected the formal relationship of the
corporation and the personnel the corporation engaged to operate successfully as a profitable
capitalist enterprise. Borders got in the way of Google plans. As business heated up, Google
wanted to bring in additional skilled personnel from other countries to serve the needs of its
technology, but legislative limits on immigration interfered with Google planning for labor
demands, so Google became actively involved in the legislative process to increase the number
of exceptions allowed under immigration regulation section H-1B.
The representation of casual culture and the collision with conventional immigration
regulations are part of a larger operational picture. The functions involved in the operation of
Google extend far beyond the requirements of their search-engine technology. Like the ink sales
that make printers profitable, and the sponsors that traditionally finance periodicals or television
programs, Google does not depend on revenue directly from search engine operations for
income. Although Google is a search-engine in identity and reputation, Google makes money
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from marketing through advertising and linking consumers to producers, in a sense applying the
concept of user/consumer sold as a product in an industrial market.
To make money from marketing requires assurance of numbers, the numbers that
represent circulation for print newspapers and ratings for television and radio programs. Google
produces numbers in various ways, including wide-spread use of the well-known search engine,
but also through a variety of peripheral resources and opportunities for users to participate in
communities of interests, including web pages, file-sharing, blogs, video, electronic publications,
and variations of social networking. All of these things can be verified by observation of Google
web pages (Google.com) where Google invites participation. The search-engine community
alone is not sufficient for Google purposes.
In that sense, immigration served as an intervention to mediate this ambiguous and
somewhat contradictory combination of casual culture and communities generated by only
slightly disguised economic interests. Google wanted to bring in more immigrants to produce
and maintain the system-induced communities that generate revenue, a potentially superficial
representation of global consciousness. As Arjun Appadurai, Manuel Castells, and Aihwa Ong,
have observed in their commentaries about global connections, immigration has an intimate
relationship with global flow, but rhetorical conditions make immigration subject to constant
manipulation (as the history of immigration explains), constant manipulation that demonstrates a
characteristic connection to the logic and ideology of production, the interests of Industrial
Modernity.
No communities better measure and elaborate global effects than the communities of
immigration, but immigration cannot be applied to the measurement or analysis of ideology
without an explanation that depends on visual rhetoric, how the visual functions in the
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construction of communities in general related to Google, and how visualization functions in the
specific community of immigration related to Google, but first, what is the context in which
immigration becomes significant?
Google has to attract and engage the user and respond to the user’s interests to insure
repeated contact (Elstrom), but the visual and functional/interactive connection of users to
Google in an environment of competition for technology and search engine users depends on
more than appropriate interests and needs. The effect for the user also depends on construction of
the appeal or message, and the message depends a lot on communities. This is one key to
community development in Google operations. The effect of the visual is not just a matter of
organization and control (such as identifying links and menus), but a matter of culture and
ideology through images that has more to do with rhetoric than with technology.
Consider what that means in terms of the Google portal page, for example.

Figure 10: The Google Main Page.
Source: Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with
permission. © 2010 Google, Inc. Google.com. Web. 10 Jan. 2010.
What does this version of Google look like in terms of the main "page" as it appears in Figure 10
above? Google looks like the title page of a book. Why does it look like the title page of a book?
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Regardless of what Google was going for, the effect invokes the credibility of print text, a visual
rhetoric. As Walter Ong explains, the association with paper print text represents the perception
of immutable authority preserved for archival eternity, a perception of permanence and authority
that Elsen Aarseth considers to be less definite for electronic communication. The connection to
print provides reassurance for information in a variable medium. Even the name of the Google
enterprise has a paper print text heritage to the predatory dinosaur in the original Google Book,
and the connections to paper print text also reflect rhetorical ambiguity that becomes a
consideration in its own right.

Extending Ambiguity
To appreciate the relationship, consider that technology is a moving target, as numerous
analysts emphasize, including Andrew Feenberg and Bruno Latour, not just as a matter of
development (innovation) but also as a matter of ideology in determinist and instrumental
alternatives according to views of technology as a kind of independent force or technology as an
instrument of human action. This ideological ambiguity adds a dimension to the category of
functional ambiguity or ambiguity of application and use. Functional ambiguity represents the
idea of using a toaster to dry socks, an electronic information system to maintain social
relationships, or a global electronic mapping system to plan terrorist attacks. In addition to
functional ambiguity and consideration of ideology or socio-political issues, I suggest two
additional categories of technological ambiguity derived collectively from the same sources.
These are Cultural and Stylistic ambiguity. Cultural Ambiguity concerns the privileging of
cultural features in the production of technology, such as using western keyboard symbols to
represent operations rather than, say, Chinese characters. Ambiguity of Style suggests a
community of resistance or distinction that does not necessarily explain the community, such as
135

a Facebook user or a hacker. What does it mean to be a Facebook user or a hacker? These
conditions contribute to inevitable difficulty explaining exactly what technology is and what it is
for. Likewise, any concept or analysis that depends on technology and the effects of technology
will be subject to ambiguity.
Ambiguity therefore complicates the identity associated with any information technology
enterprise, such as Google. The benefit is innovative. Ambiguity allows for development,
production, and market adaptation. Ambiguity allows for adjustment to the effects of media
capitalism that control the rhetoric of the relationship between immigration and the corporation,
making arguments through media. Ambiguity plays critical roles in what technology means.
Ambiguity helps Google connect to the authority of print, for instance, yet ambiguity does not
totally account for the rhetorical relationship with media capitalism on which Google relies for
validation (the print heritage) because ambiguity became a tool of the industrial corporation, as
in the representation of immigrants. What were railroads as a technology, a mode of
transportation, or a means to constrict space, or both? It is the connection of immigration to
market conditions of commerce that controls the rhetoric, and this is a condition of Industrial
Modernity, the pragmatic as market response, the technology as commercial enterprise. As the
discussion of immigration history explained, in terms of capitalist industrial concerns, when
business is good, immigration is an asset. When business is bad, immigration is a liability.
Google has aligned itself with that ambiguous mindset as a function of technology inherited from
Industrial Modernity.
Ambiguity can be employed in resistance to conformity, as in the case of repurposing
technology, but ambiguity as a rhetorical argument to maintain or disguise industrial interests is
a feature of Industrial Modernity illustrated in the extreme by such revealing rhetorical allusions
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as "Human Resources" in the case of Frederick Taylor and the Ford Motor Company according
to Alan Liu, where the underlying assumption seems to be that subjugation to technology should
be considered an honor. The statements in principle applied by Google to the Industry of
Knowledge Work are adapted rhetorically regardless of the apparent meaning. Don’t be evil,
assuming that means the determination to do only good, and not encourage subjective
interpretations of what falls outside the realm of evil, whether it is good or not. (Don’t be evil,
but maybe something not entirely good would be okay, an ambiguous response.) Evil was in the
eye of Google, the manager of all information, while one of Alan Liu’s basic concerns reflects
ideological self-justification as a rhetorical strategy of industrial production. The leading
corporations of Industrial Modernity were their own standards of performance. To paraphrase
Faulkner’s fictional character, an industrial corporation answers to itself, or not, depending on
the rhetorical need, a reflection of the ambiguity inherent in the technology.
Even the Google name remains somewhat undetermined, a little awkward and
ambiguous. The Google web page reports that the corporation title is a “play” on the word
“googol” (as opposed to outright misinterpretation?) which was itself a mathematician’s
variation on the name of a fictional creature from a book which the Google founders
acknowledged by making it the first book scanned into what was meant to be the electrification
of all books ever written (Google Archives). In between, the name was adopted by the cartoonist
Billy De Beck for Barney Google, a character representing wide-eyed, cynical skepticism about
industrial culture and society. Barney Google dresses in the jacket, top-hat, tie, gloves and waist
coat of Industrial Modernity represented in Figure 11 below, similar in detail to the
representative financial character in the board game, Monopoly, but with somewhat less civilized
polish. In a typical illustration from the cover of the popular “Barney Google” sheet music from
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that era, Barney heads out on his technology-enhanced racehorse, Spark Plug, to engage in his
own version of free enterprise. Due to copyright concerns, the image has not been included, but
can be located with electronic search for Barney Google music.

Figure 11: Top hat, coat, gloves; captains of industry, Carnegie and Gilman, circa. 1900
Source: Library of Congress
The connections of the Google web page and the Google name to culture and visual
rhetoric are not accidents. They are reactions to the effects of technology. The actual book, The
Google Book, came out in 1913 at a time that both the scientific advance of the second industrial
revolution and demands for immigration control gained momentum. The arrangement of the
book is the form of an ornithological catalogue, of the type that Daniel Headrick described as a
popular collection of information in the schemes of nomenclature that had been organized to
record the results of observation and experiment. The book was, therefore, and oddly enough, a
product of knowledge accumulated through the empirical methodology of the science that
supported device technology. V.C. Vickers produced The Google Book in what was then a
suitably pragmatic and positivist form of literature for children, a catalogue similar to those that
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had been developed for the systematic recording of scientific knowledge according to empirical
observations. The Google Book was not just an imaginative adventure. It was an introduction to
recording information in the scientific process, and includes, for instance, such technically
appropriate (but possibly audience inappropriate) details as a nasty bird that beats mice to death
and eats them.
The Google itself, however, was an even more enigmatic character. Living in a garden
(one of the premier displays of imperial acquisition and exhibition in the way of Timothy
Mitchell’s analysis) it wanders at night in search of plunder, a source of alarm to the various
birds of Google paradise. It is not a bird itself, apparently more of a pudgy lizard-like creature
(or even dinosaur) as it appears in Figure 11 above, that scours the surface of the mysterious and
Orientalized Google land for anything desirable. Equipped with fangs and a protective ridge of
spikes, yet it has fingernails instead of claws and a rather cheerfully goofy facial expression.
From the beginning, therefore, symbolic abstraction of the Google search engine concept has
connections to ambiguous representations of attitude toward Other in terms of Edward Said, and
toward representation of technology. Is systematic empirical knowledge a good thing for The
Google Book in the sense of respect for science as opposed to parody? Like the Dr. Seuss
characters who find an equally mysterious creature “in the park, in the dark” and wonder if their
mother will like him, "We don't know." The Google Book privileges brutality and imperialism at
the same time that it invites imagination and empirical research. If the priority is a more benign
application of resources, then The Google Book at least indicates the possibility of Industrial
Modernity’s less pleasant aspects, a significant metaphor of immigration control.
Engaging “all information” is an inherently ambitious and equally ambiguous project,
perhaps even schizophrenic. In spite of the corporate commitment to avoid evil (and by
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inference, encourage good, as considered previously), the Google Corporation that emerged from
the dot.com frenzy of information technology has been more of a neoliberal project than
humanitarian enterprise. Nor is it an accident that ambiguity characterizes the relationship to
technology and immigration. Ambiguity may not totally reconcile a discussion of immigration
and ideology, yet it is unavoidable, not just because ambiguity characterizes technology, but
because ambiguity elaborates visual effects, a reflection of Burke's tension between the myth and
the idea of the image and the context applied here partly as an analytic scheme, or associations in
the context for Roland Barthes and Ron Burnett. It is the implied messages of the visual, the
associations that make the visual persuasive, the context and the elements of the visual that the
viewer unconsciously incorporates into meaning and agreement. Even the function of Google
involves this rhetorical connection. When Google is acknowledged and approved by clicking the
search function, what is also acknowledged and approved are rhetorical connections to the
culture of Industrial Modernity, such as The Google Book.
The Spectacle of Immigration
To an extent, these connections explain how Google can apply visualization to operate
with a kind of amiable rhetorical informality, a sense of adventure and play, yet with a scientific
foundation. How does that apply to immigration? Anne Demo suggested that the age of global
flows in which immigration has become prominent is an age of "spectacle". When Google
became involved with immigration legislation, there were two issues at stake with respect to
visualization. One was the fundamental perception of how Google functions as a technology.
The other was the perception of Google’s effort to maximize the effect of the technology by
intervention in the immigration process. The efforts of Google to intervene with respect to
control of immigration were not particularly successful, but the success or failure of the effort to
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intervene is less important than the trajectory that historically manipulates, or "enframes" in
terms of Heidegger, perception of the immigrant as a resource of industrial production. How the
immigrant related to agriculture in the 1930s, for instance, or the Ford Motor company in 1913,
explains industrial expectations for human beings as a resource (Flores 369, Liu 21). Combining
the attempt to manage immigration regulation with the rhetorical appeals of Google’s
comprehensive community development and search engine operations illustrates inherent
connections to an operating model of Industrial Modernity.
As an immigrant himself, as well as the child of Russian immigrants, Sergey Brin serves
as an example of immigrant achievement, although his Russian immigrant parents were college
professors with professional connections as well as political refugees, rather than impoverished
laborers, and his attendance at Stanford with its significant core of information technology does
not seem to have impeded his progress. Google rhetoric did not include these resources in
pointing out the contributions of immigrants to Google’s success. The argument was an allusion,
not to the reality of superior education and support, but to the convention of the determined
immigrant overcoming opposition and adversity to make good in the land of opportunity.
To appreciate the rhetorical effect of the argument, consider an endearingly nauseating
scene from the film Slumdog Millionaire portraying the young protagonist imprisoned by his
cheerfully sadistic older brother in a crude, entrepreneurial outdoor toilet on stilts, surrounded by
an equally distasteful lake of sewage, all coincident with arrival by helicopter of his cinematic
super-hero idol for a nearby once-in-a-lifetime photo-signing event in the impossible Mumbai
slum of which they are residents. Faced with a choice between immersing himself in excrement
to escape from imprisonment in the toilet by jumping through the disgusting opening, or
otherwise passing up the opportunity to secure the precious autograph, he chooses adulation over
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dignity, holds his nose, raises the treasured photograph above his head, and drops into the abyss.
Ironically, the consequent coating of crap aids in his access to his objective, parting his
competition like the Red Sea ahead of Moses, and possibly to escape his offensive condition, the
celebrity promptly delivers up the signature.
The movie involved technological globalization in a number of ways that ultimately
privilege an argument or rhetoric of visual images in the elaboration of technology. The ironies
of technology and free enterprise are rampant in this scene with reference to Thomas Friedman’s
commentary on globalization. Friedman described an occasion in the development of
information technology infrastructure in which India took advantage of an opportunity offered by
discarded technology, acquisition by India’s developing information technology businesses of
trans-oceanic fiber-optic cables essentially abandoned by American companies that had installed
them when the communications business for which they were designed failed to develop as
projected.
India represents the globalization of demand. Involvement with this discarded business
“excrement” positioned India to capitalize on the outsourcing of various tasks when transfer of
information over fiber-optic cables later became more productive, and the willingness of India to
take over mundane and less profitable, lower-profile enterprises, such as customer service call
centers, gave India’s competitively skilled and trained technical community the opportunity to
leverage a variety of information technology developments. Much as in the movie scene, the
technological slumdog appropriated industrial refuse to achieve the goal of strategically
positioning itself. India as a community might not be exactly flattered by the metaphorical
connection, but the representations of determination and ingenuity are difficult to dismiss. The
recommendation would be to next time choose your hit movie more carefully or insist on
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editorial approval, but the film ingeniously reflects India’s complicated history with technology
and economic enterprise.
India’s involvement with technological initiative has not been limited to reinventing
opportunities for international outsource-restructuring, however. Capitalizing on low-profile
technology development encouraged training and education and a concurrent increase in the
export of both technical experts and academically promising students. As Friedman, Castells,
Appadurai, and Aiwa Ong also note, the attraction of Information Technology enterprise in the
United States has been a significant factor in relocation from other countries of both the
academically capable and the technically trained, but that is not a simple proposition for a
number of reasons.
The most direct is that the opportunities are limited by immigration regulations. With
respect to Google, consider the example of Sanjay Mavinkurve reported in the New York Times.
Mavinkurve was a software engineer for Google. As an American citizen, Mavinkurve himself
had no issues working in the United States, but his wife, an educated professional from India, did
have issues, so Mavinkurve commuted between California and Canada where his wife could be
employed.
A photograph of Mavinkurve in a New York Times article from 2009 written by Matt
Richtel shows an isolated figure in conference by remote connection. Mavinkurve’s hope for
admission of his wife to the United States with permission to work depended on section H-1B,
illustrating some of the complexities of the argument.
In the realm of spectacle, Sanjay Mavinkurve was not the controversial subject that
inspires Pulitzer prize-winning confrontations between INS agents and five-year-old Cuban
refugees like Elian Gonzales in Miami. In fact the article notes that “it could be said that Mr.
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Mavinkurve’s case is one of a self-entitled immigrant refusing to live in the United States
because his wife would not be able to work” (Richtel), which seems to make a rather strange
case for the increase of H-1B limits. Mavinkurve’s employment is not even an issue. The issue is
the spouse of the employed expert, for which the article argues extending the advantage to
employment of the spouse as an added inducement to the productive expert. The critical factor
with regard to rhetoric may be, however, less a concern of the inducement as to put the issue in
the context of family relationships.
As the history of immigration also explains, the interests of the nuclear family became a
critical factor in the immigration argument, later reflected in the policy priority of uniting family
members. Like Elian Gonzalez, Mavinkurve’s story also appeared on the front page of the New
York Times, but in the accompanying photograph, there are no SWAT uniforms, automatic
weapons, or expressions of terrified confusion on the faces of small children. In the front-page
image, Mavinkurve’s intensity is directed, not at threatening firearms, but to a computer on a
conference table in front of him, surrounded by large-screen images of what seem to be other
similarly focused individuals, apparently a conference regarding Google affairs, in which
Mavinkurve participates remotely.
Even compared to the historic images of Elian Gonzales, however, the image of
Mavinkurve in the photograph is far from rhetorically neutral or even passive. In the RolandBarthes sense of images calculated to produce effects, in its way, the photograph achieves equal
expression and drama, actually connecting to multiple features of what Google is and does. The
monitors and projections flanking Mavinkurve privilege domination by information technology,
filling half the background and raising the projected figures above the image of the seated figure,
effectively subordinating the subject to the technological apparitions of the monitors, despite a
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nominal sense of multicultural globalization. The coloring in the projection on the right seems to
reflect the color of the conventional chalk-board to the left and behind the fore-ground figure of
Mavinkurve, giving the field compositional balance, but suggesting that the technology both
incorporates and reflects the traditional display form (a reflection or restatement of the Google
web page effect; information technology, that looks like a book.).
The dark green rectangle of the conventional chalk board surrounding Mavinbkurve’s
head contrasts and highlights his face, as if he is contained by the conventional, while the more
contemporary representations of information technology hover almost elusively, like spirits,
beyond his reach and his view. This is in fact a direct reflection of his relationship to technology
and policy, not even as much symbolic as it is real. The conventional, formalized rhetoric of
policy and law frame and constrain his social status, while the technologized (through IT
enterprise) rhetoric of the H-1B exception accords his domestic relationship an elusive status of
approval without full connection. Mavinkurve, therefore, hovers on a performatively liminal
threshold at a theoretical gate in a fence that is a national border where technology exploits
media capitalism to perpetuate itself by mediating limits and establishing new borders.
Mavinkurve's status is ambiguous.
In his way, Mavinkurve is also an Elian, but an alien in a different discourse community.
Elian Gonzales was an alien refugee in a discourse of ideological sovereign spectacle (Demo).
Mavinkurve is alienated in a more subtle discourse of competing economic interests, in a sense
an anti-spectacle, yet they share the rhetorical consequences of argument adapted to the nature of
economics, and the consequences are what Julia Kristeva and Timothy Mitchell described as
creating an Other, a foreigner, perhaps even an enemy, to mediate the boundaries of community
as sovereign nation, particularly with regard to Kristeva’s emphasis on the family as the
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foundation of community. How do we know who us is unless we have a them? What that
discourse really represents, however, is a repurposing of culture, of discourse and rhetoric, to
serve the purpose of technological boundary determinations, of extension through media
capitalism in the service of technology, by which community is subordinated to technological
enterprise. Technology has unjustly made Mavinkurve an outcast. How can we return him to his
rightful place? We can reunite his family with an H-1B visa.
Review
With respect to Roland Barthes and symbolic interpretation, the image of Sanjay
Mvainkurve seems to suggest not only a remote, and therefore potentially global reconfiguration
of space, but also intrusion and supremacy of technology in the life-world. For Liu and perhaps
Adorno and Horkheimer, the ultimate intrusion of technology in the life world is the merging of
work and leisure as a permanent condition of industrial knowledge work. Such a merged identity,
Liu argues, is an ideal of the industrial, where extension of collaborative democracy may be
indistinguishable from a combination of work and leisure, incorporation of the life-world, and
commentary on resistance. Where there is no separation between work and leisure, there is no
resistance. There is nothing to resist. In the same way that the specific technology of
conferencing takes control of Mavinkurve’s image, the technology of electronic information
represented by Google takes control of discourse, politics, and ideology. There is no longer any
separation. Technology as a concern displaces, not just identity, but politics, ideology, and
culture in the visually determined space.
The nature of this neoliberal condition provokes the temptation to technological
determinism through the visual effect of technological supremacy. McLuhan and Heidegger
warned against the appropriation of culture by technology, and McLuhan argued the significance
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of the “resonant intervals” that direct flow and control events (of which borders, and presumably
gates, are examples). A corporation such as Google can also function as an interval, but the
calling forth of borders by technology that names and appropriates community, the method by
which technology intervenes, remains vague and unexplained, and that is part of the concern
with the relationship of the visual. It is not necessarily technological determinism, as much as an
illusion of the electronic.
Technology, Andrew Feenberg suggests, is not in and of itself a conscious entity. It is an
extension of human beings. The technology does not control Mavinkurve, capital as the
enterprise that is Google controls Mavinkurve. The domination of the representative figure by
the symbolically technological is actually an anthropomorphization of the technological, for the
domination is in reality only compositional, Lev Manovich’s propaganda strategy of the
industrial. The name of domination is not technology. The name of domination is the capitalist
industrial corporation. Technology is the extended reach by which the capitalist as corporation
expresses power, the application of technology to the problems of power and domination.
It is primarily the effects of the visual and the relationship with Modernity that this part has
attempted to explain. The visual rhetoric that invokes or engages these effects makes industrial
supremacy possible for the industry of knowledge work, and immigration illustrates the
application of industrial supremacy by Google. To operate successfully as a business enterprise,
Google engages users in two ways, functionally and visually. Functional engagement represents
the technology of devices, such as controls and programs. Functional engagement is only
superficially considered here. Visual engagement represents images, language, and associated
rhetorical effects. Images are the critical concern here. The rhetorical effects of the images
connected to Google and immigration are mediated by the inherent ambiguity of technology as
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ideological, functional, cultural, and stylistic. This ambiguity characterizes visual
representations associated with Google and with Google's immigration concerns, representing
connections to paper print text and print capitalism as industrial production through the web page
and the organization name. Ambiguity makes images a rhetorical force. The visual rhetoric of
Google as an enterprise and the visual rhetoric of concern with immigration intersect in the
example of "Googler" Sanjay Mavinkurve.
Considering the vast connections of Google and the corporate inclination to represent
itself/themselves as unconventional, it may be disturbing to speculate that Google as an
organization (somewhat ironically, like Burke's media-conditioned adolescent) cannot think in an
ideological way other than the predetermined expressions provided by Modernity. Yet the
evidence suggests a discouraging dependence on the patterns of industrial predecessors. Visual
rhetoric suggests patterns and connections to Industrial Modernity that play out further in the
history and regulations of immigration that apply to Google concerns.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This analysis has considered Google, an information technology enterprise, in a rhetorical
context or situation of history and imagery connected to Industrial Modernity. Historically,
immigration management has been described in terms of prejudice, principle, competition for
jobs, class conflict, and wage control. The habit of control has been less obvious. Laszlo Bock
testified on behalf of Google in favor of higher legislative limits on the annual number of H-1B
visas for skilled workers. Bock’s argument tapped into what had become the relationship,
employment, and political priorities of American immigration policies. Along with the response
to immigration priorities, concern with diversity expressed by Bock connected to discrimination
issues that have been raised repeatedly in opposition to immigration controls. Racial prejudice
and concerns about national loyalty regularly figured in the history of policy development.
What Bock described, however, invokes more than a rhetorical response to political
concerns. Intervention by Google to determine H-1B limits also reflected a history of labor
management by the corporations of Industrial Modernity. With respect to immigration, Google
operated on a trajectory of labor management by industrial enterprise. Google used technical
innovation, not just for production, but as a way to imply the engineering of a universally
progressive and inclusive social culture. Involvement with H-1B, however, suggests something
less socially responsible, a kind of default expectation represented metaphorically by the nonimage of white space associated with the Google main page, a misrepresentation of transparency.
Whitespace: A Metaphor of Non-transparency
As a technology, Google reflects the somewhat inconsistent and ironic effects of the
relationship between producers and users. Technology likes to imply neutrality, the availability
of tools to suit purposes without prejudice. The iconic web page that represents Google suggests
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that quality. The only advertising on the original portal page has been Google itself, the
resources Google provides for access to imagined cultural communities of information. The
portal is all about the information, with a striking extent of whitespace to emphasize that focus.
The original Google portal page has been particularly remarkable for the feature of
“virtually” priceless space. Google has never conceded the striking whitespace of the original
page to additional development, in spite of the potential value for advertising. We might like to
think that the meticulously protected whitespace of the Google portal page therefore represents
resistance to commercialization, efforts by Google to provide an accessible and unbiased service
for universal application, an impression reinforced by the neutrality and transparency of
whitespace as imagery.
Whitespace, however, is not simply empty. Whitespace suggests neutrality, simplicity,
and transparency, but, like the technology it represents, this whitespace is not strictly neutral and
transparent. Through contrast and form, whitespace determines focus, focus on the concerns of
Google, on information, and on community. Blank space can serve as an invitation to interact.
An empty chair is a chair to sit in. An open gate is a border to cross. An empty page is a page to
fill. The suggestion and motivation to fill and/or move beyond the empty page resolves a
vacuum. Therefore white space serves as a liminal threshold, a gateway to some kind of frontier.
Although whitespace may suggest neutrality and transparency simply because it invokes
associations with neutrality and transparency, it can also disguise the opposite. The appearance
of neutrality and transparency serves as the entry point for what is not only all the information in
the universe, but also the entry point for management of all the information in the universe. If we
are information, then the objective of Google is to manage us, bringing us into a Google
community of production.
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Whitespace suggests transparency, neutrality, focus, availability, and even the reflexivity
of information, but whitespace also serves as the threshold for access to somebody else’s
territory, a disguise for part of Liu’s inverted transparency, using the appeal of transparency to
produce the opposite. But this is not about Big Brother, any more than it is about Marxism. It is
about the prejudice of information. Despite enthusiasm for citizen journalism and global
communication, the extension of deadly conflicts such as Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, and North
Korea have reminded us that even the glaring light of day represented by the proliferation of
information through technology does not guarantee instantaneous solutions for problems. A
recent UN report notes that in Kuwait, one of the richest oil nations in the world by size, half the
population has no reliable supply of water. Technology may have enriched and empowered a
traditional elite, but it has not resolved even the basic needs of others. In a sense, this is a
reminder that technology is never neutral. The unseen hands on the other side of the threshold
that we cross when we pick up tools, from knitting needles to smartphone applications, represent
people with ideologies and agendas. The “we” engaged in technology production and use does
not thoroughly homogenize itself. We almost never have identical interests. In spite of what
technology may look like to us as tools to suit our purposes, it is not handed to us by indifferent
powers.
Critical Thinking
The myths of democratic technology and the Immigrant Nation represent alternate
perspectives. Technology comes to us through the reflexive processes of development,
production, and consumption. Determining those processes involves other people with their own
agendas and interests. The functions of technology privilege knowledge in a variety of ways.
Don Norman’s The Design of Everyday Things reminds us that the interests of technology

151

producers are inevitably reflected in the application of technology. Operating a computer
requires knowledge. The designer of the computer determines some of the required knowledge.
Operating the computer therefore depends on how the designer thinks it should operate. As
Bruno Latour suggested, this does not mean the makers of technology can avoid the effect of
social issues in the process of technology production, but users cannot avoid the concerns of
designers either. Despite the innovative nature of information technology, if we cannot get
beyond the old imperial ways of thinking about responsibility and people as resources of a closed
system that were established in the era of Industrial Modernity, then the problems of exclusion
for Industrial Modernity will only continue to be, as for Alan Liu, the problems that characterize
the Industry of Knowledge Work.
So to an extent this study is also a cautionary tale about critical thinking, a way of
examining the ideology of a web page. With respect to science, as an historian of science,
Thomas Kuhn argued that the modification of prevailing views depends on a point at which they
are no longer sustainable, but prevailing views resist modification by a kind of self-sustaining
validation. The prevailing view is right because it is the prevailing view. Technology also
represents power relationships with capabilities that can do good, or do evil, or do both
depending on the motivation of the people in control, as in the example of Benjamin Bratton and
Jihadists in the Google Caliphate, where the convenient and entertaining capabilities of Google
Earth serve the purposes of violence and destruction. Yet control can be a complicated question.
Managing control depends on understanding who is in control. The story told by the continuing
effects of Industrial Modernity, such as Andrew Feenberg’s argument for technological social
responsibility, Thomas Headrick’s skepticism about “ethical progress,” and Alan Liu’s critical
questioning of industrial motivation, is a reminder and an admonition that even the common and
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accepted search engine technology used every day for innocuous information access represents
such prevailing views and power relationships as surely as the matrix controls individual
existence in popular fiction.
But this is not about popular fiction either. This is about modern information technology
represented by a search engine named Google, and this is about connections to a heritage of
Industrial Modernity. This is about the reality and virtual reality of how we perceive electronic
representations that we use in the technology process of search. Google is not just a tool, it is an
agent of ideology, an expression of ways of thinking that are based on a history of attitudes and
ideology. That does not mean, with reference to what was once Google's famous motto, that
Google either does evil or does not do evil, but, like the Vandals on the borders and more
contemporary threats to security, it bears watching.
One way to measure the effects of technology is by social outcomes in which social
responsibility or “social justice” becomes a kind of standard (Liu 78). Critical thinking as an
intellectual project requires at least a point of view from which to assess relative conditions. To
have some idea of where we are now and where we are going, we need an idea of where we
started. For ideology, this becomes questions of history and rhetoric. If you asked me personally,
I would say that social responsibility is an issue, the application of standards grounded in values
and beliefs that accept the importance of inquiry and understanding as a philosophical premise,
but advocacy is not the point here as much as a way of asking questions. Whether the questions
are based on standards of social responsibility or economic imperialism, capitalism, free
enterprise, or something else, is less important than the process and the context that the questions
establish. Social responsibility in Alan Liu’s sense of progress and equity becomes a standard
against which the practices and rhetoric of information technology enterprise are measured. Is it
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socially responsible, or is it something else? I have chosen social responsibility as the most
broadly relevant to critical thinking based on the commentary of the analysts I have also chosen
for guidance, Liu, Feenberg, and Stuart Selber.
The discussion of technological effects has included three concepts of technology that
encompass the range from determinist technophobia to a kind of instrumental techno-delirium.
The first is Heidegger's famous invocation of technology as an independent social force. The
second is Andrew Feenberg's middle ground of neutrality, technology as extensions of human
aspiration, meaning the instruments, tools, and processes in the busy hands of makers. The third
is Thomas Friedman's technology as an optimistic panacea for the challenges of humanity,
perhaps also a variation on the old positivist idea of solving any problem with the right
information which I introduced at the beginning of the discussion. If there is advocacy here, it is,
for the second view in moderation of the first and third, the hope for a degree of neutrality
regardless of technological prejudice. Technology is neutral in the sense that people make
technology and control it, although qualified by the reservation that technology cannot be strictly
neutral in all ways.
In fact, technology can only be thought of as strictly neutral with difficulty. In a
fundamentally neutral condition, technology is a lump of elemental materials or relative states
without human intervention, but technology is made and used by people who invest it with
inevitable prejudice and privilege, perhaps as the surrealists recognized the paradox of the artist
who portrays the image of the exploited victim. The artist is not the slaver or the slave-maker.
The designers and users of technology do not put their hands on the exploited. The artist portrays
what the artist encounters. Technologists design what serves a purpose and users apply it. Art
and Technology serve those who make use of it, yet in doing so the artists and the technologists
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participate in the prejudice and affect it for better or worse. The mistake is in thinking that
technology made useful escapes the prejudice of the makers and users; that because technology
emerges and functions in a widely participatory process that it is somehow equally democratic,
when in fact it may be no more democratic than the economic aristocracy that determines it. The
production and use of technology invoke prejudice in the same way that prior knowledge and
paradigms invoke prejudice in the advancement of science for Kuhn. The prevailing technology
depends as much on popularity and political approval as on scholarship and performance in the
same way that systems of nomenclature prevailed for Daniel Headrick in the history of
information, or that VHS video prevailed over Beta, or that credit for the discovery of the
double-helix went to the most politically enterprising researchers. People make the choices.
The qualification, that people initiate prejudice, however, also serves to emphasize the
simple reality that technology without a producer and a user, technology without the involvement
of people, means little or nothing. We only imagine technologies that operate for their own
purposes independent of their makers. We still rely, if not on deliberation, at least on accidents of
human behavior to make choices. When the day comes that the machines achieve their complete
independence, then perhaps they can define their own purposes. Maybe they will make better
choices than we do, but until then, we are left to manage the effects ourselves. Managing the
effects requires informed concentration, critical thinking.
The dependence of technology on people being noted, treating technology as an
independent entity can still be useful as a shorthand discussion. Despite the lack of complete
practical relevance in Heidegger's idea of independent technology and Friedman's more benign
but similarly extremist enthusiasm for the social possibilities of technology, ideas of selfdetermined technology are also useful as a way of referring to the totality of technological
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effects. By this I mean that for the convenience of discussion, I continue to refer to technology as
an entity with some kind of independent identity, rather than trying to substitute a social
construct for the existence of devices. I can refer to the future of technology and the effects of
technology, even though one of my basic arguments is that the future and effects of technology
are the future and effects of the people involved with technology. Without human intervention, a
toaster has no past or future independent of a few fundamental materials, yet all the suspicion
and opportunity applied by language to technology as an independent force (what amounts to the
personification of technology), make the idea of technology and its capabilities easily
misleading. Heidegger's windmill does not demand performance from the miller. The mill
simply sprang immaculately from the mind of Heidegger in the sense that the windmill of the
mind is an imagined windmill. In spite of Heidegger's ingenious insistence on a kind of
personification for the mill, the mill will cheerfully cease operation with the first decline in wind
speed. The absent owner controls the mill and the miller, but a convenient means of expression
still resides in the behavior and intentions of the mill. The mill wants attention, a distinction that
Heidegger does not entirely resolve.
Like the conversion of wind to rotation by the mill, technology is the solution of
problems, but strictly speaking, technology does not solve problems. People solve problems, and
make problems, both in the sense of being the problem and in the sense of identifying or defining
the problem. A toaster can be described as friendly, indifferent, or unfriendly to the human hand
that operates it, but if the hand that operates it is an impoverished hand making toast on behalf of
the privileged, or the hand that makes the toaster is the hand of the impoverished, then the toaster
has a part in poverty and privilege. It is the mechanism of control that makes that determination.
It is the mechanism of control that consigns manufacture of the toaster to a sweat-shop in
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Pakistan. In the right ideology, the toaster can be part of a process of economic empowerment as
well as poverty. That is the potential, and that is a simplistic but fundamentally representative
view of the prejudice associated with technology. Technology is the solution to problems, but
technology cannot escape the effects of human intervention in some form.
Even that premise is less important, however, than understanding the ideology that
controls the technology. As well as being logically misleading, the problems of both technology
as an independent force in the sense of Heidegger and the problems of Friedman's instrumentalist
enthusiasm are both to some extent distractions. Not only do they dispute the relationship of
people to the processes and production of technology, those views also take the focus away from
the relationship. Likewise, Latour's insistence that politics and social concerns have always
affected technological development does not eliminate the political and social structures of
control. In fact it tends to confirm their existence and intervention.
Every analytical path therefore leads to the potential for exploitation, but the complexity
of information technology makes it difficult to use, let alone understand and appreciate. Like an
iceberg of electronic information with its tip visible on a computer screen, using a Google web
page represents a vast, shifting bulk of electronic information. The only manageable critical
option available to some of us is what appears in front of us. Using technology responsibly, or at
least cogently, therefore requires some kind of ability to get at the organizations controlling
technology through their products. One of those organizations is Google.
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Review
Even the ideals of freedom represented by the Immigrant Nation have fundamental
connections to commerce, but as Jean Baudrillard contends, commerce is about more than
profitability. It is about who calls the shots. This is not and is not meant to be a Marxist critique.
Marx inspires too much controversy in an already complicated argument, although avoiding
class conflict where questions of labor are concerned becomes futile to an extent, and Marx is the
equally unavoidable go-to guy for class conflict. The question is not exactly, as in labor activist
Otto Bauer’s objections to immigration restrictions, whether industry used immigration to
control wages. The question was whether labor would have any part in production management.
Who was in control? As Ford demonstrated, higher wages do not necessarily reduce profit, but
industrial management was an authoritative project, and as Ford also made perfectly clear, labor
was a resource, not a partner. Industrial production as corporate enterprise used immigration not
just as a way of controlling wages for maximum profit. It was a way of excluding labor from
participation in management, a way of maintaining control of the commercial enterprise. By the
late 1800s, management control had become a way of thinking, not just about class distinctions,
but about the practice of Industrial Modernity. Early colonial enterprise did not prevent
individuals from striking out on their own, but experience in colonies such as Massachusetts and
Virginia suggested that if they remained within the enterprise, success, and even survival,
required them to toe the line. In reality, that experience determined the Immigrant Nation more
forcefully, although less famously, than the cherished ideals of freedom and opportunity.
That immigration affected wages, that wages were a labor issue, and that labor issues
represented class conflicts, are not new ideas, but this is about more than wages, labor, classes,
and even profitability. As consumers, we might like to think that we are equal partners in the
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enterprise, but as human resources or even “assets” in the processes of technology production
and consumption, we are subject to management and control. To get beyond that industrial
relationship, we have to recognize where we stand and where we are going.
Immigration regulations distribute immigration quotas among specific countries and
groups of countries, such as for those of Chinese or Eastern European origin. Immigration
through the conventional process of application and approval typically requires several years of
effort, but there are some exceptions based on relationships and particularly on special expertise
in competitive fields, the H-1B, or “highly skilled worker” exception. This has been the
“interval” in McLuhan’s terms, or point of contact for Google. Congress adjusts the number of
immigration exceptions allowed under H-1B, controlling availability or access to potentially
useful technology personnel from other countries for importation to the United States. Google
argued for increasing the limit. Advocates for U.S. labor protection argue that the U.S. has
adequately trained and capable personnel, especially if Google provides opportunities for
domestic employees to become familiar with Google operations, controversies that continue to
inspire opposition (Harkinson). The Google response has been indirect, at least vague in that
respect, and in a sense perhaps evasive, concentrating on the contributions of immigration to the
country in general and to Google in particular with convincing examples such as Sergey Brin.
The technical qualifications of personnel have not necessarily been the issue as much as
conveniently securing a committed community of competent workers with connections to
foreign markets.
The global reach of information technology and philanthropic efforts such as the Gates
Foundation, as well as organized and innovative emphasis on social concerns by corporations
including Google itself, seem to suggest the extension of efforts to reach excluded and
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marginalized communities, but does that reach the fundamental context of problems in ways
other than a neoliberal determination to recreate community in its own image? Andrew Carnegie
invested in public libraries to an extent that made his involvement almost synonymous with the
institution, a Carnegie Library. In the process, his own expectations became part of what the
imagined institution stands for. Carnegie created the library in his own image, and thereby
insured extension of Industrial Modernity in the community that it served. Henry Ford’s pacifism
may have been as much an expression of ethnic discrimination as humanitarian concern. In their
consideration of information technology as another kind of empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri suggest that real solutions to problems have to “get beyond” the imperialist impulse to
consider the world as an exclusive resource of the enterprise. A transparent process is the
ultimate objective of access to information, especially where social responsibility and social
progress are concerns, a logical outcome for Google efforts to make information accessible, but
where has a transparent outcome ever been the real priority for an elitist organization? Not in the
practice of Industrial Modernity. Based on the treatment of immigration as a resource, that would
not have been Google either, even though Google might have preferred to think of it that way.
Further Research
The most critical concern for additional research is the connection of industrial
corporations to the original changes in characterization of immigrants. Is there conclusive
evidence that industrial corporations deliberately promoted negative perceptions of immigrants
to control labor organizations? What would a detailed comparison with a corporation such as
General Motors reveal? How does the legislative history of H-1B compare to the motivation?
My analysis also suggests a variety of possibilities for further research investigation. The
prejudice of search results, such as gender neutrality. A search for images of “attractive people”
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with Google, for instance, returns results conventionally identifiable as female at a ratio of about
two to one compared to males, with only a small fraction of children. What does that say about
what we value, and are our preferences being tracked depending on how we respond to the
results?
The Google Book itself has connections to a children's literature of Modernity that
attempted to adapt scientific information for popular distribution in ways that were virtually lost
until interest revived in science and inspired more factual and philosophical treatment, such as
Star Trek and Isaac Asimov many decades later.
As another example, the popular children's science writer, George MalcolmSmith, is totally out of print and virtually unavailable. Smith wrote science-based fantasy
adventures in simple language for young readers, such as Professor Peckham's Adventures in a
Drop of Water. In the general form of scientific expeditions patterned after Darwin and Perry,
the book follows the quixotic Professor and his young companions as they are shrunk to
microscopic size by the logical means of concentrated vinegar pills. If it works for pickles, why
not for people? By this premise the characters travel through an imaginary kingdom contained
within the drop of water and encounter the variety of organisms living there, many of them real,
some of them completely fictional. The influence of these writers and how they faded into
obscurity could be a complete subject of its own, while extending the rhetorical, contextual, and
cultural impacts revealed by my research.
The immigrant out of context is a condition explored by Aiwa Ong and other social
analysts as a logical effect of displacement, but contextual effects are also a dimension of
immigration worth developing as focused research. Metaphorically analogous to the importation
of the exotic weed kudzu, the immigrant encounters conditions that seem to have the potential
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for either notable success or equally extreme and challenging difficulty. Is this supposed
condition of alternate states of being a realistic assessment, or only an impression based on the
nature of media representation? As kudzu illustrates, when an imported organism encounters a
fertile environment, the result is not necessarily a symbiotic relationship.
Ekphrasis, a kind of rhetorical dependence on visual imagery, is a classical concept of
rhetoric which has also been considered indirectly in connection with other subjects, such as by
Bolter for the nature of writing in the digital electronic age. Ekphrasis is also a concept that has
special relevance to the internet and electronic communication as data transfer becomes more
reliable and prodigious, but ekphrasis has never been thoroughly examined in that context.
The history of the future, how the future has been envisioned from the perspective of the
past depends on the vision of what has been most effective and promising in whatever
technology has been current, so that the vision of the future really reflects the vision of what has
produced the present. The controlling influence of Modernity continued at least into Disney and
Tomorrowland. Did Star Wars, Brazil, Blade Runner, and District 9 put Modernity to rest as a
future view, or do Jules Verne and Flash Gordon still set the standard for the popular culture
definition of the future? Is the contemporary view of the future changing, and what, if anything,
is replacing it? Modernity's view of the future transferred industrial ideology, the adventure of
empire, to the new frontier of space. Has that transference been modified or superseded? Were
Star Trek and Avatar new ways of looking at the space frontier, or only a disguised search for
new routes to the Orient?
Arjun Appadurai's imagined nostalgia seems to be a rather under-rated or underestimated
concept in connection with immigration. Immigrant cultures become a celebration of cultural
fragments, some of which may never have actually been, creating unique communities of
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imagination for the immigrant, both as a connection to a previous community and as a shared
experience in an adopted community. Such an imagined community involves added levels of
complexity in the construction of shared experience. How does the immigrant adapt to that added
complexity? Does technology affect the outcome?
The persistence of Industrial Modernity in the rhetoric of knowledge work and neoliberal ideology suggests the consideration of Postmodernity as a distinct reaction to both the
rhetoric and the politics. Do collaboration and participation, networking and self-service, and the
condition of information distinguish a recognizable Postmodern condition that has enabled new
approaches to business, art, and communication, or is that only an electronic illusion, like many
electronic illusions, in which socio-economic classes of technology merely transfer traditional
classes to an electronic environment? Do page rank and other mechanisms of search actually
transmit the values that Google has adopted, and/or do the mechanisms of Google search
transmit values of users?
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